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ABSTRACT 
Risk management is a recognised business discipline with a broad supporting 
infrastructure in academe and professional practice. Development of a sound framework 
of risk oversight, risk management and internal control is fundamental to good 
corporate governance (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2008; ASX Markets 
Supervision, 2009). The board and the senior management of Australian listed 
companies have a statutory duty to develop, implement, oversee and report on an 
effective system of risk management (structures, policies, and procedures and culture) 
to identify, assess, treat and monitor risk to support achievement of the organisation‟s 
objectives. This is articulated in the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
extended under the ASX listing rules which are given legal authority by the 
Corporations Act 2001. The services required to support a company‟s risk management 
activities can be conducted in house by employees of the company, outsourced to 
professionals such as accounting practices or other professional consultants or by a 
combination of internal and external sources.  
This study examines internal and external factors that influence the decision to 
internalise or outsource risk management activities using the theoretical framework of 
TCE (transaction cost economics). A transaction‟s attributes can be characterised by the 
three broad principal dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
according to TCE. It is these dimensions which determine why some transactions are 
internalised and directed by managers in a hierarchy and others are outsourced in the 
market to external suppliers. Four hypotheses are developed and operationalised using a 
unique data set combined with archival data from company annual reports. A survey 
questionnaire sent to ASX listed companies requesting information about their risk 
management function for the financial year ending 2009 achieved a sample of 271 
companies. Linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis is used to test the 
hypotheses and explain the governance choice for risk management activities for ASX 
listed companies.  
Results suggest 46 per cent of Australian listed companies outsource risk 
management activities. Financial reporting, compliance and operational risks are 
identified as the top three categories of risk management and are the top three risk 
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priorities. Environmental, sustainability and climate change are the least identified 
categories of risk management with lowest priorities given by respondents. Risk 
associated with human capital and the environment are the most frequently outsourced 
categories. 
Broadly in line with the TCE propositions expenditure on research and 
development, staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions and 
environmental uncertainty measured in terms of technological change and transaction 
frequency is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. Uncertainty 
due to environmental diversity measured by the number of subsidiaries and recent 
restructures, acquisitions or mergers is associated with more outsourcing of risk 
management activities. Behavioural uncertainty related to new staff is also associated 
with more outsourcing. Contrary to the theoretical predictions of TCE, volatile sales are 
associated with more outsourcing and competition and overseas sales are associated 
with less outsourcing of risk management activities. Training and contract duration, 
hypothesised as indicators of asset specificity, are associated with more outsourcing. 
Big4 supplier is associated with more outsourcing of risk management activities and 
leverage is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. Financial 
distress is associated with the decision not to outsource in the whole sample of 
companies and associated with more outsourcing for the subsample of companies that 
do outsource risk management activities. Capital intensity is associated with more 
outsourcing in the whole sample of companies and there is a marginal association with 
less outsourcing for the subsample of companies that do outsource risk management 
activities. 
This study is motivated to extend the boundaries of research into companies‟ 
risk management practices. Limited comparable studies of risk 
management activities have been found to have been conducted in Australia or 
internationally and the accounting discipline has concentrated on internal audit. The 
research period of 2009 is important because it is the first full reporting year following 
the implementation of the revised ASX Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk which 
extended the scope of management‟s responsibilities. Application of TCE to the risk 
management function contributes to the body of knowledge by expanding the scope of 
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the theory‟s application to an area of corporate governance which incorporates 
operations, compliance, financial reporting and strategic imperatives. Increasing our 
understanding of risk management practices benefits organisations, accounting 
professionals and regulators concerned with governance practice and enables policy 
development to be based on informed research. This study undertakes to investigate 
directly the factors influencing the risk management sourcing decision. This knowledge, 
by increasing and promoting understanding of the issues, can be used by managers and 
professional bodies to enhance their decision making on the choice of governance for 
risk management. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
The activities facilitating risk management can be generated internally, 
outsourced to external consultants such as accounting professionals or by a combination 
of both. This research seeks to determine factors influencing this source of supply using 
transaction cost economics (TCE) as a theoretical framework. Risk management is a 
recognised discipline in business with a broad supporting infrastructure in academe and 
professional practice. There are many categories of business risk, including numerous 
internal and external sources (Hillson, 2007)
1
. Hillson (2007) outlines three 
predominant factors that have focused recent international attention on risk management 
and these are corporate governance, corporate failures and regulation. 
International governance regulations reflect that the concepts of corporate 
governance, internal control and risk management are inter-dependent (Spira and Page, 
2003; Woods, 2009). The 1992 Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom (U.K.) was one 
of the first policy initiatives legitimatising the widening of organisational control 
practices to encompass risk management and corporate governance issues (Bhimani, 
2009; Maclean, 1999). Cadbury (1992) resulted in the first release of the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance in the U.K in 1998. Previously, the primary focus of 
risk management guidelines had been internal controls over financial reporting. The 
inclusion of enterprise wide risk management into the governance spectrum was 
endorsed further following the Turnbull Report
2
 in 1999. This report resulted in the 
publication of a guidance for directors on the Combined Code extending requirements 
beyond the financial sphere to include broader business risks, explicitly linking internal 
                                                          
1
 Types of risk management cited by Hillson (2007) include strategic, corporate governance, financial 
business continuity and disaster recovery, reputational, marketing, operational, project, environmental, 
legal, contract, technical, fraud and counter terrorism. 
2 A report prepared by an Internal Control working party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales and endorsed by the London Stock Exchange under the chairmanship of Nigel 
Turnbull. The objective of the Turnbull Report was to provide a framework of risk management for U.K 
listed companies to implement the requirements relating to internal controls in the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (1998). 
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control over financial reporting to risk management (Arena, Arnaboldi, and  Azzone, 
2010; Spira and Page, 2003). 
Formal recognition of risk management can be attributed to a number of factors 
including major financial and business scandals in the 1980‟s and 1990‟s in the U.K, for 
example Mirror Group, Barings Bank, Polly Peck, Maxwell Corporation (Arena et al., 
2010). The first few years of this century provided a further series of high profile 
corporate collapses internationally (for example Enron, WorldCom, HIH and OneTel), 
events which could be partly linked to a failure to effectively manage risk (Francis and 
Armstrong, 2003). More recently we have seen heightened concern and focus on risk 
management with the advent of the current global financial crisis in 2007 (KPMG, 
2010). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development concluded the 
global financial crisis could be partly attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate 
governance arrangements including lack of risk management (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Mikes 
(2009) observes Chief Executive Officers (CEO) are indicating one of the most 
importance lessons flowing from the global financial crisis is to make risk management 
a strategic imperative. 
Internationally, regulators have made timely responses to the aforementioned 
events and enacted legislation and guidelines which have significantly expanded public 
policy in the corporate governance and risk management arena (Beasley, Clune, and  
Hermanson, 2005). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) in the United States (U.S.) 
and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2003, 
2008) in the U.K. contain key elements requiring public companies to incorporate 
effective systems of risk oversight. The authorities governing Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) listed companies have sought to minimise the risk of further major 
failures by tighter regulation of risk management systems (Woods, 2009). The ASX 
listing rules are given legal authority by the Corporations Act (2002) and impose 
disclosure and certification requirements on risk management through the Corporate 
Governance Principles (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, 2007a) - hereafter 
referred to as the „Principles‟.  
The aim of this study is to identify factors influencing a company‟s decision to 
internally generate or outsource the activities required to effectively manage risk and 
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thus comply with their statutory obligations. Given the regulatory and legislative burden 
imposed on companies, the overarching objective is to increase our understanding of the 
issues in order that organisations, accounting professionals and regulators concerned 
with governance practice and policy development can base decisions on informed 
research. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the 
regulatory context governing company‟s risk management activities and section 1.3 
summarises the research question.  Section 1.4 provides the motivation for the study and 
section 1.5 outlines the contribution made to current research. Section 1.6 describes the 
conceptual framework of transaction cost economics and section 1.7 provides an 
overview of the research methodology. Section 1.8 summarises the results and section 
1.9 provides definitions for the key elements of the research. Section 1.10 provides a 
structure for this thesis. 
1.2 REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council released the first edition, Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, in March 2003. This 
was after a request by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and 
government to take a leadership role in formulating a non-legislative response to the 
corporate governance issues arising after the aforementioned series of high profile 
corporate collapses in Australia and overseas (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2008). The aim of the Principles is to provide a flexible non prescriptive approach to 
corporate governance, focusing on disclosure of actual practice, rather than mandating a 
particular practice. However, this is tempered by the requirement to provide an 
explanation to report justifications of deviations from the Principles. This has put 
considerable pressure on listed companies to adopt the recommendations contained 
within them or the stakeholders of a company could perceive noncompliance with the 
principles as an adverse signal (Kohler, 2005). 
The 2003 version of the Principles was updated in 2007 reducing the number of 
principles from ten to eight and the number of recommendations from twenty-eight to 
twenty-six to remove regulatory overlap with the Corporations Act (2002) and the 
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accounting standards. The board and management‟s responsibilities for risk oversight, 
management and disclosure are more clearly defined in the second edition, Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (2007). A key change is the expansion of 
the scope of Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk to reflect the heightened concern 
and increasing expectations of stakeholders with regard to risk management (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2008). 
The changes made to Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk place a greater 
emphasis on reporting and disclosing the effectiveness of risk management across a 
broader range of risks (KPMG, 2007). Previously, the focus was on the risks 
surrounding financial reporting. The scope of risks has been broadened by adopting the 
concept of material business risks. The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2008) 
defines these as “the most significant areas of uncertainty or exposure, at a whole-of-
company level, that could have an adverse impact on the achievement of company 
objectives”. Examples of external environmental factors impacting a company‟s risk 
profile include industrial sector outlook, market competition, industrial relations, 
foreign exchange, interest rates and commodity prices and changes in government 
policy and regulation. Internal environmental factors include occupational health and 
safety, environmental impact, consumer protection/trade practices, financial controls 
and reporting, technology reliability, production capacity and people and skills (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2008). Hence, there is clarification that material 
business risks involve financial and non-financial risks.  
The scope of the obligations contained in the Principles (2007) is extended 
considerably under the ASX Listing Rules. The ASX listing rules are contractually 
binding between the ASX and listed entities and are enforceable under sections 793C 
and 1101BN of the Corporations Act (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002).  The 
Corporations Act also imposes a number of further requirements on a company‟s 
management with respect to the risk management of financial reporting. Under section 
295A of the Act, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 
or person‟s acting in these roles, must provide the directors of the company a written 
declaration attesting to the integrity of the financial reporting process.  Companies must 
also be aware of their obligations under section 299A to include in the directors‟ report 
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information required to make an informed assessment of companies‟ operations, 
financial position, business strategies and prospects for future financial years.  
Three ASX listing rules covering mandatory requirements are applicable to an 
entity‟s risk management practices. The prevailing rule is ASX listing rule 4.10.3 which 
requires companies to disclose in a Corporate Governance Statement in the annual 
report the extent to which the company has followed the Principles. Companies are 
required to explain their different governance practices with respect to the Council‟s 
recommendations. ASX listing rule 12.7 directs the top 500 listed companies in the 
Standard and Poor‟s Top 500 to have an audit committee and those in the Top 300 to 
have an audit committee in accordance with Principle 4
3
. Guidelines for Principle 4 
include the audit committee‟s responsibility to review the risk management and internal 
control systems. 
ASX listing rule 3.1 is a continuous disclosure provision requiring timely 
disclosure of any information that could have a material impact on the valuation of the 
company‟s securities. Therefore, ASX listed companies have an obligation to make an 
announcement to the securities market in relation to some or all their material business 
risks and/or changes to those risks, where the risk or change is likely to have a material 
impact on the price or value of a company‟s securities. In addition, further support for 
this rule is provided in section 674 of the Corporations Act which imposes statutory 
liability for its breach in certain circumstances under civil (s. 1317) and criminal (s. 
1311) provisions. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In summary, the board and the senior management of Australian listed 
companies have a statutory duty to develop, implement, oversee and report on an 
effective system of risk management. This requirement is articulated by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council in the Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2007a) and given authority by the ASX Listing Rules with 
legislative backing from the Corporations Act (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). The 
                                                          
3
 Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting makes recommendations with regard to the 
composition, operation and responsibilities of the audit committee. 
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issue of risk is addressed in a number of the Principles but predominantly in Principle 7: 
Recognise and Manage Risk.  
The activities required to achieve this objective can be conducted in house by 
employees of the company, outsourced to professionals such as accounting practices or 
other professional consultants, or by a combination of internal and external sources. 
TCE predicts the costs of these alternative governance structures vary depending on the 
characteristics of the transaction within each individual company and the company 
selects the governance structure with the lowest costs for them. An answer to the 
research problem is provided using the theoretical framework of TCE. The research 
question is „what are the internal and external factors influencing the decision to 
internalise or outsource risk management activities?‟ 
1.4 MOTIVATION 
Limited research exists on the characteristics of companies‟ risk management 
systems in individual organisational settings (Bhimani, 2009). Prior research, overseas 
and in Australia, has tended to focus on specific functional areas of risk management 
such as internal audit, financial risk and operational risk. In a U.S. study, Widener and 
Selto (1999) surveyed 600 randomly selected large companies (with greater than 500 
employees) in 1996 and 71 percent of the respondents reported they use internal audit. 
In a replication of the Widener and Selto (1999) study conducted in the Netherlands in 
2003, Speklé et al., (2007) reported that 57 per cent of companies surveyed use internal 
audit. Two notable studies of Australian listed companies have examined the 
determinants of outsourcing the internal audit function (Carey et al., 2006) and use of 
internal audit (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006) using data from 2000 and earlier. 
Carey et al., (2006) reported that only 31 per cent of 304 companies surveyed in 1998 
engaged internal audit services and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) reported that 
only 34 per cent of 450 companies surveyed in 2000 used internal audit. 
Internal audit is intrinsically tied to the risk management mechanism of a system 
of internal controls and all organisations have some form of risk management either 
consciously or sometimes without realising it (Standards Australia/Standards New 
Zealand, 2004). Organisations reporting they have no internal audit function could have 
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a different perception of internal audit to those in professional practice and academe. 
Given the blurred boundaries between defining internal audit and many of the risk 
management activities, a more meaningful approach is to examine the issue holistically 
by providing a wider context in which companies can inform researchers of the range 
and nature of their activities. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is an extensive growing body of empirical 
TCE research across business disciplines, for example, economics, organisation, law, 
sociology, marketing, finance, accounting and operations management (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, and  Kumar, 2006). However, its application in accounting is relatively 
scarce (Macher and Richman, 2008) and mainly confined to management accounting, 
for example, Carey et al., (2006), Speklé et al., (2007) and Widener and Selto (1999). In 
addition, Bhimani (2009) proposes the relationships between management accounting, 
corporate governance and risk management have been addressed only to a minimal 
extent in the academic literature, but are increasingly intertwined and inextricably 
interdependent. Applying the TCE framework in the context of risk management 
extends the application of the theory. 
From a regulatory perspective, evidence from this research has implications for 
those involved in designing and implementing corporate governance risk management 
policy. Simkins and Ramirez (2007) maintain current disclosure requirements with 
respect to risk management are inadequate given it can have a serious adverse impact on 
business. However, implementing recommendations incurs costs for companies and 
these costs must be compared with related benefits (Christensen, Kent & Stewart, 
2010). The overarching objective of this research is to increase understanding of this 
critical aspect of how the risk management function is implemented in practice 
incurring minimal transactions costs. 
In summary, this study is motivated by the need for an empirically tested 
established theoretical framework to explain a company‟s decision to outsource, 
internally generate or use a combination of both to support their risk management 
activities.  
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1.5 CONTRIBUTION 
This study examines the factors determining the sourcing of risk management 
services by exploring the internal and external characteristics of a company‟s 
governance structure and contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways.  
Limited comparable studies of risk management activities have been found to 
have been conducted in Australia or internationally. Given the emergence of enterprise 
risk management, research is required to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon. 
As yet there are few contributions exploring how enterprise risk management works in 
practice and how it is organised and contributes to a risk management style (Arena et al., 
2010; Power, 2009). A number of studies have applied TCE to explain the sourcing 
decision for internal audit activities (Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999) and 
managerial advisory services (Kent, 2011). Application of TCE to the risk management 
function as encapsulated in the ASX Principles is in a research context; applicable and 
familiar to all listed companies regardless of size, industry affiliation and resource 
constraints. In addition, it contributes to the body of knowledge by expanding the scope 
of the theory‟s application to an area of corporate governance which incorporates 
operations, compliance, financial reporting and strategic imperatives. 
Second, it is timely given the increased focus on risk management activities in 
light of the recent global financial crisis and the additional compliance burden placed on 
listed entities by the revised Corporate Governance Principles in Australia. This study is 
undertaken in an important period because data has been collected from companies for 
2009. This is the first full reporting year following the implementation of the revised 
Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk. 
Third, this research creates a unique data set by combining data obtained from a 
survey sample of 271 companies listed on the ASX in 2009 with archival data from the 
sample company‟s annual reports. The survey sample is representative of the ten 
industry sectors as classified by the GICS
4
.The study provides up to date information on 
companies‟ risk management practices. The governance choice for risk management is 
identified and data is collected on the fourteen categories of material business risks 
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 Global industry classification standard. 
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covered under a company‟s risk management system. In following a „principles‟5 based 
approach, Australia provides scope for considerable variation in risk management 
practices when compared to mandatory regulatory environments such as SOX (2002) in 
the U.S. (Christensen, Kent, and  Stewart, 2010). 
Managers rarely consider the transaction costs of making governance decisions 
from a theoretical viewpoint, although they have an intuitive awareness of their sources 
and compare the costs and benefits of the alternatives (Gatignon and Gatignon, 2010). 
This study undertakes to investigate directly the factors influencing the risk 
management sourcing decision. This knowledge, by increasing and promoting 
understanding of the issues, can be used by managers and professional bodies to 
enhance their decision making on the choice of governance for risk management. 
1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW 
This study uses TCE as a theoretical framework to identify those factors 
influencing a company‟s decision to internally generate or outsource the activities 
required to effectively manage risk. TCE views the company as a governance structure 
based on a series of contractual agreements (Alchian and Woodward, 1988) resulting in 
a succession of transactions assisting the production process. Transaction costs are those 
associated with contracting for the procurement of goods and/or services and can be 
divided into ex ante (drafting, negotiating and safeguarding the agreement) and ex post 
transaction costs of subsequent administration (monitoring, evaluation, enforcing the 
agreement) (Williamson, 1985). Distinct from production costs, transaction costs are the 
economic equivalent of friction in physical systems and arise as a result of the need to 
contract (Williamson, 1989). Based on the assumption of profit maximisation, the 
objective is to minimise the sum of the production and transaction costs. 
TCE began with Ronald Coase (1937) in the economics discipline with his 
examination of the issue of economic organisations and why companies substitute 
markets as the principal means of coordinating activities. Coase‟s fundamental insight is 
that companies and markets are alternative governance structures differing in their 
                                                          
5
 A „principles‟ based approach places greater reliance on laying out key objectives, providing guidance 
and focusing on outcomes rather than issuing a list of detailed prescriptive rules (The Financial Services 
Authority, 2007). 
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transaction costs. However, the theoretical development of TCE is predominantly 
associated with the extensive works of Williamson (1973, 1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 
1983b, 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 2002, 2005, 2008a, 2008b; 
Williamson, 2009). Williamson proposes that transactions can be characterised by three 
broad principal dimensions and these are asset specificity, uncertainly and frequency 
with identifiable relative qualitative and measureable quantitative characteristics. 
Williamson‟s seminal contribution to the theory is the proposition that economising on 
transaction costs is realised by assigning a transaction to a governance structure 
according to these three dimensions. 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
Hypothesises are developed for each of the TCE framework‟s three dimensions 
predicting a governance mode for the sourcing of an ASX listed company‟s risk 
management requirements. Archival data is insufficient to test the hypothesis as 
information relating to the characteristics of a company‟s risk management function is 
not obtainable from publically available sources such as databases. Managers within the 
companies have information pertaining to the hypothesised variables. A questionnaire 
was sent to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or the company secretary of 1811 
companies listed on the ASX as at 31
st
 December 2009 in a six week period from March 
to May 2010. Each respondent was asked to complete a questionnaire which included 
items to measure aspects of the three TCE dimensions (asset specificity, uncertainly and 
frequency). A response rate of 17.10 per cent was achieved. The survey data is 
combined with archival data from the respondent company‟s annual reports. Linear and 
logistic regression are used to test the hypotheses developed. 
1.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Significant factors related to the internalisation of risk management activities for 
ASX listed companies are higher expenditure on research and development, lower staff 
turnover in risk management relative to other service functions, greater technological 
uncertainty, increased competition, higher proportion of overseas revenue, transaction 
frequency, financial distress and leverage. Factors significantly related to outsourcing 
risk management activities include higher sales volatility, greater number of subsidiaries, 
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more diverse operating environments, recent mergers, acquisitions or restructures and a 
recent change in the CEO. Financial distress is associated with more outsourcing for the 
subsample of companies that do outsource risk management activities. Reputation of the 
external supplier and capital intensity are also associated with more outsourcing. 
Results from the survey of ASX listed companies indicate risk management 
activities in Australia are predominantly sourced in house, evidenced by 54 per cent of 
the sample companies conducting all activities in house and 41 per cent outsourcing less 
than 50 per cent in 2009. Survey respondents indicate the risks associated with human 
capital and the environment are the most frequently outsourced risk management 
activities. Professional service providers, other than accountancy companies, and 
external auditors are the primary external providers of risk management services. Fifty 
four per cent of respondents cite access to expertise as the primary motivation for 
outsourcing, with strategic importance cited by 55 per cent of respondents as the most 
important reason to maintain the risk management function in house. 
1.9 DEFINITIONS 
This section provides definitions and descriptions for key elements of this study. 
The first key definition is material business risk. This is the risk posed by corporate 
decisions resulting in economic loss (Francis and Armstrong, 2003). This study is 
concerned with the management of material business risks for ASX listed companies. 
The ASX Council (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007b, p. 38) defines material 
business risks as: 
“Risks that could have a material impact on a company’s business. They can include 
but are not limited to: operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategic, 
ethical conduct, reputation or brand, technological, product or service quality, human 
capital, financial reporting and market-related risk”. 
 The second definition is „risk management‟ which is inherent in many facets of 
business. The underlying premise of risk management is to preserve value for 
shareholders and other stakeholders (COSO, 2004). Risk oversight is a core function of 
a company‟s board of directors complimenting an organisation‟s strategy formulation 
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and execution (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2005). At a minimum, the 
oversight process must review the establishment, implementation and effectiveness of a 
risk management system. Management are responsible for the development of the 
system (structures, policies, and procedures and culture) to identify, assess, treat and 
monitor risk to support the achievement of the organisation‟s objectives. Development 
of a sound framework of risk oversight, risk management and internal control is 
fundamental to good corporate governance (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2008; 
ASX Markets Supervision, 2009). Risk management and internal controls were ranked 
as the most important audit objectives
6
 in a 2002 survey of Chief Audit Executives 
(Leung et al., 2003). 
The third definition, „enterprise risk management‟, is described by Arena et al., 
(2010) as the culmination of the risk management resurgence that started in the 1990s. 
Enterprise risk management has emerged as the new paradigm in response to the 
growing expectations of stakeholders demanding greater oversight of risk management 
(Beasley et al., 2005). It is recommended the board, in its oversight of risk management, 
should not focus on financial reporting risk in isolation but adopt an enterprise wide 
approach which includes strategic, operational and compliance. This is indicated in the 
following statement by the Group of 100 (Deloitte and 100, 2008, p. 2): 
“The Board’s oversight of risk management should encompass enterprise-wide risks 
including strategic, operational, financial reporting and compliance risks. The 
assurance provided by the Chief Executive Officer/Chief Financial Officer certification 
should focus on financial reporting risks and controls as well as such other risks and 
controls requiring assurance as specified by the Board.” 
The fourth definition concerns „risk management frameworks‟. The heightened 
focus on formal risk management had led many companies to conduct in depth 
assessments of their existing risk management systems and anecdotal evidence suggests 
many companies are formalising their practices or adopting new more holistic 
approaches at the enterprise level. The ASX Council (ASX Corporate Governance 
                                                          
6
 The mean for risk management and assessment was 6 out of 7 for importance with 74 per cent of 
respondents giving it a 6 or 7 rating, second only to monitoring and effectiveness of internal controls with 
a mean of 6.3 out of 7 and 91 per cent of respondents giving it a 6 or 7 rating (Leung et al., 2003). (Leung, 
Cooper, and  Robertson, 2003) 
13 
 
Council, 2007c, 2008) recommends a number of Guides for implementing Principle 7: 
Recognise and Manage Risk
7
. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission enterprise risk management model and the Australian 
Standards/New Zealand Standards Risk Management 4360:2004
8
 are recognised as the 
preferred global frameworks to ensure consistency with other countries‟ risk 
management and internal control frameworks, such as the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2008) in the U.K. and SOX (2002) in the 
U.S. Companies must assemble resources to develop and implement systems of risk 
management to suit their individual requirements within these formal frameworks.  
Finally, internal sourcing and outsourcing are defined. Internal sourcing is when 
the company employs experts within the company in an employer/employee 
relationship and is frequently referred to as „hierarchical‟ or „vertical integration‟. The 
concept of outsourcing refers to the procurement of products or services from sources 
external to the organisation (Lankford and Parsa, 1999) as an alternative to internal 
production (Aubert, Rivard, and  Patry, 2003). Outsourcing is a typical example of what 
is traditionally known in theory and practice as the „make or buy decision‟ (Arnold, 
2000), where a significant contribution is made by an external vendor of the physical or 
human resources associated with an end product or service. In the service context the 
make or buy decision is the choice between the company employing experts internally 
or using contractors in the market (Kent, 2011). 
1.10 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is presented in six chapters, including this introductory chapter. A 
brief overview of the remainder of this thesis follows: 
Chapter 2, titled “Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development”, 
describes the theoretical framework of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) on which 
this study is based. It applies it in the context of a company‟s risk management function 
to predict the most efficient form of governance with respect to outsourcing or 
                                                          
7
 This study focuses on one of eight guiding principles contained in the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council in the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX, 2007), discussed in detail 
in further sections. 
8
 In November 2009 Australian Standards/New Zealand Standards Risk Management 4360:2004 was 
replaced by the new international standard for risk management, AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management.  
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employing internal experts. In particular it applies the three transactional dimensions of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency developed by Oliver Williamson. 
Hypotheses are developed to operationalise the three dimensions to predict the most 
efficient form of governance for transactions involved in the sourcing decision for ASX 
listed companies‟ risk management activities. 
Chapter 3, titled “Research Methodology”, describes the development of the 
research instrument used to measure each of the three TCE dimensions.  The process of 
constructing reliable and valid measures for each of the TCE dimensions involving the 
generation, development and refinement of questionnaire items and scales is described. 
Following an extensive cross-disciplinary review of the literature on governance choice, 
survey questionnaire items and archival proxies from databases (FinAnalyis, Reuters, 
Bloomberg and CapitalIQ) are assembled. Quantitative data on resources allocated to 
risk management and qualitative data to measure the TCE dimensions and scope of the 
risk management activities are explained. A summary of the variables used in the 
statistical modelling to predict the governance choice for risk management activities for 
ASX listed companies is presented.  
Chapter 4, titled “Research Protocol”, provides a discussion of the development, 
refinement and administration of the research instrument. The survey questionnaire was 
distributed to all ASX listed companies by mail and electronic methods. The aim of the 
survey questionnaire, distributed to a large sample of ASX listed companies, is to 
capture information with respect to their risk management activities.  Data obtained is 
used in conjunction with archival data from annual reports for statistical analyses to 
address the research question. 
Chapter 5, titled “Results and Analysis”, presents the results from descriptive 
statistics of the data collected from the sample of surveyed companies and 
corresponding archival data employed in the multiple and logistic regression analyses. 
The results of multiple and logistic regression models specified for identifying the 
factors influencing a company‟s decision to internally generate or outsource risk 
management activities are reported. 
15 
 
Chapter 6, titled “Discussion and Conclusion”, presents a summary of the 
study‟s findings and discusses the contribution made and implications for stakeholders.  
Limitations are identified and opportunities for future research are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Grant (1996) describes theories of the firm as conceptualisations and models of 
business enterprises which explain and predict their structure and behaviours. There are 
a number of alternative theories explaining the existence of the firm from the economics 
and organisational disciplines (Grant, 1996). This study relies on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) to predict which risk management activities are conducted in house 
and which are outsourced in the market. 
The theoretical framework of TCE relies on a number of underlying contextual 
assumptions including profit maximisation, bounded rationality, opportunism and risk 
neutrality. However, the predictive power of the theory lies in identifying transactions 
with the specific dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. A number 
of empirically tested hypotheses are developed from these dimensions which describe 
the extent to which internal and external company specific factors influence the decision 
to internally generate or outsource those activities that collectively constitute the risk 
management function. 
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the development of the theory of TCE and a review of the relevant 
literature. Section 2.3 discusses the alternative governance choices for risk management. 
Section 2.4 provides an overview of the underlying assumptions of TCE. Section 2.5 
discusses the TCE transactional attributes and their dimensions, and develops 
hypotheses for each to predict the most appropriate governance mechanism for risk 
management activities for ASX listed companies. Section 2.6 discuses complementary 
theoretical frameworks on which this study draws. Section 2.7 describes the control 
variables used in the study and section 2.8 concludes this chapter with a summary. 
2.2 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
This study applies the TCE framework to the sourcing decision ASX listed 
companies face when undertaking their risk management activities. It provides an 
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explanation for why companies internally generate risk management activities or source 
them from an external supplier such as an accounting company or other professional 
consultant. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is described as a synthesis of institutional 
economics, organisational theory and contract law (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; John 
and Weitz, 1988). The breadth of TCE research includes a variety of disciplines 
including sociology, marketing, finance, accounting and operations management 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). TCE has become the predominant theory for explaining the 
boundaries of the company, that is, which activities are likely to be governed internally 
and which are outsourced in the market (Geyskens et al., 2006). 
2.2.1Theoretical development of TCE 
It is generally accepted that the antecedents of TCE began with Ronald Coase‟s 
1937 seminal paper „The Nature of the Firm‟ which examines the issue of economic 
organisations and provides explanations for why companies substitute markets as the 
principal means of coordinating activities. Prior to Coase, classical economics had taken 
the existence of the company for granted. This was based on the assumption that the 
business enterprise had low to nonexistent transaction difficulties due to the market 
mechanism. The market, in its pure form, is the most efficient form of control as prices 
convey all the necessary information for efficient decision making (Arrow, 1969). 
Therefore, in the absence of information asymmetry, contracts are complete or costless 
to amend (Aubert, Rivard, and  Patry, 1996b). 
Coase (1937) observed that in this efficient market there is no need for 
companies. Coase‟s fundamental insight was to recognise that companies‟ existence 
was due to varying transaction costs which, distinct from production costs, are the costs 
of “running the system” (Arrow, 1969, p. 1). Production costs are the combined costs of 
raw material and/or labour. Although the transaction costs of production are important, 
especially from an efficiency perspective, alone they are insufficient to explain the 
governance choice between outsourcing in the market and internal production (John and 
Weitz, 1988; Klein, Frazier, and  Roth, 1990). Transaction costs are those associated 
with contracting for the procurement of goods and/or services. They are the economic 
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equivalent of friction in physical systems and arise as a result of the need to contract 
(Coase, 1937). Whether transactions are organised within the company or between 
companies across a market is a decision which depends on the transaction costs for each 
alternative. The more complex the transaction between two different parties in the 
market, the more costly it is to negotiate, write and enforce a contract and this creates 
transaction costs. 
Coase recognised the importance of modelling transaction costs to indentify the 
cost of organising information, coordinating behaviour, safeguarding the interests of the 
transacting parties and monitoring and inducing appropriate behaviours. As these costs, 
increase they reach a point where it is less costly to internalise them into a collective 
enterprise called a „firm‟ or „company‟. The company then incurs management costs 
which include those of recruiting, performance evaluation and monitoring. The essence 
of Coase‟s argument is that companies and markets are alternative governance 
structures differing in their transaction costs. Therefore, assuming cost minimisation is 
the goal, there is a need to align governance structures with the drivers of transaction 
costs in order to economise (Widener, 2004; Williamson, 1991b). 
 Geyskens et al., (2006, p. 519) comment “like most influential theories, TCE 
was not fully developed at the outset, it was refined, reformulated, corrected and 
expanded in response to new theoretical and empirical developments”. However, the 
theoretical development of TCE is predominantly associated with the extensive works 
of Oliver Williamson (Williamson, 1973, 1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 
1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2005; Williamson, Wachter, and  
Harris, 1975). 
Williamson‟s approach to understanding company behaviour maintains that the 
main purpose is to economise on transactions costs, which can be divided into ex ante 
and ex post costs (Williamson, 1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1985, 1989). The ex ante costs are 
those of establishing a contract and include drafting, negotiating and safeguarding the 
agreement. The ex post costs are those incurred in subsequently administering the 
contract. These include monitoring and enforcing agreements and the renegotiation and 
remedial costs when the contract is not adhered to by both parties. In addition, 
Williamson extends the scope of direct costs to argue there is also the potential 
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opportunity costs of making an inferior governance decision, that is, the choice of 
internal production when outsourcing is the less costly alternative or vice versa. 
Whilst Coase identified transaction costs, he also acknowledged the difficulty in 
measuring them. Williamson resolved this dilemma by proposing that a transaction‟s 
attributes can be characterised by the three broad principal dimensions of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, all of which have identifiable relative qualitative 
and measurable quantitative characteristics. This then solves the challenge of directly 
measuring transaction costs in monetary terms and permits the assignment of a 
transaction to a governance structure according to these three dimensions. Hence, 
incorporating Williamson‟s theoretical developments, TCE explains why some 
transactions are internalised and directed by managers in a hierarchy rather than 
outsourced in the open market.  
2.3 GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTS 
TCE views the company as a governance structure based on a series of 
contractual agreements (Alchian and Woodward, 1988) from which a succession of 
transactions facilitates the production process. Williamson (1979) reiterates that, ideally, 
contracts between parties should be complete. That is, comprehensive where all relevant 
future contingencies pertaining to the supply of the good or service are described and 
priced into the agreement. Accordingly, if all information can be specified, is verifiable 
and there are no extra costs associated with writing and enforcing the contract (Baiman 
and Rajan, 2002), the consequences of non performance are relatively predictable. 
However, not every transaction fits into this schema and bilateral contracts which are 
complex are invariably incomplete as it is impossible to consider all future 
contingencies (Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 2002). 
Williamson (1985, 1991a) discusses three alternate forms of governance 
contracts. These are outsource in the market, internalise the transaction or an 
intermediate „hybrid‟ option such as a joint venture or strategic alliance. Frequently 
referred to as „relational governance‟, hybrids are considered a viable alternative to 
internal production when the market no longer delivers the lowest transaction costs 
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(Geyskens et al., 2006) 9 . However, this intermediate governance option is not 
considered in this study. 
Companies can outsource a contract for risk management activities in the market.  
The market is a mechanism which co-ordinates the flow of transactions between 
different individuals and companies through the forces of supply and demand. TCE is 
based on the assumption that markets are competitive in that there are many potential 
suppliers (Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Thus, market forces determine price, quantity and 
time schedule, and the buyer of the good or service selects suppliers by comparing these 
choices (Malone, 1987). There are a number of factors that can seriously impede the 
ability to contract in the market.  First, it can be impossible to compile a complete list of 
the ex ante and ex post contingencies with the added complexity associated with 
estimating the probability of each contingency (Coase, 1937). As a result there are gaps 
and omissions in the original contract and the subsequent requirement to renegotiate as 
circumstances change (Williamson, 2002). Contracts can then become too costly to 
manage and legal costs can be expensive preventing enforcement in court in the event of 
disputes. 
Second, risk management activities are associated with professional services 
such as accounting, finance and law. The elements of an exchange in the case of 
services is particularly difficult to evaluate (Aubert et al., 1996b) and this incurs 
transaction costs.  Beaumont and Sohal (2004), in their study of outsourcing in Australia, 
describe a number of non trivial costs for contracting services out to the market 
including defining the scope of services and deciding the relevant measures of quality. 
Companies consider alternative governance mechanisms as the transaction costs 
of arms length contracts escalate in the market and become excessive. There are two 
alternatives, the first being to forgo the transaction altogether. However, this may not be 
a feasible option if there are legal or commercial imperatives (Williamson, 1985). The 
second alternative is hierarchy and involves removing the transaction from the market 
and internalising it within the company. This involves an employment relationship 
                                                          
9
 Incorporating a large informal component, relational governance lacks transparency and is therefore not 
easily measured or legally enforceable. Sociologists argue that the parties operate their own safeguard 
mechanisms to guard the future value of the relationship (Geyskens et al., 2006). 
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where adaptations can be made within the company and decision making can be 
implemented with incentives and control systems (Williamson, 1985, p. 70). 
Internalisation is preferable to transacting in the market if there are problems associated 
with measuring the output10, resulting in overpricing or undersupply in the market, 
which Hennart (1993) describes as the transaction costs incurred as a result of 
„cheating‟. 
In contrast to the market mechanism, the hierarchical structure 
(employee/employer) reduces the incentive to „cheat‟ as employees are rewarded as 
much for their behaviour (obeying directives) as their output (Hennart, 2010). However, 
the uncoupling of the output/reward nexus invokes the unavoidable consequence of 
reducing incentives for individuals to produce outputs (work) and the tendency to exert 
less effort and initiative than if they were self-employed (Hennart, 2010). Consequently, 
internalisation has its own transaction costs which must be deducted from the gains 
made from eliminating the market transaction costs. These include the information 
gathering and set up costs of integration plus the ongoing supervisory and monitoring 
costs. There are also transition costs to consider if a company transfers from internal to 
external production. Examples of these include staff reassignment and termination costs, 
changing from internal to external operations, writing and agreeing new contracts with 
the external suppliers and monitoring the quality of service (Beaumont and Sohal, 2004). 
This study is concerned with transactions involving the sourcing of risk 
management activities by ASX listed companies in the financial reporting year 2009. 
Two governance modes are considered 11 , internal sourcing through the 
employer/employee relationship and outsourcing to the market by a contract with an 
external supplier such as an accounting company or other professional consultant.  
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 TCE attributes these problems to the behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism 
of the market supplier discussed in section 2.4 of this chapter in the thesis. 
11
 Examining joint ventures or strategic alliances between ASX listed companies and a risk management 
service provider is beyond the scope of this research and is acknowledged as a limitation. 
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2.4 UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF TCE 
TCE has two main underlying contextual behavioural assumptions, bounded 
rationality and opportunism, which are viewed as the source of many transaction costs 
across markets and within companies (Williamson, 1985). 
2.4.1 Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on which TCE relies and is 
based on the premise that economic actors have limited information and limited 
processing abilities (Williamson, 1985; Williamson et al., 1975). Given these conditions, 
comprehensive contracting is not realistic or likely to be possible. As TCE is principally 
concerned with assigning transactions to the most appropriate governance structure to 
minimise transaction costs, confronted with bounded rationality the costs of planning, 
adapting and monitoring transactions is a primary consideration (Williamson, 1985, p. 
46). 
2.4.2 Opportunism 
  Opportunism is the possibility for economic actors to behave in a self-interested 
manner to the possible detriment of others, thus giving rise to uncertainty in any 
exchange (Alchian and Woodward, 1988). In the absence of opportunism, all behaviour 
could be governed by rules (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). Opportunism, when incorporated 
with bounded rationality, is described as the ultimate cause for the failure of markets 
and for the existence of hierarchies (Williamson, 1993). 
Williamson (1985, p. 47) describes opportunism as “self-interest seeking with 
guile”, which, in its blatant form, is lying and stealing but also includes more subtle 
forms of deceit that can occur before, during and after a contract is agreed. Williamson 
(1985, p. 64) is not insisting all individuals are continuously opportunistic, but merely 
some individuals are opportunistic some of the time and identifying when individual 
parties, including companies, employees and external providers are likely to act 
opportunistically is difficult.  
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In a market exchange, buyers and sellers can exhibit opportunistic behaviour 
that results in incomplete or distorted information, which leads to the problematic 
condition of „information asymmetry‟ (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). As this is rarely 
transparent pre contract, ex ante screening, along with the creation of ex post safeguards, 
is necessary (Williamson, 1985, pp. 47, 64). Seeking to assure compliance with a 
contractual agreement and reduce the associated costs is a motivation for internalising 
the transaction rather than conducting it in the market.  
2.4.3 Risk preference 
Williamson (1985) includes a third behavioural assumption, risk preference, 
which refers to the propensity for humans to exhibit variable risk preference behaviours 
when making decisions. The risk preference spectrum ranges from risk adversity 
through to risk neutrality and culminates in risk seeking behaviours. Williamson 
proposes risk averse decision makers are likely to choose internal organisation, whereas 
risk seeking decision makers prefer a market exchange when making governance 
decisions (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). Williamson (1985) adopts an assumption of 
risk neutrality in TCE on the basis the focus should be on the transaction‟s attributes 
rather than the risk attitude of the transactors although he acknowledges the importance 
of risk preferences for decision makers. He defends this on three bases. First, 
transactions are conducted at a company level rather than an individual level. Second, 
neutrality captures central tendencies to facilitate analysis and, finally, to assume 
otherwise would deflect attention from the core principles of examining efficiency.  
2.5 THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF TRANSACTION ATTRIBUTES 
In the absence of bounded rationality and opportunism, transaction costs are not 
a significant factor as complex contracts could be written and all individuals honestly 
disclose all relevant information (Williamson et al., 1975). However, given these 
underlying assumptions, TCE maintains there are rational economic reasons for 
organising transactions in different governance modes. To determine the appropriate 
governance structure to minimise transaction costs it is necessary to determine the 
attributes of the transactions. Williamson (1979) proposes these can be characterised by 
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the three broad principal dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency with 
identifiable relative qualitative and measureable quantitative characteristics. 
2.5.1 Asset specificity 
Businesses invest in a variety of tangible and intangible assets to facilitate the 
production function. Some assets are useful in many settings while others are dedicated 
to a specific purpose and have limited alternative applications. In TCE, the „specificity‟ 
of an asset refers to the value it has outside a particular relationship. Williamson (1981b) 
proposes that „asset specificity‟ is measured by the difference between the cost of the 
asset and the value in its second best use. This difference in value is a transaction cost 
and frequently referred to in the literature as a „quasi-rent‟12. Recall that contracts are 
generally incomplete due to bounded rationality and subject to the possibility of post 
contractual opportunistic behaviour. Hence, as the assets involved in the contract 
become more specialised, that is, the level of asset specificity increases, problems arise 
when external suppliers attempt to extract „appropriable specialised quasi-rents‟ (Klein, 
Crawford, and  Alchian, 1978, p. 297). As a result, the degree of asset specificity 
impacts the choice of governance mechanism. TCE proposes that as asset specificity 
rises, companies favour internalising the transaction as the cost of contracting in the 
market increases relatively more than the costs of internal production (Aubert et al., 
1996b; Klein et al., 1978). 
Williamson distinguishes between four main types of asset specificity13. Physical 
asset specificity refers to tangible assets such as plant and machinery where the level of 
asset specificity is determined by the next best use for the plant or machinery. Site asset 
specificity refers to the investment made in locating an asset to support particular 
                                                          
12 The term "composite quasi-rent" was first used by Alfred Marshall, in his Principles of Economics, 8th 
ed. [1890] 1936, pp. 453-54 and 626. A quasi-rent is the excess above the return necessary to maintain a 
resource's current service flow, which can be the means to recover sunk costs. Composite quasi-rent is 
that portion of the quasi-rent of resources that depends on continued association with some other specific, 
currently associated resources. Marshall offered the example of a steel mill that locates near a public 
utility and makes an investment, the profitability of which depends on being able to buy power at some 
given price. Once the steel mill incurs costs that become sunk, the power company could raise power 
prices. The steel mill continues to operate so long as the new marginal cost does exceed marginal revenue, 
even though the sunk costs are not being recovered. Marshall recognized the danger of parties with sunk 
costs relying on those in a position to expropriate composite quasi-rents (Alchian and Woodward, 1988).  
13
 In earlier works Oliver Williamson also discusses brand name capital and temporal as other types of 
asset specificity. 
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transactions. Dedicated asset specificity refers to a general purpose asset purchased with 
a particular trading relationship, which results in excess capacity if the trading 
relationship ceases. The fourth type is human asset specificity, which refers to the time 
and effort invested to acquire the company specific knowledge needed to be productive, 
which largely becomes useless once the relationship is terminated (John and Weitz, 
1988). 
2.5.1.1 Human asset specificity 
Human specific assets differ from tangible specific assets because they present 
additional management challenges14 included in the notion of behavioural uncertainty15 
(Coff, 1997). Williamson describes transactions involving human capital investments 
that are transaction specific as being characterised by “skills acquired in a learning-by-
doing fashion and imperfectly transferable across employers which need to be 
embedded in a protective governance structure, lest productive values are sacrificed if 
the employment relation is unwittingly served” (Williamson, 1981a, p. 563). Coff (1997, 
pp. 375, 377) describes human asset specificity as “special skills, knowledge, or 
personal relationships only applicable in a given firm” and “human capital under limited 
organisational control having the potential to generate economic rent”. As a result, these 
investments are not transferrable to alternative uses at no or low cost and hence the 
benefits can only be realised as long as the relationship is maintained. 
Skills associated with human asset specificity are in contrast to the generic 
technical and professional skills of engineers, doctors, lawyers and accountants. Skills 
held by these professionals are valuable in a variety of companies or industries (Coff, 
1997; Williamson, 1981a). It is only when these generic skills are deepened and 
specialised to a particular employer that both parties have an interest in maintaining the 
relationship. If they are not, the employer can easily employ a substitute and the 
employee can easily move to alternative employment (Williamson, 1981a). Williamson 
(1981a), further emphasises work experience is not sufficient to constitute high human 
                                                          
14
 Coff (1997, pp374) illustrates this point by contrasting human assets with physical assets (oil field) 
from four perspectives: 1. Cannot resign and move to competing firm; 2. Demand higher or more 
equitable wages; 3. Reject the firms‟ authority or be unmotivated; 4. Need not be satisfied with 
supervision, co-workers or advancement opportunities”. 
15
 Behavioural uncertainty is a separate transactional dimension discussed later in this section. 
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asset specificity. He illustrates this by contrasting typing skills, enhanced by practice 
but equally valuable to any employer (not asset specific) with the knowledge and 
experience of a company‟s unique filing system which is highly asset specific as it is of 
little use to another company. Thus, low human asset specificity imposes less emphasis 
on the choice of outsourcing or providing services internally. 
2.5.1.2 Human asset specificity – literature review 
A large body of literature examines the concept of human asset specificity in a 
variety of organisational settings. Lohtia, Brooks, and Krapfel, (1994), in an 
examination of TCE literature, observes human asset specificity has received the most 
attention of the asset specificity constructs. In a more recent review Macher and 
Richman (2008) concur suggesting this is due to the significant cost of human capital 
and because there are a wide variety of measurement approaches for the construct. The 
following discussion of the impact of human asset specificity on governance choice 
proceeds in approximate chronological order. 
Monteverde and Teece (1982), in a study of the U.S automobile industry, 
examine why General Motors and Ford took some development activities, described as 
specialised, non-patentable know-how, in house. The researchers, using the required 
engineering effort for a variety of different components as a proxy for the degree of 
asset specificity, find a significant positive association with the level of vertical 
integration as predicted by TCE. Anderson and Coughlan (1987), Anderson and 
Schmittlein (1984) and John and Weitz (1988) find support for human asset specificity 
as an explanatory factor in the choice of using a direct sales force (employees) versus 
indirect (outside agents). Results provide evidence of the propensity to maintain the 
function in house rising concurrently with the importance of company specific factors 
such as knowledge of formal and informal operating procedures, relationships with 
customers, relationships within the company and technical expertise. Klein et al., (1990) 
use TCE to explain the extent of forward integration within distribution channels in 
international markets. They find evidence in support of TCE that the asset specificity of 
the specialised knowledge required is a significant positive factor in determining 
whether the marketing function is internalised or outsourced. 
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Aubert et al., (1996b), in their study of outsourcing in the Information 
Technology industry, find support for human asset specificity as a significant 
determinant for sourcing information technology requirements. The authors conducted 
in depth interviews with ten large organisations outsourcing all or part of their 
information technology requirements and found routine maintenance of personal 
computers, characterised by low asset specificity, was generally outsourced. In contrast, 
software development activities requiring a greater degree of company specific 
knowledge were more likely to be maintained in house. 
The authors extend their argument in a later study (Aubert et al., 2003) by using 
the „theory of costly contracts‟ proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986)16. They propose 
that business skills and technical skills are required to carry out any given activity. 
Business skills are defined as knowledge of the company‟s business environment 
(company specific knowledge) and technical skills as the generic components of a given 
activity. Tasks requiring a high level of business skills (high asset specificity) should be 
kept in house as employees master this content more easily. Tasks with a high 
component of technical skills should be outsourced to suppliers who can foster them 
more effectively. Aubert et al., (2003) de-couple business and technical skills from the 
construct asset specificity and measure them as separate dimensions. Using a two stage 
process of an initial survey followed by a follow up survey and ranking exercise, they 
find evidence that companies tend to outsource their information technology 
requirements to external suppliers when important technical skills are involved. This is 
in contrast to operation scheduling, a complex highly company specific task requiring 
an understanding of the nature of the business information being processed which is 
almost exclusively conducted in house supporting the Grossman and Hart (1986) 
proposition. 
However, results for the separate construct „asset specificity‟ were conflicting. 
The initial survey found a positive association between outsourcing information 
technology and the presence of human specific assets in contradiction to the theory. In 
contrast, the subsequent follow up and ranking exercise provided opposite results in 
                                                          
16
 Grossman and Hart (1986) acknowledge their theory of costly contracts is building on foundations laid 
by Ronald Coase (1937), Klein et al., (1978) and Williamson (1979). 
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support of TCE. Aubert et al., (2003) suggest this could be due to a number of 
confounding factors unrelated to specific knowledge. Anecdotal evidence suggests at 
the time of the study there was a shortage of qualified experts, which lead to delays in 
employing and training employees making outsourcing the best option regardless of the 
asset specificity of the activity. Other studies finding conflicting results for asset 
specificity as a factor in determining governance choice include Nam, Rajagopalan, Rao, 
and Chaudhury (1996), who explore the determinants of the outsourcing decision for 
information technology and find no significant relation. Murray and Kotabe (1999) 
examine the sourcing of services by U.S. companies on a global basis and results 
indicate a positive relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing, the opposite 
direction predicted by TCE. 
There are limited studies examining human asset specificity in a corporate 
governance context. Kent (2011) applies TCE to explain the decision to outsource 
management advisory services. Two studies using TCE as a theoretical framework to 
investigate why companies outsource internal audit are of more relevance to this thesis. 
Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et al., (2007) in their replication of the Widener 
and Selto study, find that companies internalising their internal audit activities reported 
significantly higher levels of asset specificity. 
Recall that risk management activities are those undertaken by ASX listed 
companies to fulfil their statutory duty to develop, implement, oversee and report on an 
effective system of risk management. TCE predicts that the asset specificity of risk 
management activities rises as the skills and knowledge of the human specific assets 
undertaking these activities is deepened to encompass „company specific‟ 
characteristics not transferrable to other companies. Hence, the risk management 
activity can be generic and standardised. For example, conducting an internal audit or 
financial review of the accounting skills required to provide support for recognising and 
managing the risks associated with financial reporting can be routine compliance work. 
However, the knowledge and skills required to effectively carry out the activity varies 
from company to company and the asset specificity of these skills depends on the 
degree of company specialised knowledge required. This is influenced by the extent that 
the company‟s systems, policies and procedures are customised to suit the company‟s 
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unique requirements. It is expected that greater transaction specificity of human assets 
required to undertake the risk management function is associated with more internal 
generation of risk management. This leads to hypothesis one: 
H1: Companies with more transaction-specific human assets outsource less risk 
management activities than those with less transaction-specific human assets. 
2.5.2 Uncertainty 
The second key dimension of a transaction increasing transaction costs is the 
uncertainty associated with the underlying transaction and the economic exchange 
partners involved. Williamson (1979) argues uncertainty is the second most prominent 
cause of increasing transaction costs. Uncertainty arises when the relevant contingencies 
surrounding the exchange are too unpredictable or numerous to specify ex ante in a 
contract, or performance ex post cannot be easily verified (Geyskens et al., 2006). This 
is a result of bounded rationality, that is, the inability to foresee all potential 
eventualities and opportunism where parties may exhibit self interested behaviours to 
the detriment of the company. The transaction costs associated with the exchange 
increase as uncertainty rises. It is then a question of which governance mechanism of 
internal production or outsourcing is the least costly.  
Aubert et al.,  (1996b) cite uncertainty as the origin of all market failures and the 
most prominent and intuitive contributor to transaction costs. Researchers distinguish 
between environmental uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty (Anderson, 1985, 1988; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; John and Weitz, 1988; 
Kent, 2011; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
2.5.2.1 Environmental uncertainty 
Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990) define environmental uncertainty as 
„unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange‟. Environmental 
uncertainty precludes the ability to write and enforce complete contracts (Klein et al., 
1990). This is because bounded rationality limits the ability to specify every possible 
contingency in an environment characterised by uncertainty (Klein, 1989). Hence, the 
resulting information asymmetry provides the potential for trading partners to behave 
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opportunistically (Klein et al., 1990). Since a comprehensive contract cannot be written, 
the costs of ongoing renegotiations are incurred (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
  Researchers have explored the concept of environmental uncertainty within the 
TCE framework resulting in a number of conceptual abstracts. Walker and Weber (1984) 
extend Williamson‟s basic framework and distinguish between two types of 
environmental uncertainty and these are volume and technological uncertainty. Volume 
uncertainty refers to the inability to accurately forecast demand requirements and 
therefore buyers and sellers face either excess or insufficient capacity. Technological 
uncertainty refers to the unpredictable changes in technical requirements such as 
standards, component specification and other technological developments (Walker and 
Weber, 1984). Klein et al., (1990)17 divide environmental uncertainty into two concepts, 
volatility and diversity of the environment which predict opposite governance modes. 
Volatility is the extent the environment is changing, with more rapid environmental 
changes harder to adapt to and to predict future outcomes. Diversity of the environment 
reflects the heterogeneous nature of a company‟s operations.  
This study deconstructs environmental uncertainty into the three broad 
constructs of volume/demand, technological and diversity, and these are described as 
follows (Klein et al., 1990; Walker and Weber, 1984). 
2.5.2.2 Environmental uncertainty – volume/demand 
Walker and Weber (1984, p. 376) describe volume/demand uncertainty as being 
dependent on the assessment of fluctuations in demand and the confidence placed in 
estimates of demand. This creates problems in writing contracts which are inevitably 
incomplete in some important respects. Under these circumstances, external suppliers 
exhibit opportunistic behaviour that is likely to have an adverse impact on transactions. 
It is proposed that this is managed more efficiently through internal production as 
employees are more flexible than external contractors. Therefore, higher uncertainty due 
to assessment of volume/demand requirements is associated with relatively higher 
                                                          
17
 Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) acknowledge these two dimensions correspond to those used to examine 
the decision making process by Leblebici, Huseyin and Saiancik, Gerald (1981), "Effects of 
Environmental Uncertainty on Information and Decision Processes in Banks," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 26, 578-596. 
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transaction costs in the market, leading to increased internalisation relative to 
outsourcing requirements (Klein et al., 1990). 
Aubert et al., (2003) refer to demand uncertainty in the context of outsourcing 
information technology requirements. Demand uncertainty occurs when both parties in 
an exchange do not know ex ante the exact quantity or nature of the deliverable product, 
or the form of the service required. This makes it difficult to write a contract with an 
external party as it could open the company up to opportunism on the part of the 
supplier. This can be mitigated in house by using employees so the employer can adapt 
or change specifications of outputs as required (Aubert et al., 2003). Results from their 
study (Aubert et al., 2003) support this proposition, finding companies outsource more 
readily those activities associated with low demand uncertainty. John and Weitz (1988) 
propose that a governance structure supporting sequential, adaptive decision making is 
required when uncertainty exists in predicting sales, volatility of market share and 
industry volumes and there is a degree of difficulty in monitoring trends. Their results 
support this proposition with evidence of a positive relation between the proportion of 
sales made through a company‟s direct channel (in-house) and this measure of 
environmental uncertainty (John and Weitz, 1988). Artz and Brush (2000) find evidence 
that environmental uncertainty due to price, demand and volume volatility increase the 
cost of outsourcing for original equipment manufacturers. 
 Widener and Selto (1999) define environmental uncertainty as the expected 
variation in the demand for internal audit activities because of business conditions and 
the adaptations required by companies due to the volatility of the business environment. 
The construct is measured as variation in business needs, changes in the organisation, 
predictability of internal audit requirements and staff turnover. Finding no support for 
this dimension, the authors conclude their measure was noisy and lacked reliability 
advocating that future research strive for more reliable measures. Speklé et al., (2007) 
propose environmental uncertainty does not affect internal audit sourcing decisions and 
their results validate the original Widener and Selto (1999) study.  
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2.5.2.3 Environmental uncertainty – technological 
 There is limited contemporary research within the TCE literature on the impact 
of technological change as a dimension of environmental uncertainty. Early researchers 
examining technology as a factor impacting governance choice include Gordon and 
Narayanan (1984), who measure the perceived stability versus dynamic nature of 
technology as one aspect of environmental uncertainty impacting organisational 
structure. Walker and Weber (1984) define uncertainty in terms of technological change. 
The costs of managing and coordinating activities between internal demands and 
external suppliers increase more than coordinating activities internally, making vertical 
integration the least costly option as the frequency of technological change increases.  
The relation between environmental uncertainty induced by technological 
change, technical skills and human asset specificity is examined in Afuah (2001). Some 
skills and knowledge are rendered obsolete as competencies are destroyed in the 
presence of rapid technological change (Afuah, 2001). Afuah (2001) proposes that 
vertical integration provides a more durable base from which adaption to technological 
change is made because tacit18 knowledge is difficult to transfer; therefore, outsourcing 
incurs higher transaction costs as predicted by TCE and knowledge based theory. Afuah 
(2001) argues this is due to the frequent interaction required to support new knowledge 
acquisition and exploitation necessitated by technological advancements.  
The above discussions lead to hypothesis 2a: 
H2a: Companies with higher volume/demand and technological uncertainty 
outsource less risk management activities than those with lower volume/demand and 
technological uncertainty. 
2.5.2.4 Environmental uncertainty - diversity 
Recall that diversity of the environment reflects the extent to which there are 
multiple sources of uncertainty in the environment, due to the heterogeneous nature of a 
                                                          
18
 Tacit knowledge is personal knowledge that is non-verbalised and often embedded in an organisation‟s 
routines. Described as the skills and craftsmanship deeply embedded by an organisation that could only 
be passed on with great difficulty (Polanyi, 1961) and specialised code words or expressions that can and 
do arise in the context of recurring transactions that yield economies (Polanyi, 1962). 
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company‟s operations. Companies with more diverse heterogeneous environments such 
as many competitors, diverse customer base, subsidiaries and international operations 
require a greater quantity of complex information. This is likely to lead to a preference 
for flexible information flow, which can be obtained more cost effectively from external 
suppliers leading to less integration of the risk management function. Kent (2011), in 
her Australian study, proposes the number of controlled entities and the number of 
geographical segments are indicators of environmental diversity. Results provide 
evidence of a positive relation with the outsourcing of management advisory services 
and these characteristics (Kent, 2011). This study measures four aspects of uncertainty 
due to environmental diversity and these are operational complexity, competition, 
structural change and variation in business needs. 
In contrast to uncertainty due to volume/demand and technology, it is proposed 
that environmental diversity is managed more efficiently through outsourcing risk 
management activities to external suppliers. This leads to hypothesis 2b:  
H2b: Companies with higher uncertainty relating to or associated with environmental 
diversity outsource more risk management activities than companies with less diverse 
environments. 
2.5.2.5 Behavioural uncertainty 
Koopmans (1957) attributes behavioural uncertainty to the lack of knowledge 
about the actions or decision rules of other economic actors. Behavioural uncertainty 
arises from human action and refers to the effects of opportunism on transactions (1985). 
The costs of opportunism increase when the output is not easily observable or verifiable. 
Behavioural uncertainty is associated with the evaluation of individual 
productivity and performance of human assets or adherence to a contract (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1981a, 1985). It is uncertainty that is attributable to 
opportunism exhibited through non-disclosure, disguise or distortion of information 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1981a, 1985). An example is making false 
claims about executing an activity and then accepting the remuneration for the false 
claim (John and Weitz, 1988). This is especially relevant for activities undertaken in the 
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service sector as the elements of an exchange are particularly difficult to evaluate 
(Aubert et al., 1996b) in comparison to the production process of goods. 
Williamson (1985) identifies a number of issues associated with the evaluation 
of individual performance. There is the possible difficulty in recording an individual‟s 
results accurately. This is magnified if individual effort or each person‟s marginal 
productivity is inseparable from the team effort when the production of a good or 
service is carried out by teams (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Williamson, Wachter, and 
Harris (1975) argue that it is not the inseparability issue alone that is problematic. It is 
only when combined with opportunism and information impactedness19, as a result of 
bounded rationality and uncertainty, that performance evaluation becomes difficult. 
There are the transaction costs of supervision as managers are required to oversee and 
make judgments about the output of individuals (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984). 
Finally, performance may not be a simple measurable output. Hence, as a result of these 
measurement issues companies attempt to minimise performance evaluation costs 
associated with monitoring and measuring the behaviours and output of exchange 
partners through internal production (Williamson, 1985). 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) conduct a study of the sales forces of 
companies in the electronic components manufacturing industry and results confirm the 
TCE proposition that difficulty in measuring individual performance (behavioural 
uncertainty) is strongly associated with the use of a direct sales force (internalisation). 
Aubert et al., (1996b) examine outsourcing of information systems in large Canadian 
companies. The authors refer to behavioural uncertainty as „measurement problems‟ 
which arise if the two conditions of observability and verifiability of performance are 
compromised. Results confirm TCE predictions that routine maintenance tasks, which 
are observable and verifiable, are frequently outsourced whereas software development, 
where performance is much more difficult to measure, is kept in house. 
                                                          
19
Williamson et al., (1975, p259) describe information impactedness as “a derivative condition which 
appears in conjunction with (1) changing economic conditions (uncertainty), (2) the inability of all 
interested parties to be costlessly appraised of the changes which have occurred (which is a manifestation 
of bounded rationality) and (3) the inclination of some of the parties opportunistically to withhold or 
distort information to which they have preferential access”. 
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Wang (2002), investigating the perceived success of outsourcing customised 
software development, identifies a number of performance measurement issues relevant 
and applicable to the risk management services sourcing decision. First is the subjective 
nature of the relative transaction costs resulting in managers miscalculating their effect 
on governance choice. Although this can be remedied over time as market forces reach 
equilibrium and correct the mistakes, this process may be slow (Wang, 2002). Second, 
the difficulty in defining efficiency, which makes comparison between alternative 
suppliers more complex (Wang, 2002). Results from Wang‟s study support the 
proposition that behavioural uncertainty is a decisive factor in determining the 
perceived success of outsourcing customised software development20.  
Risk management is a function requiring specialist skills and knowledge 
performed with relative autonomy in the completion of the task. Therefore, there is the 
possibility that service providers are in a position to shirk on quality and effort (Speklé 
et al., 2007). Hence the problem of behavioural uncertainty and the associated issues of 
observability and verifiability are especially relevant. In addition, a great deal of 
professional judgment is required if the quality and efficiency of the output cannot be 
easily ascertained (Speklé et al., 2007). Internalising the risk management function 
allows for better monitoring of performance quality under these circumstances. 
Kent (2011), proposes that established management has a relative advantage in 
the performance evaluation of internal employees, thus reducing behavioural uncertainty. 
In contrast, new management do not have this relative advantage because they are 
unfamiliar with their new employees‟ knowledge, expertise and potential for 
opportunistic behaviour. This increases relative behavioural uncertainty in evaluating 
internal employees. Hence, new members entering the organisation, uncertain about the 
expertise of internal management, seek the advice of independent advisers outside the 
organisation rather than internal advisers. Kent (2011) finds evidence that a change in 
management is associated with increased outsourcing of management advisory services.  
Given the above arguments, this study expects behavioural uncertainty 
associated with external suppliers is managed more efficiently through internalisation of   
                                                          
20 The research model used by Wang (2002) includes contractor reputation and asset specificity and 
the effects of asset specificity interacting with the other variables. 
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a company‟s risk management activities except for newer management who lose the 
relative advantage in evaluating internal employees.  This is leads to hypotheses 3a and 
3b: 
H3a: Companies with higher behavioural uncertainty relating to external suppliers 
outsource less risk management activities than those with lower behavioural 
uncertainty relating to external suppliers. 
H3b: Companies with newer management outsource more risk management activities. 
2.5.3 Frequency 
The third dimension in TCE is frequency, which is the most simple to 
contextualise because it represents the volume and value of transactions over time 
(Speklé et al., 2007; Williamson, 1979). A greater volume of transactions leads to 
internal specialisation and provides greater potential for gaining benefits from 
economies of scale and thus reduced production costs (Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 1990). 
Likewise, with increasing frequency of transactions, a company is able to develop their 
own assembled knowledge facilitating internalisation of the activity and mitigating the 
requirement to contract with external providers (Kent, 2011). In addition, there is the 
benefit of holding and utilising management skills and thus maximising the value from 
expenditure on internal production (Anderson, 1985). However, if the demand for and 
occurrence of transactions associated with risk management activities is infrequent, the 
benefit of establishing a dedicated internal risk management function are unlikely to 
exceed the considerable set up costs and incremental overheads (Anderson and 
Schmittlein, 1984). Hence, transactions made infrequently are more likely to be 
outsourced to obtain the help of external providers as companies prefer to bear the costs 
of potential opportunism and uncertainty rather than the cost of creating and 
maintaining a dedicated function (Aubert et al., 1996b). 
A company‟s ability to internalise an activity could be a function of the size of 
the company with larger companies having more capacity to expend the required 
resources than smaller companies (Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Larger companies are 
therefore more likely to integrate their risk management function. In support of the 
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size/governance choice nexus, Heide and John (1988) argue that small companies with 
specific assets protect their investment by investing in relationships with their external 
suppliers. Results from a survey of 199 small manufacturing companies support this 
proposition.  
Williamson (1981a) asserts that the frequency dimension is suppressed for 
human assets involved in a continuing supply of services and attention is focused only 
on the internal aspects of uncertainty and asset specificity. However, Widener and Selto 
(1999), Speklé et al., (2007) and Kent (2011) argue that the demand and thus frequency 
of transactions for internal audit and management advisory services is a relevant factor 
in determining governance choice. Results from these studies support this proposition, 
finding a negative relation with the outsourcing of internal audit and management 
advisory services as predicted by TCE. Based on this premise, it is expected that the 
governance choice for risk management services is driven by frequency of transactions.  
This leads to hypothesis 4: 
H4: Companies with higher frequency of risk management activities outsource less 
than those with lower frequency of risk management activities. 
2.6 COMPLIMENTARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Whilst this study emphasises TCE in explaining the governance choice, it 
recognises and draws on other theoretical frameworks predicting the boundaries of the 
company. In particular, elements of TCE overlap with agency theory. TCE and agency 
theory depict the company as a nexus of contracting relationships
21
 incurring transaction 
costs that the organisation seeks to minimise (Oviatt, 1988). The propensity for 
opportunistic behaviour is acknowledged in both theoretical frameworks as a key 
impediment to accomplishing this goal (Oviatt, 1988). The transaction costs identified 
in TCE of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts are similar to the agency 
costs of bonding and monitoring. Information asymmetry is identified in the literature as 
the core driver of these transaction costs (Coff, 2003). Hence, it is acknowledged that 
the two theories are complementary. 
                                                          
21
 Agency theorists define organizations as "legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 310). 
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Resource based theory provides the foundation for a number of theoretical 
frameworks examining the governance choice with asset specificity as a key component. 
They include knowledge based, core competencies and dependency approaches. 
Resource based theories view the company as a unique bundle of assets, some of which 
can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Viewing the 
company from a strategic perspective, a company‟s competitive advantage lies in 
identifying and acquiring critical resources (Barney, 1991). These approaches 
acknowledge asset specificity as closely related to strategic importance (Arnold, 2000) 
and the specificity of assets as a key determinant of governance choice. The knowledge 
based approach focuses on the transaction costs associated with transferring knowledge 
(Grant, 1996) as companies operate with different degrees of „knowledge intensity‟ as a 
key factor of production (Coff, 1999). Coff (1999) describes the management dilemmas 
associated with knowledge intensity and the associated costs of providing for 
difficulties in the coordination and transfer of knowledge from specific human assets. 
He argues these are more relevant in determining the boundaries of the company than 
opportunism as proposed by TCE (Coff, 2003).  
Dependency theory argues that human asset specificity creates inter 
organisational dependence through the requirement to safeguard human assets which 
incurs costs22 (Heide and John, 1988). The core competencies approach that argues 
those activities considered as core competencies should remain within the company due 
to their strategic importance regardless of the asset specificity of the activity (Arnold, 
2000; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
2.7 CONTROL VARIABLES 
 There are other company characteristics likely to influence the sourcing decision 
for a company‟s risk management activities. The following discussion, which draws on 
theoretical propositions and evidence from existing research, provides a theoretical 
foundation for a number of control variables to be included in the study. 
                                                          
22
 Heide and John (1988) propose that companies will engage in „bonding behaviours‟ to create exit 
barriers and safeguard their specific assets which incur additional transaction costs. 
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2.7.1 Industry 
A company‟s risk management activities are likely to be related to the industry 
in which they operate ,and industry regulatory bodies can restrict management‟s 
discretion (Christie, Joye, and  Watts, 2003). For example, the finance industry is 
regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, which places an additional 
burden of risk management on its affiliates. This study draws on previous research 
examining industry affiliation from TCE and resource based theory perspectives given 
industry membership influences the nature and magnitude of risk management activities. 
Demsetz (1988) proposes that knowledge is costly to transfer and these costs 
increase as asset specificity rises, and are a determining factor in establishing the 
boundaries of a company. Christie et al., (2003), categorise the fifteen U.S. SIC 23 
industries into one of three levels according to the unobservable transaction costs of 
their „knowledge transfer‟ 24  using Demsetz‟s definition. Inclusion of this variable 
improves the fit and specification of their model‟s ability to explain the degree of 
decentralisation of a company. This study adopts an adaption of the schema developed 
by (Christie et al., 2003). Each of the sixty-seven GICS25 industry sub sectors used by 
the ASX is categorised by knowledge transfer costs as defined by Christie et al., (2003) 
and each company in the sample under analysis in the study is classed accordingly. 
2.7.2 Proprietary information 
A company derives its competitive strength from its proprietary assets and is 
protective about losing these to an alliance partner (Kale, Singh, and  Perlmutter, 2000). 
Therefore, companies with high proprietary knowledge are expected to minimise the use 
of external consultants in order to reduce the number of outside personnel exposed to 
their private information. Recognising generally sensitive and proprietary information, 
                                                          
23
 Standard Industrial Classification is a U.S government system for classifying industries by a four-digit 
code. 
24
 Christie et al., (2003) use a combination of survey and archival data to measure whether companies in 
an industry group tend to generate relatively more specialized or non-specialized knowledge, categorised 
as 0, 0.5 or 1.  The construct „specialised knowledge‟ is a composite measure incorporating industry 
affiliation, growth, size and performance (volatility of the company‟s rate of return on equity at firm and 
divisional level). 
25
 The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) has ten industry sectors containing 67 industry 
sub-sectors, which are used to categorise companies in the sample.  
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such as trade secrets and strategic planning, are conducted in house even though 
outsourcing may result in cost saving this study controls for the magnitude of exposure 
to proprietary information for risk management personnel (Anderson, 1985; Anderson 
and Schmittlein, 1984; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Christensen, Kent, and  Stewart, 
2009; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
2.7.3 Reputation of external supplier 
 A large body of accounting and audit research literature exists classifying the 
largest international accounting companies, known as the Big426, as high quality service 
providers (Beasley et al., 2005). In an empirical study examining enterprise risk 
management in U.S. and international organisations, Beasley et al., (2005) find that 
companies with a Big4 auditor are more advanced in their implementation of enterprise 
risk management. Wang (2002) finds evidence that the reputation of an external 
supplier has the ability to limit perceived post contractual opportunism and enhance 
perceived quality of performance for information systems outsourcing. Given these 
arguments, companies are more likely to outsource to external suppliers with a 
reputation for quality, regardless of other factors. Hence, this study identifies whether 
the company has a Big4 accounting company providing any external audit and/or risk 
management services. It is proposed that companies with a Big4 auditor outsource to 
the Big4 more risk management activities than those with an auditor who is a non Big4 
accounting company. 
2.7.4 Capital intensity 
 Erramilli and Rao (1993) argue capital intensity represents the magnitude of a 
company‟s investment in fixed assets which varies across and within industry groups, 
and is a moderating variable in the choice of governance decision. Increasing capital 
intensity signifies rising resource commitments; the cost of which make it harder for 
companies to establish functions internally regardless of other company specific factors 
such as the degree of asset specificity. Therefore, as capital intensity increases, 
                                                          
26
 The four accounting firms are Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young , KPMG and PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers 
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companies are more likely to seek external suppliers for their risk management 
requirements rather than maintain a function in house.  
2.7.5 Growth and financial distress 
Abbott, Parker, Peters and Rama (2007) find evidence that fast growing 
companies and companies more likely to experience financial distress are more likely to 
outsource internal audit. Kent (2011) provides evidence that short-term growth restrains 
internal production of management advisory services as it is positively associated with 
outsourcing to external suppliers. On this basis, this study controls for growth in total 
assets in the previous three years (Abbott et al., 2007; Kent, 2011) and financial distress 
measured by two net losses in the previous three year period (Abbott et al., 2007) as 
factors that have the potential to restrain internalisation of the risk management function. 
2.7.6 Leverage 
 Implicit in the decision to internalise or outsource production of any good or 
service is the assumption the company has the resources available to make this choice 
(Kent, 2011). High debt levels could reduce the financial resources available and 
preclude a company from contracting for risk management activities from any suppliers. 
Thus, leverage is measured as a control variable in this study. 
2.7.7 Other reasons for internalising and/or outsourcing risk management 
activities 
Recall that this research acknowledges there is a significant body of literature 
applying other theoretical frameworks predicting the boundaries of the company. A 
number of studies explore outsourcing from alternative perspectives: identifying 
advantages and disadvantages, some complementary and others contradictory to the 
theoretical propositions of TCE. Therefore, as a supplementary analysis, this study 
draws on prior research to more comprehensively explore alternative explanations for 
internalising and outsourcing risk management activities. 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) emphasise the strategic importance of maintaining 
core competencies in house and outsourcing other activities. Internalising core functions 
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maintains control, ensures flexibility and mitigates the risk of sub-optimal service by 
avoiding the requirement to manage relationships with external parties (Beaumont and 
Sohal, 2004; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Lonsdale, 1999; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; 
Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Raiborn, Butler, and  Massoud, 2009; Selim and Yiannakas, 
2000; Serafini, Sumners, Apostolou, and  Lafleur, 2003).  
Lonsdale (1999) and Lonsdale and Cox (2000) explore the history of 
outsourcing, combining TCE and resource based theory to develop a risk model of 
outsourcing from a strategic and operational perspective. Arnold (2000) combines TCE 
with core competencies theory as complementary approach to modelling the 
outsourcing decision. He proposes that asset specificity is closely related to strategic 
importance and is therefore more likely to be internalised. His outsourcing model 
incorporates outsourcing strategic activities not considered as core competencies.  
Gilley and Rasheed (2000b) apply competency based and resource based 
theories in a study of U.S. manufacturing companies. They identify strategic importance 
as a reason to internalise, and risk sharing and concentration on core competencies as a 
motivation to outsource.  
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) conduct interviews and a follow up survey to 
identify the key reasons for companies to outsource activities in the U.S. and Europe. 
Shared objectives are achieving best practice, ability to focus on core competencies and 
access to expertise with European companies placing greater emphasis than U.S. 
companies on achieving economies of scale. Beaumont and Sohal (2004) survey one 
hundred and sixty two CEOs of Australian companies in 2002 seeking information on 
the nature and intensity of their outsourced activities. The study identified advantages to 
outsourcing, which included the ability to concentrate on core activities, share risks with 
external suppliers and accommodate variable demand requirements. These advantages 
are also identified as motivation to outsource the internal audit function (Caplan and 
Kirschenheiter, 2000; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000). Abbott et al., (2007) find evidence 
that companies are more likely to outsource routine internal audit activities. However, in 
a survey of the U.K. public and private sectors, Selim and Yiannakas (2000) find 
organisations are less inclined to outsource internal audit than other services. 
Considered a „core‟ and „essential‟ activity, the main motivating factor behind 
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outsourcing internal audit is access to specialist skills. Serafini, Sumners, Apostolou and 
Lafleur (2003) survey and interview a number of chief audit executives in the U.S. 
concerning their attitudes to external providers of internal audit services. Benefits 
identified include access to knowledge and expertise, achieving best practice and 
flexibility. 
Raiborn et al., (2009) examine issues associated with the outsourcing of internal 
support functions, identifying loss of control and innovation as key risks. Investigating 
the relationship between strategic human capital and the design of management control 
systems, Widener (2004) draws on TCE and contingency theory. Recognising that 
human capital is not necessarily company specific, her study identifies the routine 
nature of an activity as a consideration in the choice of governance structure.  
Other studies examining reasons to outsource include Lankford and Parsa (1999), 
who explore the effective management of outsourcing relationships, and Quélin and 
Duhamel (2003), who study the motivations and risks of outsourcing in a sample of 
large European manufacturing companies. 
Given the above, this study identifies strategic importance, difficulty in 
managing external relationships with external suppliers, risk of sub-optimal service, non 
standard nature of tasks, loss of flexibility and economies of scale as possible 
alternative reasons to internalise risk management activities. Access to expertise, 
concentration on core competencies, risk sharing, variable demand requirements, 
achieving best practice and routine nature of activity are possible reasons to outsource 
risk management activities. 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the theoretical foundation upon which this study is 
built. TCE has been used to provide a basis for explaining the choice of governance 
mechanism for the risk management activities of ASX listed companies. Research 
hypotheses have been developed describing the association between the TCE 
dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency and the decision to 
internalise or outsource transactions for risk management activities.  
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Under TCE, risk management transactions characterised by no requirement for 
specialised investment (trivial asset specificity) and/or ease of performance 
measurement (low behavioural uncertainty) and/or a predictable environment (low 
demand/volume and low technological uncertainty) and/or a diverse environment and/or 
infrequent transactions outsourcing is the preferred mode of governance as transaction 
costs are negligible. Any deviations and transaction costs increase and the market ceases 
to be the less costly option. The research hypotheses are tested using the research 
methodology discussed in Chapter 3. 
This study acknowledges agency theory and resource based theories are 
complementary theoretical frameworks that can be applied to the governance choice 
decision for a company‟s risk management activities. In addition, this chapter identifies 
and discusses industry affiliation, exposure to proprietary information, reputation of 
external supplier, capital intensity, growth, financial distress and leverage as factors 
likely to influence the sourcing decision for a company‟s risk management activities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated in chapter 1, the boards and senior management of companies listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange have statutory obligations with respect to risk 
management. This study uses the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics 
(TCE) to identify factors that determine how companies resource their risk management 
function. TCE views the company as a governance structure based on a series of 
contractual agreements (Alchian and Woodward, 1988), which seeks to minimise 
transaction costs, and argues that the company will either internalise or outsource in the 
market depending on the relative transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). 
Williamson (1979) proposes that transactions can be characterised by the three 
broad principal dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. Chapter 2 
discusses these dimensions as company specific factors impacting the sourcing decision 
for risk management activities. A number of hypotheses are developed and presented 
based on the predictions of TCE. This chapter describes the research methodology used 
to measure each of the hypothesised variables for operationalisation in the statistical 
analysis and proceeds in the following manner. 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the methodology used for development of 
the research instrument, a survey questionnaire and archival measures. A summary of 
the variables employed in the statistical modelling to predict the governance choice for 
risk management activities for ASX listed companies is also presented. Section 3.3 
discusses the development of measures for the dependent variable, governance mode 
and the independent variables for the three key TCE dimensions of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. Measurement of control variables is also discussed. Section 
3.4 summarises the chapter. 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
„Theory provides the foundation for all scientific research‟ (Flynn, Sakakibara, 
Schroeder, Bates, and  Flynn, 1990, p. 253). This study applies the theory of TCE to 
46 
 
determine what factors impact the decision to internally generate or outsource risk 
management activities using empirical research methodology. Empirical research uses 
knowledge based on real world observations (Flynn et al., 1990) to test hypotheses. This 
study operationalises the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 using empirical data 
obtained from two sources; a survey instrument and archival data from company annual 
reports. A combination of data collection methods is useful to triangulate research 
evidence (Flynn et al., 1990).  
The first stage is construction of the measures for operationalisation. That is, 
item and scale generation and development. Assuring accuracy of measurement of the 
constructs under examination is a critical consideration when constructing questionnaire 
items (Barrett, 1972). The ability to successfully observe a covariance between 
variables is dependent upon the ability to accurately and reliably operationalise the 
constructs of interest (Hinkin, 1995). An extensive cross disciplinary review of 
governance choice studies is conducted. Empirical studies that have employed survey 
questionnaires, interviews and supplementary archival data are used as the basis for 
development of this study‟s research instrument and provide guidance in the 
measurement of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of a company‟s risk 
management function.  Two governance studies on internal audit in the management 
accounting literature (Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999) published 
questionnaire items. However, much of the empirical analysis in the TCE field has been 
conducted in the fields of marketing and information systems due to these disciplines‟ 
traditions of using surveys to measure and operationalise constructs which can be 
readily applied to TCE (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). As a result this study‟s research 
instrument relies heavily on modifying items developed for measuring constructs from 
these disciplines (Anderson, 1985, 1988; Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Aubert, Rivard, and  Patry, 1996a; 
Aubert et al., 1996b, 2003; Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 1990).  
Geyskens et al., (2006) review 200 empirical TCE studies noting that survey and 
proxy measures were frequently limited by a single item. Herche and Engelland (1996) 
note the importance of using multi item measurement methodology for constructs which 
47 
 
are not directly observable and complex in their interpretation, and this study seeks to 
measure the TCE constructs by multiple item measures where possible. 
A survey questionnaire is developed in accordance with the objectives of the 
research. Items in the questionnaire consist of questions and statements designed to 
capture the relevant domain of interest, which is a company‟s risk management 
activities, by focusing on factual matters and perceptual viewpoints (Leung et al., 2003). 
The aim is to capture quantitative data for operationalising in the statistical models and 
qualitative data to enhance descriptive analysis and provide a comprehensive overview 
of the risk management activities for ASX listed companies.   
Table 3.1 below summarises the variables, measures, applicable questionnaire 
references (or archival data) developed for the statistical analysis. The questionnaire 
sent to respondents is presented in Appendices A-1 and A-2. 
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Table 3.1 - Summary of variables, measures and data sources developed for 
statistical regression analysis. 
Variable Measure Questionnaire item number 
Governance: 
dependent variables  
three dependent variables 
 Categories of risk covered by company‟s risk 
management system (for descriptive purposes). 
 Governance choice & proportion of a company‟s 
risk management activities outsourced if 
applicable.   
 Nature of external supplier (for descriptive 
purposes and as control variable). 
 Number of staff working in risk management 
(measure of insourcing). 
 1 
 
 2 and 3  
 
 4 
 
 23 
Asset Specificity: 
five independent variables 
 Company specific knowledge and training. 
 Contract characteristics. 
 Staff turnover. 
 Education (not used in hypothesis testing). 
 Expenditure on research and development. 
 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13 
 5 and 12  
 14 and 15 
 23(b) 
 Archival data 
Environmental Uncertainty –
volume/demand and 
technological  
three independent variables 
 Volume/demand uncertainty. 
 Volume/demand (environmental dynamism). 
 Technological uncertainty. 
 Archival proxy  
 18 
 19 
Environmental Uncertainty – 
Diversity: 
five independent variables 
 Diversity of internal operating environment. 
 Environmental diversity through competition.  
 Heterogeneous nature of company‟s activities. 
 Uncertainty associated with recent restructure, 
merger or acquisition. 
 17 
 Archival proxy 
 2 archival proxies 
 Archival data 
Behavioural Uncertainty: 
three independent variables 
 Degree of difficulty perceived in evaluating 
individual productivity and performance of 
external suppliers of risk management services. 
 Degree of perceived difficulty in evaluating 
quality of external suppliers of risk management 
services.  
 New management. 
 10 
 
 
 16 
 
 Archival data 
Frequency: 
one composite independent 
variable 
 Company size. 
 Volume of transactions of risk management 
projects undertaken and magnitude of direct 
expenditure on risk management activities (not 
used in hypothesis testing). 
 3 archival proxies 
 21 & 22 
 
 
 
Control Variables: 
seven independent variables 
 Industry. 
 Exposure to proprietary information. 
 Reputation of supplier. 
 Capital intensity. 
 Growth and financial distress. 
 Leverage. 
 Archival proxy 
 20 
 4 and archival data 
 Archival data 
 2 archival proxies 
 Archival data 
 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL VARIABLES – STAGE 1 
Prior to commencement of the questionnaire development process a panel of 
academic experts consisting of six professors from accounting, management, economics 
and marketing were assembled. The panel members, with extensive experience in TCE, 
corporate governance and survey questionnaire design agreed to review and provide 
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feedback at each stage of the survey development process. This is an integral part of 
questionnaire development and assists in ensuring validity and reliability which 
typically results in a requirement for revision at each stage (Flynn et al., 1990). The 
instrument is reviewed and feedback provided three times, twice prior to pilot testing 
with three Chief Financial Officers and finally before submission to the university 
ethics committee. Each review resulted in the deletion and modification of questionnaire 
items and rating scales and refinement of design and formatting. The final questionnaire 
consisted of 25 items and is presented in Appendices A-1 and A-2. 
3.3.1 Item generation and scale development 
The first stage in the survey questionnaire development process is item 
generation where the primary concern is content validity to ensure adequate capture of 
the domain of interest without extraneous content (Hinkin, 1995, 1998). An extensive 
cross disciplinary review of governance choice studies is conducted. A number of 
publications provide questionnaire items and are used as the basis for development of 
the questionnaire.  
Items in the survey questionnaire contain questions and statements designed to 
identify the theoretical constructs being measured. Scales are used to distinguish the 
differences in survey respondents in the variables of interest measured by the 
questionnaire items (Sekaran, 2003). Reliable scale design is essential for achieving 
satisfactory valid research conclusions (Krosnick and Berent 1994). This study, relying 
on prior research to provide guidance, employs a number of rating scales to obtain 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio data. A summary of the measurement, rating scale 
used and type of data obtained for each of the 25 items in the survey questionnaire 
instrument is presented in table 3.2 at the end of this section. 
Nominal and dichotomous scales assign observations to categories and are used 
to collect nominal data on the nature, extent and source of a company‟s risk 
management activities for operationalisation in the statistical analysis (items 1, 2, 4, 6, 
24, 25). Ratio scales have the advantage of absolute zero as the point of origin and can 
therefore measure the magnitude and proportions of differences (Flynn et al., 1990). In 
addition, the mathematical properties of ratio data increases the number of analytical 
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techniques available for data analysis (Flynn et al., 1990; Sekaran, 2003). This study 
uses ratio scales to collect interval data on the proportion of risk management activities 
outsourced and the average contract length for external suppliers of risk management 
activities (items 3, 5). In addition actual values are collected for a number of items, 
(items 13, 14, 21, 22, 23) providing ratio data for training, staff turnover and transaction 
volume relating to risk management activities. 
Likert
27
 scales are interval scales designed to determine the relative intensity 
respondents feel towards a particular concept (Babbie, 1998). Respondents are asked to 
rate according to an interval scale of categories varying in intensity, for example, from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree and very difficult to very easy. It is important for a 
scale to contain enough categories in the measure to generate sufficient variance among 
respondents (Hinkin, 1998). Some researchers (Jacoby and Mattel, 1971) indicate that 
two or three categories are sufficient to ensure sufficient reliability, which levels off 
after five (Lissitz and Green, 1975). More recent studies have found that more than 
three are needed for stability and a rating scale of less than five should be discouraged 
(Weng, 2004).  This study assigns five and six point Likert scales respectively (items 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 15, 16, 17, 18 19) consistent with prior literature. Table 3.2 at the 
end of this section summarises the measurement, rating scale used and type of data 
obtained for each of the 25 items in the survey questionnaire instrument. 
An initial questionnaire master containing 433 items and their measurement 
scales from 27 individual surveys used by researchers to operationalise constructs from 
TCE and other theoretical frameworks is assembled. Each item and corresponding scale 
is examined for suitability and adaption to this study‟s research context. Duplicate items, 
questions that are very similar and those clearly conceptually inconsistent or irrelevant 
in the context of risk management are deleted. This results in 54 items and 
corresponding scales from existing studies used as a basis for questionnaire item 
development for this study. 
                                                          
27
 Likert first introduced the summative (may or added or subtracted) rating scale in 1932 and they have 
been widely used ever since amongst social science researchers for the assessment of participants‟ 
responses and attributes (Weng 2004).   
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Hinkin (1995, 1998) advises the development of twice as many as required as 
only half are likely to be retained. The 54 questionnaire master items and scales are 
modified to address the research question and gather quantitative and qualitative data on 
the nature, extent and source of risk management activities. Items consisting of 
questions and statements are adapted within the parameters of established survey 
question guidelines (Babbie, 1998; Dillman, 1978, 1991; Sekaran, 2003). Each item 
addresses a single issue and statements are designed to minimise question bias through 
proper wording including the use of unambiguous and concise language familiar to 
target respondents.  
The first expert panel review is conducted at this stage. Content validity is 
assessed to ensure the existence of a clear link between the questions and the theoretical 
grounding. This results in a number of items being deleted, modifications made and 
measurement scales refined. The questionnaire is reviewed and feedback provided twice 
more by the expert panel prior to pilot testing. The final questionnaire consists of 25 
items (see Appendices A-1 and A-2). 
Statistical regression is used to analyse data to test hypotheses developed by 
applying the theory of TCE to the risk management sourcing decision. Regression is a 
statistical modelling technique frequently used in the social sciences (Babbie, 1998) to 
examine the relationship between a criterion variable (dependent variable) and predictor 
variables (independent variables) (Sekaran, 2003). The research goal is the explanation 
of the variability of the dependent variable and its prediction through the influence of 
the independent variables in the model (Sekaran, 2003). The following sections discuss 
the development of the measures for the dependent variables, governance mode and the 
independent variables for the TCE constructs, asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency. 
A number of control variables are also measured. 
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Table 3.2 - Summary of questionnaire item rating scales and data type 
Questionnaire 
Item No. 
Measurement Rating Scale Data Type 
1 
Identification of risk categories covered under 
company's risk management system. 
Category 
 
Nominal 
1 Governance mode – outsourced yes or no. Dichotomous Nominal 
1 Identified as top 3 priorities. Category Ordinal 
2 
Governance mode – all internal, all external or 
combination of both. 
Category 
 
Nominal 
3 
Estimated % outsourced: 0-10%; 11-25%; 26-
49%; 50-74%; 75-90%; 91-100% 
Category Ratio 
4 
Nature of external supplier: External auditor, 
Big4 Accountant, Non-Big4 Firm, Other 
professional provider. 
Category Nominal 
5 
Contract characteristics of external supplier 
from less than yr; 1-3 yrs or more than 3years. 
Category 
 
Ratio 
6 
Training provision to external consultants yes or 
no. 
Dichotomous 
 
Nominal 
7,8,9,10,11,12 
Company specific knowledge and training, 
contract characteristics, staff turnover and 
education:  
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
 
Likert (6pt): 
 
Interval 
13,14 Company specific training and staff turnover. Actual Value Ratio 
15 Staff turnover: Much Lower to Much Higher. 
Likert Scale (5pt) 
 
Interval 
16 
Service quality evaluation:  
Very Difficult to Very Easy. 
Likert Scale (5pt) 
 
Interval 
17 
Diversity of internal operating environment: 
(no modification - completely modified.) 
Likert Scale (5pt) 
 
Interval 
18,19 
Environmental dynamism and technological 
uncertainty: 
Changing very slowly to Changing very rapidly. 
Likert Scale (5pt) 
 
Interval 
20 
Exposure to proprietary information: 
0%, less than 50%; more than 50%; uncertain. 
Category 
 
Interval 
21,22,23 
Volume of transactions in number of projects, 
expenditure, staff numbers. 
Actual Value Ratio 
24,25 
Six reasons to internalise/outsource risk 
management. 
Category Nominal 
 
3.3.2 Governance mode 
Prior studies have frequently modelled the dependent variable, governance mode, 
as a binary variable - internalise or outsource. Fewer studies have modelled the 
dependent variable using the proportion of outsourced activities. David and Han (2004) 
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conducted a meta analytical study of empirical research in TCE examining 238 
statistical tests from 63 relevant papers and of these 82 per cent were binary. This study 
models the dependent variable, the choice to outsource risk management activities, as a 
binary decision (yes/no and high/low) and as the proportion of total risk management 
activities outsourced.  
The first part of the survey questionnaire (items one to four) is designed to 
capture specific information on the nature of risk management activities outsourced, the 
proportion outsourced and, if outsourced, the type of external supplier. Item one on the 
questionnaire requires respondents to identify which categories of risk (from a list of 
fourteen28) are covered under their company‟s risk management system for the financial 
year ending in 2009. In addition to identifying risk categories, respondents were asked 
to indicate which, if any, of these were outsourced. They were also asked to identify 
their top three most important categories of risk. Items two and three of the survey 
questionnaire capture data for the dependent variables, outsourcing risk management 
activities as a dichotomous measure, yes or no/high or low and as a proportion 
outsourced. Item four captures data on the external supplier of risk management 
services from four categories provided: external auditor, Big4 accountant, Non-Big4 
and other professional service provider. 
Table 3.3 below presents the survey questionnaire items, the measure, the scale 
and the studies from which the items have been derived or adapted:  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Twelve of the fourteen categories are the material business risks described in the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (2007) „as risks that could have a material impact on a 
company‟s business. They can include, but are not limited to: operational, environmental, sustainability, 
compliance, strategic, ethical conduct, reputation or brand, technological, product or service quality, 
human capital, financial reporting and market-related risks‟. The other two risk categories, safety and 
climate change were included in a compliance review of the amended governance Principles conducted 
by the ASX Markets Supervision in 2009. 
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Table 3.3 - Survey questionnaire items for governance choice 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
1. Please tick all the categories of risks 
covered under your company's risk 
management system for the 2009 financial 
year, and indicate for those ticked if they are 
outsourced (all or part) to external 
consultants yes or no (circle Y/N). 
Nature and  
governance choice 
for specific risk 
management 
activities 
14 individual 
categories of 
risk 
management 
activities 
(Abbott et al., 2007; ASX 
Markets Supervision, 
2009; Aubert et al., 1996a; 
Carey et al., 2006) 
2. For the 2009 financial year, which best 
describes how your company sourced its risk 
management activities?  
Governance choice 
for risk 
management 
activities 
Choice of three 
categories: all 
internal, all 
external or 
combination of 
both 
(Abbott et al., 2007; 
Aubert et al., 1996a; 
Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009) 
3. Estimated proportion of risk management 
activities outsourced: 
Proportion of risk 
management 
activities 
outsourced 
Choice of six 
Categories: 0-
10%; 11-25%; 
26-49%; 50-
74%; 75-90%; 
91-100% 
(Abbott et al., 2007; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984; Carey et al., 2006; 
John and Weitz, 1988; 
Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009; Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999) 
4. To whom? (please tick all that apply) 
External auditor, Big4 Accountant, Non-
Big4 Firm, Other professional provider 
Type of external 
supplier 
Choice of four 
categories of 
external 
supplier 
(Abbott et al., 2007; Carey 
et al., 2006) 
23. How many full time equivalent staff 
work in risk management?  
Insourcing of risk 
management 
activities 
Number of staff 
working in risk 
management 
scaled by total 
number of 
employees 
Developed by researcher29 
 
3.3.3 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity is frequently measured by collecting original data from the 
contracting parties through techniques such as survey questionnaires and one to one 
interviews (Macher and Richman, 2008). A number of research methodologies from the 
accounting, marketing and organisation disciplines are used as the basis for the 
development of the survey questionnaire and archival proxies used to measure the level 
of asset specificity of a company‟s risk management function. This study uses a 
combination of survey questionnaire items and archival data from company annual 
                                                          
29
 Item 23 is developed to capture data on the number of employees working in risk management as a 
measure of the insourcing of risk management activities for robustness testing purposes. However, a large 
number of respondents reported this data as unavailable, which precluded its use in the analysis. 
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reports to measure five different aspects of the TCE construct asset specificity. These 
are: company specific knowledge and training, contractual characteristics, staff turnover, 
education level and expenditure on research and development. 
3.3.3.1 Company specific knowledge and training 
Recall that TCE predicts that the asset specificity of risk management activities 
rises as the skills and knowledge of the individuals undertaking these activities is 
deepened to encompass „company specific‟ characteristics that would not be 
transferrable to other companies. Williamson (1979, 1981a) describes human asset 
specificity as transactions involving human capital investments that are transaction 
specific, characterised by „specialised training and learning-by-doing‟. Hence, the assets 
associated with risk management activities not transferrable to other companies are the 
knowledge and skills that are specific to the company. 
Table 3.4 below presents the questionnaire items, measurement scales and 
studies from which they have been derived and/or adapted used to measure the degree 
of specialised training and „company specific‟ specialised knowledge and skills required 
by risk management staff. 
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Table 3.4 - Survey questionnaire items measuring degree of specialised training 
and company specific specialised knowledge and skills 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
If any risk management activities are 
outsourced: 
6. Does your company provide training to 
your external consultants to enable them to 
provide you with risk management services? 
Training 
Dichotomous 
Scale (Yes/No) 
(Aubert et al., 1996a; De 
Vita, Tekaya, and  Wang, 
2009; Heide and John, 
1992; Wang, 2002; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995)  
7. Staff working in a risk management 
capacity acquire specialised knowledge, 
skills & abilities that would not be 
transferable to another company (i.e. 
'company specific' skills). 
 
Requirement for 
company-specific 
skills 
 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) 
(Anderson, 1988; Ang and 
Cummings, 1997; Colbert 
and Spicer, 1995; John and 
Weitz, 1988; Parmigiani 
and Mitchell, 2009; 
Widener, 2004; Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995)  
8. It would be hard for an industry 
experienced and suitably qualified outsider 
to work in risk management in our company 
without additional 'company specific' 
training. 
Training in 
company-specific 
skills 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) 
(Anderson, 1988; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984; Ang and Cummings, 
1997; Aubert et al., 1996a; 
John and Weitz, 1988; 
Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; Lohtia et al., 1994; 
McIvor, 2009; Wang, 
2002; Widener, 2004; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995)  
9. Training in 'company specific' skills for 
new risk management staff represents a 
significant investment for our company. 
Training in 
company-specific 
skills 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) 
(Ang and Cummings, 
1997; Artz and Brush, 
2000; Colbert and Spicer, 
1995; De Vita et al., 2009; 
Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; Lohtia et al., 1994; 
McIvor, 2009) 
11. A high degree of 'company-specific' 
skills are required to effectively carry out 
risk management in our organisation. 
Requirement for 
company-specific 
skills 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) 
(Anderson, 1988; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984; Ang and Cummings, 
1997; Artz and Brush, 
2000; Aubert et al., 1996a; 
Heide and John, 1988; 
John and Weitz, 1988; 
Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; McIvor, 2009; 
Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009; Wang, 2002; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995) 
13. Could you estimate on average how 
many hours per year each employee who 
works in risk management undertakes 
'company specific' training? 
 
Training in 
company-specific 
skills 
Actual hours 
(Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984; Aubert et al., 1996a; 
John and Weitz, 1988; 
Lohtia et al., 1994; Speklé 
et al., 2007; Widener, 
2004; Widener and Selto, 
1999)  
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3.3.3.2 Contractual characteristics, staff turnover and education level 
TCE predicts that transactions characterised by a high level of asset specificity 
are supplied in house as it eliminates the expense of writing and effectively executing 
complex contracts. Contextually, this economises on bounded rationality and reduces 
opportunism. Therefore, where a high degree of specialisation is required (high asset 
specificity), both parties are committed to the transaction in a bilateral exchange for a 
considerable period thereafter once the investment has been made. The company that 
has contracted for these services cannot easily turn to alternative sources and the skills 
the employee or external supplier has obtained are not easily transferable elsewhere. 
Hence, when asset specificity is high, both parties make special efforts to design an 
exchange contract that has good continuity properties (Williamson, 1981a).  
Aubert et al., (1996b) link contract duration to asset specificity arguing that 
transactions requiring specific investments require a mechanism to protect the investor. 
One mechanism is to ask for a longer contract duration. Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988, 
1990) examines the effects of asset specificity on contracts between coal suppliers and 
electricity generation plants and find the higher the level of specificity the longer the 
duration of the contract. Deegan (1997) investigates the relationship between human 
asset specificity and the design of management remuneration contracts. Results provide 
evidence of a significant positive relationship between asset specificity and favourable 
remuneration packages containing incentives such as long run performance measures 
and termination compensation. 
According to resource based theory, human assets are a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Coff, 1997). As such, they are a special form of strategic asset 
which presents different issues to other assets because they cannot be owned and 
companies risk losing their employees if they become dissatisfied (Coff, 1997). This is a 
greater problem if the skills and knowledge of employees is company specific and 
involves a considerable investment by the company. Companies then attempt to control 
staff turnover in order to sustain their competitive advantage and employ retention 
strategies such as favourable contractual terms (Coff, 1997).  
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Erramilli and Rao (1993) propose that highly asset specific services are 
characterised by a high level of professional skills acquired through several years of 
education and training (such as accounting or management consulting), specialised 
know how and customisation.  Knowledge based theory is based on the premise that 
companies operate with different degrees of „knowledge intensity‟ as key factors of 
production and argue that knowledge intensive companies are associated with having a 
heavily educated work force (Coff, 1999). 
Given the above discussions, table 3.5 below presents the questionnaire items, 
measurement scales and studies from which they have been derived and/or adapted, 
used to measure contract characteristics, staff turnover and education level of risk 
management staff.  
Table 3.5 - Survey questionnaire items measuring contract characteristics, staff 
turnover and education level of risk management staff 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
If any risk management activities are 
outsourced: 
5. What is the average length of a contract 
with an external consultant for risk 
management services? 
Contract duration 
3 Categories:  
<1 yr; 1-3 yrs 
or > 3years 
(Abbott et al., 2007; Artz 
and Brush, 2000; Aubert et 
al., 1996a; Coff, 1997; 
Deegan, 1997; Joskow, 
1985, 1987, 1988, 1990; 
McIvor, 2009) 
12. Employment contracts with staff working 
in our company's risk management function 
include performance incentives designed for 
retention purposes (e.g. promotion 
opportunities). 
Contract Incentives 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly 
Agree) 
(Coff, 1997; Deegan, 
1997) 
14. Could you estimate the annual rate of 
staff turnover in your company? 
Staff turnover 
Actual 
Percentage 
(Coff, 1997; Lohtia et al., 
1994) 
15. The turnover of staff working in risk 
management activities compared to staff 
turnover in other service functions is: 
Staff turnover 
Likert Scale – 
5pt (Much 
Lower to High 
(Coff, 1997) 
23. (b) Could you estimate what proportion of 
them (staff working in risk management) have 
professional qualifications such as a 
university degree or equivalent? 
Level of education 
Actual 
Percentage 
(Coff, 1997; Erramilli and 
Rao, 1993) 
 
3.3.3.3 Expenditure on research and development 
This study uses the archival measure of expenditure on research and 
development as a proxy for asset specificity. Levy (1985) argues that research intensive 
companies tend to rely on transaction specific inputs from human capital and internalise 
these transactions to minimise associated transaction costs. Levy (1985) finds support 
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for the proposition that companies with higher levels of research and development 
internalise transactions using expenditure on research and development as a proxy for 
asset specificity. Other researchers find that knowledge intensive companies are 
associated with large investments in research and development (Coff, 2003; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Coff (2003) finds evidence of a positive association between 
expenditure on research and development and mechanisms instituted by management to 
discourage unwanted takeover bids.  
Patents are traditionally used as artificial restrictions to prevent the diffusion of 
knowledge gained in research and development activities outside of the company 
(Helfat, 1994). Helfat (1994) argues this focus on patents detracts from the important 
role research and development plays in altering and enhancing existing company assets, 
products and production processes. In her study of the U.S. petroleum industry, Helfat 
proposes that research and development also involves learning which is cumulative, has 
company specific characteristics and elements which impede imitation and therefore do 
not transfer easily to other companies (Helfat, 1994). 
Widener and Selto (1999) use expenditure on research and development as a 
proxy for product strategy in their study of the governance determinants of internal 
audit. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) find evidence that research and development 
intensive companies prefer to maintain 100 per cent ownership of their foreign 
subsidiaries. The authors argue that research and development is a measure of asset 
specificity and companies will adopt unified governance in preference to low levels of 
integration in its presence (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988).  
Given the above arguments and the assumption that risk management is carried 
out at an enterprise level, it is proposed that research and development activities impact 
the governance choice due to their transaction specific nature. Hence expenditure on 
research and development is measured as a proxy for asset specificity. Table 3.6 
summarises the measure, scale and relevant studies discussed above.  
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Table 3.6 – Research and development archival proxy for asset specificity 
Archival Proxy Measure Scale Basis 
Asset specificity 
Expenditure on 
research and 
development 
Scaled as a 
proportion of 
operating 
revenue 
(Abbott et al., 2007; Coff, 
2003; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Gatignon 
and Anderson, 1988; 
Helfat, 1994; Levy, 1985; 
Widener and Selto, 1999) 
 
3.3.4 Uncertainty 
Recall that the second key dimension that increases transaction costs is 
uncertainty associated with the underlying transaction and the economic exchange 
partners involved. Within the construct uncertainty, researchers distinguish between 
environmental uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty (Anderson, 1985, 1988; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; John and Weitz, 1988; 
Kent, 2011; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
3.3.4.1 Environmental uncertainty 
As previously stated, Noordewier et al., (1990) define environmental uncertainty 
as „unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange‟. Volatility is the 
extent the environment is changing, with more rapid environment changes harder to 
adapt to and to predict future outcomes. Researchers have explored the construct within 
the theoretical framework of TCE resulting in a many different conceptual abstracts. 
However, results are inconsistent and, therefore, there is a lack of empirical support. 
The uncertainty of the external environment is subject to the individual 
perception of decision makers and survey questionnaires have informed various 
environmental uncertainty studies. Gordon and Narayanan (1984) examine the effect of 
perceived environmental uncertainty on organisational structure and management 
accounting systems, distinguishing between stable versus dynamic environments. 
Gordon and Narayanan (1984) refer specifically to the organisation's industrial, 
economic, technological, competitive and customer environments. A number of survey 
studies discuss and measure environmental „dynamism‟ as a factor in the sourcing 
decision (John and Weitz, 1988; Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 1990) 
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Various studies, (for example Anderson, 1985, 1988; Anderson and Coughlan, 
1987; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; John and Weitz, 
1988; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) 
measure environmental uncertainty as a single independent variable in their empirical 
modelling. This study breaks environmental uncertainty into the three broad constructs 
of volume/demand, technological and diversity (Klein et al., 1990; Walker and Weber, 
1984). The hypotheses developed within the TCE theoretical framework predict that 
environmental uncertainty, due to volume/demand and technological uncertainty, leads 
to internalisation of risk management activities within the company. This is discussed 
further in section 3.3.3.2. Uncertainty due to environmental diversity leads to 
outsourcing of risk management activities, a discussion of which is provided in section 
3.3.3.3. In accordance with prior research, a survey questionnaire and archival data are 
used to measure a number of individual variables representing these three constructs. 
3.3.4.2 Volume/demand and technological uncertainty 
Volume/demand uncertainty is when companies do not know the exact quantity 
of a product or service. Walker and Weber (1984) describe this as uncertainty due to 
fluctuations in demand and the degree of confidence in estimating the variability. This 
construct is measured in various studies by the archival proxy of variance in sales over a 
period (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Artz and Brush, 2000; Levy, 1985; Widener 
and Selto, 1999) and survey questionnaires (Artz and Brush, 2000; Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000b; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988; Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; McIvor, 2009; Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009; Speklé 
et al., 2007; Walker and Weber, 1984; Wang, 2002; Widener and Selto, 1999; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995). 
Technological uncertainty is defined by technological change (Afuah, 2001; 
Walker and Weber, 1984) and prior studies have measured the construct by a survey 
questionnaire (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Gordon and 
Narayanan, 1984; Widener and Selto, 1999). Gilley and Rasheed (2000b) examine the 
effects of outsourcing on company performance, measuring environmental dynamism 
from a technological and strategic perspective. Ang and Cummings (1997) measure 
technological uncertainty as a factor affecting the sourcing of information systems in the 
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banking industry. Widener and Selto (1999) measure the impact of changes in 
information technology on the quality of internal audit services. 
Table 3.7 presents the questionnaire items, archival proxy, measurement scales 
and studies from which they have been derived and/or adapted used to measure the two 
aspects of environmental uncertainty (volume/demand and technological) associated 
with a company‟s risk management activities.  
Table 3.7 - Survey questionnaire items and archival proxy measuring 
environmental uncertainty, volume/demand and technological 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
18. How stable/dynamic would you rate the 
external economic environment facing your 
company? 
Environmental 
uncertainly – 
demand/volume 
(dynamism) 
Likert Scale – 
5pt 
(changing very 
slowly -
changing very 
rapidly) 
(Artz and Brush, 2000; 
Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000b; Gordon and 
Narayanan, 1984; John and 
Weitz, 1988; Klein, 1989; 
Klein et al., 1990; McIvor, 
2009; Murray and Kotabe, 
1999; Parmigiani and 
Mitchell, 2009; Speklé et 
al., 2007; Wang, 2002; 
Widener and Selto, 1999; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995) 
19. What is your assessment of the rate of 
technological change in your industry? 
Environmental 
uncertainly – 
technological 
Likert Scale – 
5pt 
(changing very 
slowly - 
changing very 
rapidly) 
(Ang and Cummings, 
1997; Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000b; Gordon and 
Narayanan, 1984; Widener 
and Selto, 1999) 
Archival Proxy Measure Scale Basis 
Variance in sales.  
Environmental 
uncertainly – 
demand/volume 
Standard 
deviation of 
operating 
revenue for 
previous three 
years 
(Anderson and 
Schmittlein, 1984; Artz 
and Brush, 2000; Aubert et 
al., 2003; John and Weitz, 
1988; Levy, 1985; Walker 
and Weber, 1984; Widener 
and Selto, 1999) 
 
3.3.4.3 Environmental uncertainty due to diversity 
Recall that diversity of the environment reflects the extent to which there are 
multiple sources of uncertainty in the environment reflected in the heterogeneous nature 
of a company‟s operations. The requirement to make strategic decisions increases as 
environmental complexity rises (Aldrich, 1979). Hence, companies with more diverse 
heterogeneous environments including many competitors, diverse customer bases, 
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subsidiaries and geographic locations require a greater quantity of complex information 
which is likely to lead to a preference for flexible information flow. TCE predicts that 
this is obtained more cost effectively from external suppliers such as accounting 
practices and other specialist consultants leading to less integration of the risk 
management function. This study draws on the existing literature and measures the 
individual aspects of environmental uncertainty due to diversity, internal functional 
diversity, the extent of heterogeneity of business operations and diversity due to 
changes in business organisation. 
Survey respondents provided information regarding the extent of modifications 
or adaptions needed for risk management processes for different departments or 
divisions. This is used as a measure internal functional diversity. Aubert et al., (1996a) 
use a survey questionnaire to measure the degree of job standardisation as a measure of 
uncertainty. Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et al., (2007) measure variation in 
business activities for internal auditors using a questionnaire item.  
Second, the heterogeneous nature of a company‟s operations is measured by the 
three archival proxies of competition, number of subsidiaries and the proportion of 
revenues from foreign operations. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used as a 
statistical measure of concentration as a proxy for competition. Klein et al., (1990) 
measure the degree of competition in a company‟s environment as a measure of 
diversity. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures market concentration by squaring 
the market shares of all companies in a market sector and then summing the squares. 
This provides companies with larger market share a greater weight than those with a 
smaller market share. The index reaches a maximum value of one when a monopoly 
exists and declines towards zero when calculated on a percentage basis of market share, 
with the introduction of increasing competitors. This is consistent with economic theory, 
which suggests that the greater the concentration of output in a small number of 
companies the greater the likelihood that competition in the market is low. In contrast, if 
concentration is low, competition is stronger (Rhoades, 1993). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used in a variety of contexts across research 
disciplines. In an empirical governance study, Boyd (1995) uses the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index on the basis that the number of companies in an industry group and 
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their relative inequalities in market share are indicators of environmental complexity. 
Levy (1985) measures the degree of diversification of unrelated products by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, finding a negative relation with vertical integration 
(positive with outsourcing) as predicted by the theory.  
The number of subsidiaries and revenue from overseas operations as a 
proportion of total revenues are used to measure operational diversity of the company. 
Kent (2011) measures environmental diversity as the number of subsidiaries and finds a 
positive relation with the outsourcing of management advisory services. A number of 
studies propose that overseas operations are an indicator of environmental complexity, 
measuring the number of geographic locations (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Klein, 1989) and revenue from 
foreign operations (Abbott et al., 2007). 
Finally, Widener and Selto (1999) use their survey questionnaire to measure any 
acquisition, divestitures or reorganisations in the respondent company as a measure of 
environmental uncertainty. Kent (2011) finds that purchases of management advisory 
service from external suppliers are associated with restructuring. This study uses 
archival data from databases (Finanalysis and Captial IQ) to ascertain if there has been a 
re-structure, acquisition or merger in the past three years as a measure of environmental 
diversity.  
Table 3.8 presents the questionnaire items, archival proxies, measurement scales 
and studies from which they have been derived and/or adapted used to measure 
environmental diversity associated with a company‟s risk management activities.  
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Table 3.8 - Survey questionnaire item and archival proxy measuring 
environmental diversity 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
17. To what extent do risk management 
processes have to be adapted or modified to 
suit different divisions/departments 
requirements? 
Environmental 
diversity 
Likert Scale – 
5pt 
(no 
modification - 
completely 
modified) 
(Aubert et al., 1996a, 
2003; Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999) 
Archival Proxy Measure Scale Basis 
Environmental Diversity 
Heterogeneous 
nature of 
operations 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman 
Index 
(Boyd, 1995; Klein, 1989; 
Klein et al., 1990; Levy, 
1985) 
Environmental Diversity 
Heterogeneous 
nature of 
operations 
Number of 
subsidiaries 
(Kent, 2011) 
Environmental Diversity 
Heterogeneous 
nature of 
operations 
Foreign sales as 
a percentage of 
total sales 
(Abbott et al., 2007) 
Environmental Diversity 
Disclosure of 
acquisitions, 
divestitures, 
restructures 
Dichotomous 
variable 
1=event in past 
three years 
(Kent, 2011; Widener and 
Selto, 1999) 
 
3.3.4.4 Behavioural uncertainty 
Recall that behavioural uncertainty is associated with the evaluation of 
individual productivity and performance of human assets (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Williamson, 1981a), and is of special importance to an understanding of TCE issues 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 57). Behavioural uncertainty reflects the difficulty of evaluating 
and measuring the performance of those undertaking risk management activities in the 
context of this study. TCE predicts that the greater the degree of behavioural uncertainty 
associated with a company‟s risk management activities the greater the degree of 
internal generation of the function. In this study, two aspects of behavioural uncertainty 
associated with risk management activities are measured. These are management‟s 
evaluation of the performance of external suppliers and new management‟s evaluation 
of existing staff. 
The questionnaire instrument is used in this study to measure the perceived 
difficulty of performance measurement for external suppliers of risk management 
activities. Many studies use this methodology to measure behavioural uncertainty. 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) assess the perceived difficulty of measuring 
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individual performance of salespeople equitably. Klein (1989) measures the extent to 
which all aspects of performance conditions are included in written contracts between 
exporters of products and external suppliers. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) explore 
disparities between service and manufacturing companies‟ international entry mode 
choice measure the difficulty of writing and enforcing contracts. Aubert et al., (1996a) 
consider the formalisation of contracts in the information systems department. McIvor 
(2009) explores the specification of standards of performance in contracts between three 
large U.S. companies and external suppliers of goods and services using structured in 
depth face to face interviews. Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et al., (2007) 
measure the degree of actual and perceived difficulty in evaluating the performance of 
outsourced internal audit activities. 
This study measures change in management by the archival proxy whether there 
has been a change in the CEO in the past two years as a measure of behavioural 
uncertainty. Recall that Kent (2011) proposes that established management have a 
relative advantage in the performance evaluation of internal employees to new 
management who are unfamiliar with their new employees‟ knowledge, expertise and 
potential for opportunistic behaviour. This increases relative behavioural uncertainty in 
evaluating internal employees and hence new members entering the organisation seek 
the advice of independent advisers outside the organisation rather than internal advisers. 
Table 3.9 presents the questionnaire items and archival proxies used to measure 
the degree of behavioural uncertainty associated with a company‟s risk management 
activities. The items and measurement scales are modified or adapted from existing 
studies. 
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Table 3.9 Survey questionnaire items and archival proxy measuring behavioural 
uncertainty 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
10. It is or would be difficult to include all 
aspects of performance (e.g. quantity, quality 
& timeliness) in contractual arrangements 
with any external consultants we engage for 
risk management activities. 
Perceived difficulty 
of performance 
evaluation 
measurement 
Likert Scale – 
6pt (Strongly 
Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) 
(Aubert et al., 1996a; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2003; Klein, 1989; 
McIvor, 2009; Speklé et 
al., 2007; Widener and 
Selto, 1999) 
If any risk management activities are 
outsourced: 
16. How easy it is to evaluate the quality of 
outsourced risk management activities in 
your company? 
Perceived difficulty 
of performance 
quality 
measurement 
Likert Scale – 
5pt 
(very difficult –
very easy) 
(Anderson and 
Schmittlein, 1984; Aubert 
et al., 1996a; Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2003; 
Klein, 1989; McIvor, 
2009; Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999) 
Archival Proxy Measure Scale Basis 
Behavioural uncertainty  
New 
Management‟s 
Perceived difficulty 
in evaluating 
existing staff 
Dichotomous 
variable 1= 
change in CEO 
in last two 
years 
(Kent, 2011) 
 
3.3.5 Frequency  
Recall that the TCE dimension of frequency represents the volume and value of 
transactions over time (Speklé et al., 2007). TCE predicts a greater volume of 
transactions provides greater potential for gaining benefits from economies of scale and 
so reducing production costs and leads to internal specialisation  (Klein, 1989; Klein et 
al., 1990). Prior studies have used a number of alternative single and composite 
measures for frequency. 
A number of archival proxies have been used in the prior literature to measure 
frequency of transactions. Studies that provide evidence to support frequency as a 
predictor of governance mode include Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), who find 
company size measured by asset value to be a significant independent explanatory 
variable in determining the extent of integration of a sales force. Klein (1989) and Klein 
et al., (1990) in their study of vertical control in international markets measure 
frequency as sales volume by a survey instrument and find a strong relation with 
channel integration of the marketing and distribution functions. Erramilli and Rao (1993) 
use the number of employees as a measure of company size when examining the 
preferred governance mode for service industries entering foreign markets. Zaheer and 
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Venkatraman (1995) examine a sample of independent insurance agencies and find a 
significant positive relation between company size measured by operating revenue and 
the extent of integration. Murray, and Kotabe (1999) examine the sourcing strategies of 
U.S. service companies measure frequency of transaction by a survey questionnaire and 
results support the theory. Kent (2011) measures frequency as a function of the size of 
the company measured by asset value and finds a significant negative relation with the 
amount of management advisory services purchased from external suppliers.  
In contrast Nam et al., (1996), in their study of outsourcing information systems, 
find a significant positive relation between company size measured by sales revenue and 
outsourcing. Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009) examine the extent of outsourcing in the 
components manufacturing industry and find companies are more likely to outsource as 
the number of employees rises. Carey et al., (2006) find no relation between company 
size measured by asset value and the outsourcing of internal audit. Beaumont and Sohal 
(2004) find size measured by number of employees, revenue and scope of operations 
has little relation to the decision to outsource. 
A number of prior studies have measured frequency using a composite variable 
of questionnaire items and archival measures. Widener and Selto (1999) use three 
questionnaire items and three archival proxies, and Speklé et al., (2007) use two 
questionnaire items plus two archival proxies. Both studies find strong support for 
frequency as a predictor of governance choice consistent with the theory using this 
methodology. This study adopts the approach of combining questions and archival 
measures. 
Table 3.10 presents the questionnaire items and archival proxies used to measure 
frequency of transaction for risk management activities. Two questionnaire items 
directly seek to measure the frequency and volume of risk management activities 
undertaken in the period. These are the volume of risk management projects and 
magnitude of direct expenditure on risk management. These measures are combined 
with three archival proxies of company size to produce a single variable for frequency 
in the statistical analysis discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 3.10 Survey questionnaire items and archival proxies measuring frequency 
Item Measure Scale Basis 
21. Could you estimate how many separately 
identifiable risk management projects and 
ongoing operational activities (including 
internal audit, special projects, fraud 
analysis) were performed in your company 
for the 2009 financial year? 
Volume of 
transactions 
Number of 
individual 
projects 
(Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; Murray and Kotabe, 
1999; Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999) 
22. Could you estimate your company‟s total 
expenditure on risk management activities 
undertaken in the 2009 financial year?          
Magnitude of 
expenditure 
Total 
expenditure on 
risk 
management  
scaled by total 
operating 
expenditures 
Developed by researcher 
Archival Proxies Measure Scale Basis 
Number of employees  Frequency 
Number of 
employees 
(Beaumont and Sohal, 
2004; Erramilli and Rao, 
1993; Parmigiani and 
Mitchell, 2009; Speklé et 
al., 2007; Widener and 
Selto, 1999) 
Operating Revenue Frequency 
Operating 
Revenue 
Log of 
Operating 
Revenue 
(Beasley et al., 2005; 
Beaumont and Sohal, 
2004; John and Weitz, 
1988; Klein et al., 1990; 
Nam et al., 1996; Speklé et 
al., 2007; Widener and 
Selto, 1999; Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995) 
Total Assets Frequency 
Natural 
Logarithm of 
Total Assets 
(Abbott et al., 2007; 
Anderson, 1985; Anderson 
and Schmittlein, 1984; 
Carey et al., 2006; Kent, 
2011; Widener and Selto, 
1999) 
 
3.3.6 Control variables 
A number of alternative factors could influence the sourcing decision for a 
company‟s risk management activities. Table 3.11 on page 72 presents questionnaire 
items and archival proxies used to measure company characteristics identified by prior 
research likely to influence the external sourcing decision. 
The sample companies used in this study are representative of all ten industry 
sectors on the ASX. A number of prior studies examining governance choice from a 
TCE perspective have focused on a specific industry to detect differences in practice 
and avoid the results being compounded by industry-specific effects. These include 
studies that have focused on the electronic components industry (Anderson, 1985, 1988; 
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Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984), the coal industry 
(Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1990), automotive components (Monteverde and Teece, 1982) 
and information technology (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Aubert et al., 1996a, 2003; 
Wang, 2002). 
Recall that a company‟s risk management activities are likely to be related to the 
industry in which they operate and industry bodies can restrict management‟s discretion 
with regard to risk management activities (Christie et al., 2003). It is argued this 
influence relates to the nature and magnitude of activities rather than governance choice 
which is a function of company specific factors as predicted by TCE. However, in order 
to control for potential confounding effects of industry, this study has adopting a 
modified version of a U.S. industry schema developed by (Christie et al., 2003) as an 
industry level control for knowledge transfer costs as a factor influencing the 
governance choice decision. The 67 Global Industry Classification Standard sub-sectors 
are classified to the equivalent U.S. Standard Industry Classification and categorised as 
non specialised (0.0), mixed (0.5) or specialised (1.0). Each company in the sample 
under analysis is then classified according to these criteria and assigned a value. This 
information is presented in Appendices B-1 to B-5. 
A company derives its competitive strength from its proprietary assets and is 
protective about losing these to an alliance partner (Kale et al., 2000). Thus, companies 
whose operations involve significant proprietary knowledge are expected to minimise 
the use of external consultants and conduct activities in house even though outsourcing 
may incur lower transaction costs. Therefore, this study uses the degree of exposure to 
proprietary information as a control variable because it is likely to influence the 
governance choice for risk management activities. It is expected that the greater 
proportion of time risk management staff spend working with proprietary information 
indicates more internal production. On the basis human expertise and knowledge are 
related to human asset specificity, other studies have included working with proprietary 
and information as a measure of asset specificity (Abbott et al., 2007; Anderson, 1985; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Christensen et al., 
2009; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). This study is based on the 
assumption that risk management activities by definition have a degree of 
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confidential/proprietary content and treats this variable individually as a control distinct 
from the four separate measures of asset specificity specified in the empirical model. 
As previously stated, prior research indicates that the reputation of the external 
supplier is a key consideration when companies consider outsourcing activities to 
external suppliers (Beasley et al., 2005; Kent, 2011; Wang, 2002). Kent (2011) proposes 
that the large international accounting firms are likely to have increased knowledge and 
expertise in offering management advisory services. Results from Kent‟s research 
indicate that companies purchase more management advisory services when their 
external auditor is from one the top five international accounting firms30. Hence, this 
study identifies the service provider for both external audit and risk management 
activities as either Big4, non Big4 accounting practice or other professional service 
provider on the basis that companies are more likely to outsource to external suppliers 
with a reputation for quality regardless of other factors.  
TCE proposes that a company‟s decision to internalise or outsource their risk 
management is determined by the relative transaction costs for each alternative. 
However, the ability to make this choice is based on the assumption that a company has 
the resources available to implement the decision. Establishing and maintaining a risk 
management function is costly and the literature identifies a number of financial factors 
outside of the TCE framework that have the capacity to restrain internalisation of the 
function. This study controls for the level of capital intensity measured as the ratio of 
fixed assets to operating revenue (Erramilli and Rao, 1993), financial distress indicated 
by the company making a loss in two of the three previous years and growth measured 
by percentage growth in total assets in previous three years (Abbott et al., 2007; Kent, 
2011). Leverage has the capacity to reduce the financial resources available and 
preclude a company from contracting for risk management activities from any suppliers 
and is measured as total liabilities as a proportion of total assets (Kent, 2011). 
Recall this study draws on prior research to explore alternative explanations for 
internalising and outsourcing risk management at activities. The survey questionnaire 
                                                          
30
 In the time period under analysis in the Kent (2011) study, five international accounting firms 
constituted the Big 5, Arthur Anderson, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  
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instrument concludes with a request for respondents to identify any of six reasons to 
internalise and six reasons to outsource risk management activities relevant to their 
company. Table 3.12 on page 73 presents the questionnaire items and relevant studies 
referenced as the basis for each item. 
Table 3.11 - Control variables  
Item Measure Scale Basis 
Industry 
Knowledge 
transfer costs per 
industry 
Interval scale 
represented by 
three 
categories, 0.0, 
0.5 and 1 
(Christie et al., 2003; 
Demsetz, 1988) 
20. Approximately how much time did your 
staff and/or external consultants performing 
risk management activities spend working 
with 'commercial in confidence/proprietary' 
information? 
Extent of exposure 
to proprietary 
information 
Four 
Categories: 0%, 
< 50%; > 50%; 
uncertain 
(Abbott et al., 2007; 
Anderson, 1985; Anderson 
and Schmittlein, 1984; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2003; Christensen et al., 
2009; Kale et al., 2000; 
Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999)  
Reputation 
Quality of external 
supplier 
Dichotomous 
variable 1=Big4 
provider of risk 
management 
services or 
external audit 
(Beasley et al., 2005; De 
Vita et al., 2009; Kent, 
2011; Wang, 2002) 
Capital Intensity 
Restraint on 
internalisation of 
risk management 
function 
Ratio of fixed 
assets to 
operating 
revenue 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993) 
Growth (previous 3 years) 
Restraint on 
internalisation of 
risk management 
function 
Percentage 
change in total 
assets over 
previous three 
years 
(Abbott et al., 2007; Kent, 
2011) 
Financial Distress 
Restraint on 
internalisation of 
risk management 
function 
Dichotomous 
variable 1=if 
loss made in 
two of three 
previous years 
(Abbott et al., 2007; Kent, 
2011) 
Leverage 
Restraint on 
internalisation of 
risk management 
function 
Total liabilities 
as a proportion 
of total assets 
(Kent, 2011) 
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Table 3.12 – Survey questionnaire items for other reasons to internalise or 
outsource risk management activities 
Q 24.Reasons to INTERNALISE Basis 
Strategic importance 
(Arnold, 2000; Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; 
Lonsdale, 1999; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; 
Raiborn et al., 2009; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000) 
Difficulty of managing relationships with 
external providers 
(Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Raiborn et al., 
2009; Serafini et al., 2003) 
To mitigate risk of sub-optimal service 
(Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; Selim and 
Yiannakas, 2000; Serafini et al., 2003) 
Non-standard nature of tasks (Beaumont and Sohal, 2004) 
To maintain flexibility 
(Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; Quinn and 
Hilmer, 1994; Raiborn et al., 2009; Serafini et al., 2003) 
Economies of scale (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002) 
Q 25. Reasons to OUTSOURCE Basis 
Access to expertise 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Quélin 
and Duhamel, 2003; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000; Serafini et al., 2003) 
To concentrate on core activities and 
competencies 
(Arnold, 2000; Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Quélin and 
Duhamel, 2003; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000) 
Share risks 
(Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000; Gilley 
and Rasheed, 2000b; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000) 
Variable demand requirements (Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Serafini et al., 2003) 
To achieve best practice 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000; Serafini 
et al., 2003) 
Routine nature of activity (Abbott et al., 2007; Widener, 2004) 
 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter describes the research methodology adopted in the development of 
the research instrument. A survey questionnaire and archival proxies are developed to 
measure and operationalise the three transactional dimensions predicted by TCE to 
influence the governance choice for risk management activities of ASX listed 
companies. Chapter 4 describes the research protocol employed to design and 
administer the survey questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study identifies the factors that determine how ASX listed companies‟ 
resource their risk management function. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology 
used to measure and operationalise the three transactional dimensions predicted by TCE 
to influence the governance choice for risk management activities, to test the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 2. This chapter outlines the research protocol employed in the 
design and administration of the survey questionnaire and proceeds in the following 
manner. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the research development and protocol 
which is conducted in three stages, stage one is described in chapter 3. Section 4.3 
describes stage two, the questionnaire refinement process. Section 4.4 describes stage 
three, the administration of the survey questionnaire instrument. Section 4.5 describes 
the construction of each of the individual hypothesised variables for inclusion in the 
regression analysis, and section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
A survey questionnaire is administered by mail and email to obtain data that is 
combined with archival data from company annual reports to operationalise attributes 
measured. This study requires insight into organisational policies and practices with 
regard to ASX listed companies‟ risk management activities (Baruch and Holtom, 2008).  
A key objective of this research is generalisablity to the population of companies 
listed on the ASX in 2009 and administering a survey questionnaire to a large sample is 
an appropriate approach (Flynn et al., 1990). Mail administered surveys are one of the 
most frequently used methods of data collection in empirical TCE research (Macher and 
Richman, 2008). Flynn et al., (1990, p. 262) note that “mail surveys are very effective 
for well defined research topics with a fairly narrow scope”.  
The survey questionnaire, incorporating a variety of research methods, is 
developed in three stages to ensure the reliability and validity of the research instrument 
and a summary of this process is presented at the end of this section. The reliability of a 
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research instrument is concerned with consistency of measurement of the constructs
31
 
for operationalisation (Sekaran, 2003) and is a prerequisite for establishing validity 
(Flynn et al., 1990). Validity is concerned with how well an instrument measures the 
construct it is intended to measure (Flynn et al., 1990; Sekaran, 2003).   
The first stage in the survey questionnaire development process, item generation 
and scale development is described in chapter 3. The second stage involves refinement 
procedures to maximise the survey‟s response rate, given generalisablity is a key 
objective. The questionnaire is designed using the principles of the Total Design 
Method to survey a large sample of the population of ASX listed companies (Dillman, 
1972, 1978, 1991; Dillman, Christenson, Carpenter, and  Brooks, 1974). The Total 
Design Method is a theoretically driven comprehensive system with prescribed 
procedures that consistently enhances response rates for most survey populations 
(Dillman, 1991). 
The third stage is survey administration. The survey questionnaire is sent to the 
Chief Financial Officer (or Company Secretary if not available) of 1811 companies
32
 
listed on the ASX as at 31
st
 December 2009 over a six week period from March to May 
2010. This is the first full reporting period for ASX listed companies under the 
enhanced reporting requirements for risk management. The sample surveyed represents 
approximately 90 per cent of the population of companies listed on the ASX domiciled 
in Australia in this time period. Two follow-up questionnaires are administered by mail 
and email and a 17.10 per cent response rate was achieved. Data from the questionnaire 
is tested for reliability and validity, and then operationalised with archival data from 
company annual reports in empirical models. Table 4.1 below presents a summary
33
 of 
this research protocol. 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 A construct is a theoretical creation based on observations which cannot be observed directly or 
indirectly (Babbie, 1998). 
32
 Contact details and financial report data was available from database sources for 1863 companies, 52 
were excluded, 93 were returned undeliverable and 77 declined to participate. Final sample size is 1641. 
33
 This table is a modification of a table presented in a study by Aubert et al. (1996a) describing a three-
stage validation process for a survey instrument to measure the transactional dimensions of information 
systems transactions. 
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Table 4.1 - Summary of research instrument development & administration 
process 
Research Instrument Development & Administration Process 
Goodness of 
Measures 
Stage 1-
Construction of 
measures: 
item/scale 
generation and 
development 
(discussed in 
chapter 3) 
 
 Review of existing measures (questionnaire item and scales) 
from prior literature across a variety of disciples and assembly 
of questionnaire item master. 
 Construction of measures by a process of modification and 
adaption of existing measures to risk management research 
context. 
 Construction of initial research instrument consisting of 54 
items and corresponding measurement scales for questionnaire 
and 15 archival proxies. 
 Initial research instrument review and feedback from expert 
panel. 
 Reliability 
and content 
validity 
 
 
 
 
 
 Content and 
face validity 
Stage 2 - 
Refinement of 
research 
instrument 
 
 Design of questionnaire with 25 items and corresponding 
measurement scales. 
 Second and third research instrument review and feedback from 
expert academic panel. 
 Pilot survey sent to three CFOs for feedback by telephone 
interview resulting in minor adjustments. 
 Final research instrument review and feedback from expert 
panel prior to ethical review.  
 
 
 Content and 
face validity 
Stage 3 - Survey 
administration 
 Survey questionnaire administered to 1811 ASX listed 
companies by mail. Two follow up questionnaires administered 
by mail and email. 
 Data from survey questionnaires combined with archival data 
from respondents annual reports for analysis. 
 Statistical tests for reliability: non-response bias, early versus 
late response bias, mail versus email response bias and 
construct validity: logit and multiple regression. 
 
 
 Response 
bias 
reliability 
 Construct 
validity 
 
4.3 REFINEMENT PROCEDURES – STAGE 2 
Following item generation and scale development as described in chapter 3, the 
second stage of the development process refines the research instrument prior to 
administration. This involves questionnaire design, further review and feedback and a 
survey pilot. 
4.3.1 Survey Design 
Sampling the population is an efficient technique to obtain information about the 
whole (Yu and Cooper, 1983). However, efficiency does not translate to accuracy and 
there is the risk that the validity and reliability of the results are threatened by non-
response bias. Non-response bias occurs if those that do not respond are systematically 
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different from those that do, thus compromising the generalisablity of the results (Flynn 
et al., 1990). To address this issue the survey is designed using the Total Design Method 
developed by Don Dillman (Dillman, 1972, 1978; Dillman et al., 1974). Total Design 
Method utilises social exchange theory as a theoretical framework positing that 
recipients undertake a cost benefit appraisal when making the decision about whether or 
not to respond. 
The intended survey recipient is the Chief Financial Officer or Company 
Secretary of each ASX listed company in the surveyed population. Top executives have 
intense demands on their time and receive frequent requests from academic scholars and 
other researchers for information. Baruch (1999) notes that executive response rates had 
declined over the previous two decades due to the increasing number of surveys 
received. Cycyota and Harrison (2006) suggest that this trend combined with increasing 
pressure on executives of running organisations has prompted many companies to adopt 
a formal company policy to reject survey requests. In a meta-analysis of survey 
response rates in the management literature from 1992 to 2003, Cycyota and Harrison 
(2006) find evidence of a significant decline in response rates. Hence, a key objective of 
the survey design is maximisation of the response rate. 
Top executives are more likely to answer questions if the topic is salient (i.e., 
important to them at the time), relates directly to their responsibilities and is relevant to 
their organisational environment (Baruch, 1999; Cycyota and Harrison, 2002; Heberlein 
and Baumgartner, 1978). There is a strong positive correlation with salience and 
response rates (Sheehan and McMillan, 1999). In their meta-analysis, Cycyota and 
Harrison (2006) find evidence that salience alone contributes to variation in the 
response rates from top managers. The Total Design Method approach treats salience as 
a manipulable variable that can be enhanced by ensuring the questionnaire design 
process addresses three primary considerations. First, reduction of perceived costs by 
making the questionnaire appear simple and, therefore, less time consuming to complete. 
Second, increase perceived rewards by making the questionnaire items relevant and of 
interest to the respondents. Third, promote trust by identifying professional affiliation, 
noting sponsorship and guaranteeing anonymity. 
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Quality control formats for questionnaire design are applied to ensure readability 
(Dillman, 1978). These include formatting to accommodate question scales, the use of 
shading to separate items, font of sufficient size, and use of bold and italics. Clearly 
stating each anchor label enhances interpretation of measurement results (Weng, 2004). 
The questionnaire (see Appendices A-1 and A-2), containing 25 items, is designed to fit 
on both sides of one page as the length of a questionnaire is one of the main motivations 
for not completing a survey (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, and  Thompson, 1994). 
Each questionnaire is accompanied by a covering letter (see Appendices A-2 and 
A-3) containing an explanatory statement personally addressed to each recipient printed 
on quality stationary with a university letterhead. Personalisation establishes the 
importance of the respondents‟ information, the special role of each respondent and 
demonstrates greater effort on the part of the researcher (Dillman, 1972). Previous 
research has identified university affiliation as a positive influence on postal mail 
survey response rates (Sheehan and McMillan, 1999). 
The covering letter is clearly titled and composed to identify the research focus, 
highlighting risk management and the additional compliance burden companies face 
with the adoption of the amended corporate governance Principle 7: Identify and 
Manage Risk (Dillman, 1972, 1978). Confidentiality is a primary concern for executives 
and research provides evidence that a guarantee of anonymity improves response rates 
(Falconer and Hodgett, 1999; Jobber and O'Reilly, 1998). For identification purposes, 
each letter is referenced to the company‟s individual ASX code and, therefore, an 
explanation is provided, along with an assurance of anonymity and an invitation to 
contact the researchers by telephone or email about any aspect of the survey. The letter 
concludes with an expression of thanks and is personally signed with the electronic 
signatures of the principal researchers. As an incentive, the letter and questionnaire 
highlight the opportunity for respondents to receive a copy of the results. Monetary 
incentives are not considered due to budgetary considerations and the nature of the 
target audience.  Research indicates that the use of material incentives in surveys does 
not have any discernable effect on response rates amongst executives (Baruch and 
Holtom, 2008; Cycyota and Harrison, 2002; Dillman, 1991).  
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It is suggested that postage paid replies improve response rates (Cycyota and 
Harrison, 2006; Jobber and O'Reilly, 1998). A return addressed reply paid envelope is 
included in each letter for the respondents‟ convenience.  
Table 4.2 summarises the application of the Total Design Method (TDM) 
recommendations in the survey administration process. The questionnaire and 
accompanying letters (initial and follow ups) are presented in Appendices A-1 to A-7. 
Table 4.2 Summary of TDM recommendations implemented in survey 
administration 
TDM 
Recommendation 
Implementation in survey 
Explanatory letter 
 Letter personalised to CFO by name and position on Bond University colour 
letter heading and signed using scanned signature. 
 Brief summary of topic, scope, relevance, regulatory environment and research 
application, value and benefits on front page.  Comprehensive explanatory 
statement on back page. 
 Limited time requirement to complete questionnaire highlighted. 
 Contact details of researchers and invitation to follow up queries by telephone 
or email. 
 Assurance of anonymity and explanation of coding. 
 Reply paid for convenience. 
 University affiliation and sponsorship obtained from professional associations. 
 Ethical approval noted and confirmation contact details provided. 
 Anticipatory thanks and incentive offered (copy of results and report). 
Questionnaire 
 Questions ordered to ensure congruence with explanatory letter. 
 Use of question writing principles to ensure ease of task of reading and 
answering. 
 Use of formatting principles to ensure ease of task of reading and completing 
questionnaire, for example alternative shading, contrasting font size, use of 
bold and italics. 
 Survey designed to fit on one page (front and back) to reduce appearance of 
time and effort required to compete task of questionnaire completion. 
Incentive 
 Offer to send copy of report and results. 
Mail Follow up 
 Two follow ups with informative covering letters that politely explain 
relevance of survey and consequence of non receipt. Replacement 
questionnaire and reply paid envelopes included. 
Email survey follow 
up 
 Administered by an online service provider, SurveyMonkey, for third follow up 
where email address could be obtained from database. 
 Adapted to suit electronic delivery mode maintaining adherence to same 
principles as mail survey. 
 
The questionnaire and covering letters were reviewed and feedback provided by 
the expert panel prior to pilot testing. A pilot survey was then sent to three Chief 
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Financial Officers from ASX listed companies who agreed to provide feedback by 
telephone interviews. A number of minor modifications are made as a result of this 
process. The final research instrument, consisting of questionnaire and accompanying 
letters with explanatory statement for initial and follow ups, was sent to the university 
ethics committee for approval prior to survey administration. 
4.4 SURVEY ADMINISTRATION – STAGE 3 
The third stage of the development process is administration of the survey. This 
involves sample selection, key informant selection, and distribution and follow up of the 
survey. The survey administration commenced with the first questionnaire mailing on 
the 24
th
 March 2010. The first follow up reminder was sent one month later on the 27
th
 
April 2010 and the second on the 11
th
 May 2010. The companies surveyed were asked 
to report on their risk management activities for the financial year ending in 2009 which 
is the first full reporting period for ASX listed companies under the enhanced reporting 
requirements for risk management. Companies listed on the ASX are subject to the 
revised principles guidance on risk management in the first financial year commencing 
on or after 1
st
 January 2008. Therefore, the first disclosures are for companies with a 
reporting period ending 31
st
 December 2008. Companies with a 30
th
 June year end did 
not have to report until 30
th
 June 2009.  
4.4.1 Sample selection 
The company is the unit of analysis in this empirical research study. Of the 
approximately 2000 companies listed on the ASX that reported in 2009, contact details 
and financial reporting data are available from the databases Aspect Huntly FinAnalysis, 
Morningstar DatAnalysis and Standard and Poor‟s Capital IQ for 1863 companies. 
Listed managed investment schemes
34
 are excluded from the study due to their 
                                                          
34
 A managed investment scheme is a scheme, often in the form of a unit trust, in which investors 
(members) pool their contributions to acquire an interest to benefits in the scheme which commonly 
invest in financial assets such as fixed interest securities, equities and related securities, property 
securities, financial derivatives. Members of the scheme do not have day to day control over the operation 
of the scheme. A Responsible Entity must be appointed, who has the dual role of trustee and manager. A 
Responsible Entity must be an Australian public company holding a dealer's licence. It is common for a 
responsible entity to manage numerous listed managed investment schemes. There is also specific 
application of the principles for trusts and externally managed entities under the governance of a 
responsible entity (Desmarchelier, 1999). 
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management structure and type of operations. Listed foreign entities with their head 
office located overseas are also excluded due to the difficulty in them corresponding.  
This resulted in a final sample size of 1811 companies who were sent the survey 
questionnaire.   
4.4.2 Key informant selection 
The survey questionnaire was addressed to the Chief Financial Officer as the 
key informant. If there was no designated Chief Financial Officer then the questionnaire 
was sent to the Company Secretary. The key informant selection is based on two criteria. 
First, the Chief Financial Officer is one of the two parties
35
 required under legislation to 
provide certification with regard to the company‟s risk management activities. Second, 
the Chief Financial Officer, in their financial and operational capacity, is assumed to 
have access to the requisite information relating to risk management activities across the 
organisation. Deloitte (2009, p. 7) note in their guide to Principle 7 that „an individual 
should be charged with implementing the risk management process and establishing a 
process to ensure that the reporting requirements of the Principle 7 are met. In small to 
medium companies this is often the Company Secretary or the Chief Financial Officer‟. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2007a, p. 19) state in the Principles that “the 
company secretary plays an important role in supporting the effectiveness of the board 
by monitoring that board policy and procedures are followed, and coordinating the 
timely completion and despatch of board agenda and briefing material”. 
4.4.3 Survey follow ups 
Research has consistently shown a powerful determinant of response rates to 
promote salience is the number of attempts made to contact the sample unit (Dillman, 
1972; Dillman et al., 1974; Flynn et al., 1990; Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978). 
Persistent follow ups can translate into increases of between 6 and 18 per cent (Cycyota 
and Harrison, 2002). Dillman (1972) recommends up to three follow ups containing 
replacement questionnaires. For individuals who have received the first survey, it 
underscores the importance of information and participation and serves to promote guilt 
in non-respondents (Cycyota and Harrison, 2002). The first follow up is administered 
                                                          
35
 Refer to discussion in Chapter 1, section 1.2: Regulatory Background. 
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by mail and contains a polite reminder, another copy of the survey and reply paid 
addressed envelope (see Appendix A-5). 
The internet provides researchers the opportunity to improve response rates by 
the use of email as an additional method of survey delivery (Dillman, Phelps, Tortora, 
Swift, Kohrell, Berck, and  Messer, 2009). As mail and email surveys rely on 
individuals‟ comprehension of written text, mode effects do not differ (Schaefer and 
Dillman, 1998) and the principles that apply to paper surveys also apply to web based 
surveys (Andrews, Nonnecke, and  Preece, 2003; Schaefer and Dillman, 1998). There 
are numerous benefits of email surveys which include cost savings from postage paper 
and labour administration (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998), rapid speed of transmission 
and ease of response. Email surveys, are also less likely to be ignored as junk mail 
(Bachmann, Elfrink, and  Vazzana, 1996; Tse, 1998), and where there is a preference 
for the convenience of email over mail the choice of response mode is appreciated. 
Mehta and Sivadas (1995) observe many tasks are completed in the electronic medium 
and completing an email survey is less likely to break the work continuum than 
completing a mail survey. In addition, the immediacy of the electronic medium also 
provides the opportunity for dialogue with the respondent
36
.  
The second and third follow ups were administered by email for those non-
respondents whose email addresses were obtainable (otherwise mail). The email survey 
used in this study, administered by SurveyMonkey
37
, is essentially an electronic version 
of the mail survey. The recipient was sent an email containing the same invitation as the 
mail follow up letters with an invitation to participate in the survey by a secured link. In 
addition, an opt-out offer to decline from the survey was included as recommended in 
the literature (Andrews et al., 2003).  
4.4.4 Response rate 
A 17.10 per cent response rate was achieved. Response time varied from two 
days to 111 days. Ninety-three survey questionnaires were returned over the 
                                                          
36
 Twelve respondents telephoned the researcher to comment on a number of issues including opportunity 
to engage with academe, guarantee of anonymity and salience of topic.  
37
 SurveyMonkey is online web-based software that enables users to create and administer questionnaires 
by email. 
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administration period, undeliverable to the addressee. New contact details were obtained 
and the survey resent. Returns after this period were not resent and excluded as 
undeliverable from the sample size (Carcello, Hermanson, and  Raghunandan, 2005). 
Seventy-seven companies that declined to participate and returned the survey with a 
statement of company policy against survey completion were also excluded from the 
sample. This resulted in a final sample size of 1641 companies and 281 questionnaires 
were returned. Data from the respondent questionnaires was coded and entered into an 
excel spreadsheet by an experienced research assistant in order to avoid possible bias 
introduced by the researcher (Flynn et al., 1990).  
The response rate from this study‟s survey is comparable with governance 
studies conducted in the field of internal audit. Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et 
al., (2007) in their studies of outsourcing internal audit from a TCE perspective, report 
useable response rates of 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Response rates from 
other U.S studies are similar. Serafini et al., (2003) received 81 responses from 447 
Chief Audit Executives surveyed (18 per cent). Beasley et al.(2005) achieved a 10.3 per 
cent response rate from a survey of Chief Financial Officers on the implementation of 
enterprise risk management. Trahan and Gitman (1995) achieve a 12 per cent response 
rate from a survey of Chief Financial Officers on barriers to using sophisticated 
financial management decision-making techniques. In a survey of Chief Executive 
Officers on their attitude to organisational change conducted in 1988, Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz and Fredrickson (1993) achieved a 20 per cent response rate. Gilley and 
Rasheed (2000a) surveyed top executives exploring the relationship between 
outsourcing core versus peripheral activities and firm performance and achieved a 17 
per cent response rate.  
A recent Australian study by Christopher, Sarens and Leung (2009) surveyed 
206 Chief Audit Executives by email and received 34 responses (17 per cent). 
Beaumont and Sohal (2004) achieved an 8 per cent response rate when surveying the 
Chief Executive Officers of Australian companies on the factors impacting the 
outsourcing decision in 2002. Falconer and Hodgett (1999), in an examination of 
executive response rates from international studies, concur that a range of 10 to 35 per 
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cent is to be expected with time and organisational constraints as the major constraining 
factors.  
4.5 CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLE MEASURES 
Recall that data from two primary sources are used to operationalise the 
variables of interest in this study. The survey questionnaire is designed to capture 
company specific information about the risk management function not available from 
public sources. This is used in conjunction with archival data from company annual 
reports to test the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. A discussion follows on the 
construction of each of the individual hypothesised variables for inclusion in the 
regression analysis, the results of which are discussed in chapter 5. 
4.5.1 Dependent variables 
Prior studies have frequently modelled the dependent variable, governance mode, 
as a binary variable: internalise or outsource (Abbott et al., 2007; Aubert et al., 1996a; 
Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). Fewer studies have modelled the dependent variable 
using the proportion of outsourced activities (Abbott et al., 2007; Anderson and 
Schmittlein, 1984; Carey et al., 2006; John and Weitz, 1988; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). This study models the dependent 
variable, the choice to outsource risk management activities both ways, as a predicator 
of the proportion of risk management activities outsourced (D1) and as a binary decision 
(D2 & 3 - yes/no or high/low) using data collected from the survey questionnaire. The 
variables are constructed from a combination of two items on the questionnaire. Item 2 
presents three discrete choices for the outsourcing of risk management activities, (all 
internal/all outsource/combination), and item 3 provides survey recipients with a choice 
of six categories of the percentage outsourced. Responses are coded accordingly and 
cross referenced for validity. Each respondent company is assigned a value 
corresponding to one of eight categories to produce an interval scale from a value of 0 
to a value of 7 for D1, the proportion of risk management services outsourced. The 
binary decision is coded as 1 if the company outsource some/all risk management 
services, 0 otherwise. A third dependent variable (D3) is produced for the subsample of 
125 companies outsourcing some/all risk management activities according to the 
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magnitude of activities outsourced. Given the limited outsourcing of risk management 
activities a value of one is given to the 38 companies outsourcing greater than 25 per 
cent of their risk management activities, zero otherwise. Sensitivity analysis is 
conducted categorising only the 12 companies outsourcing 50 per cent or more as high 
outsourcers of risk management activities and assigned a value of 1. Results are 
qualitatively similar overall although significance is lower in some variables. 
4.5.2 Asset specificity 
Recall that the specificity of the human assets associated with a company‟s risk 
management activities are the company specific skills and knowledge not transferrable 
to another company. This study uses a combination of survey questionnaire items and 
archival data from company annual reports to measure four different aspects of the TCE 
construct asset specificity of a company‟s risk management function. Four individual 
variables are constructed for inclusion in the regression analysis for the whole sample. 
The independent variable for company specific knowledge and training is measured by 
the sum of the individual scores from a 6 point Likert attitudinal scale from four 
questionnaire items (7, 8, 9 and 11). The higher the score, the higher the implied level 
of asset specificity. The reliability of the scale is measured producing a Cronbach‟s 
coefficient of 0.72 indicating the individual items are reliably measuring the same 
underlying construct at an acceptable level (DeVellis, 1991). Reliability relates to the 
precision and the consistency of the instrument to measure its intended construct 
(DeCoster, 2005; Sekaran, 2003). Cronbach‟s alpha is commonly used and indicates 
how well the items measuring a concept are positively correlated to one another, and the 
closer to one the higher the internal consistency and reliability (Sekaran, 2003).  
The second and third variables, contractual characteristics and staff turnover, are 
measured as interval scales constructed from two questionnaire items (12 and 15) using 
6 and 5 point Likert attitudinal scales respectively. Item 15 is reverse coded
38
. The 
fourth variable representing asset specificity is the archival proxy, expenditure on 
research and development as a proportion of operating revenue. Two additional 
                                                          
38
 Reverse coded items are re-worded so that lower responses indicate a larger amount of the abstract 
construct of interest and incorporated in order to encourage respondents to read each question carefully 
(DeCoster, 2005; Herche and Engelland, 1996). 
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variables are constructed from questionnaire items 5 and 6 for analysis of the subsample 
of companies outsourcing risk management activities. Companies are assigned a value 
of 1 (less than one year), 2 (one to three years) or 3 (more than three years) according to 
contract length with external suppliers (item 5). A dichotomous variable is used to 
measure if training is provided to external suppliers with companies assigned a value of 
1 if so, otherwise 0 (item 6). Item 13, requesting respondents to quantify the number of 
hours spent on company specific training, is not used in the analysis due to 27 per cent 
of companies (75) indicating this information was not available. 
4.5.3 Environmental uncertainty 
Recall that environmental uncertainty is a broad concept encompassing a 
number of different constructs (Kent, 2011). This study decomposes environmental 
uncertainty into three separate dimensions, volume/demand, technological and diversity, 
which predict different governance modes. 
Volume/Demand: Recall that volume/demand uncertainty is when companies 
do not know the exact quantity of a product or service. Two variables for this dimension 
are operationalised in the regression analysis. First, based on the existing literature, the 
variable for the dynamic nature of the external economic environmental is constructed 
from questionnaire item 18, a 5 point Likert attitudinal scale (Artz and Brush, 2000; 
Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988; Klein, 
1989; Klein et al., 1990; McIvor, 2009; Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Parmigiani and 
Mitchell, 2009; Speklé et al., 2007; Wang, 2002; Widener and Selto, 1999; Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). Second the archival proxy, the standard deviation of sales in the 
past three years, is used to measure uncertainty in volume/demand in a number of 
studies (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Artz and Brush, 2000; Aubert et al., 2003; 
John and Weitz, 1988; Levy, 1985; Walker and Weber, 1984; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
Technological: Recall technological uncertainty is defined in terms of the pace 
of technological change and the unpredictable changes in technical requirements such as 
standards, component specification or general technological developments. Based on 
the existing literature this variable is constructed from questionnaire item 19, a 5 point 
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Likert attitudinal scale (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Gordon 
and Narayanan, 1984; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
Diversity: Recall, diversity of the environment reflects the extent to which there 
are multiple sources of uncertainty in a company‟s internal and external environment. 
This study draws on existing literature and uses five individual variables to measure 
diversity. First internal functional diversity is constructed from item 17, a 5 point Likert 
attitudinal scale measuring the degree of modifications or adaptions required to risk 
management processes required to suit different departments or divisions (Aubert et al., 
1996a; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). Second, the heterogeneous nature 
of a company‟s operations is operationalised by the four archival proxies of competition, 
number of subsidiaries, proportion of overseas revenue and whether the company has 
had a re structure, acquisition or merger in the past three years.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used as a statistical measure of 
concentration as a proxy measure for competition. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
2009 is calculated by squaring the market shares of all companies in each of the 147 
GICS Sub-industry
39
 sectors and then summing the squares. This produces an index 
with a maximum value of one when a monopoly exists, declining towards zero in a 
purely competitive market with the introduction of more and more companies in each 
industry sector. In order to ease interpretation and maintain consistency of predicted 
direction with the other hypothesised variables for diversity, the calculated Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is rescaled (1 minus the index) to rise as competition in the industry 
sector increases. 
Environmental diversity is measured as the number of subsidiaries (Kent, 2011) 
and the proportion of revenues from foreign operations (Abbott et al., 2007). Diversity 
through changes in the company‟s organisational structure is measured as a 
dichotomous variable given a value of one if there has been a re-structure, acquisition or 
merger or in the past three years, zero otherwise. Widener and Selto (1999) uses a 
survey questionnaire to measure any acquisition, divestitures or reorganisations in the 
respondent company as a measure of environmental uncertainty. Kent (2011) finds 
                                                          
39
 Recall Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) consists of 10 Sectors aggregated from 24 
Industry Groups, 67 Industry sectors and 147 Sub-Industry sectors. 
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purchases of management advisory service from external suppliers are associated with 
restructuring. 
4.5.4 Behavioural uncertainty 
Recall, behavioural uncertainty is associated with the evaluation of individual 
productivity and performance of human assets (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 
1981a). This study measures three aspects of behavioural uncertainty associated with 
risk management activities. First, the perceived degree of difficulty in defining 
performance parameters in contracts for external suppliers is constructed from a 6 point 
Likert scale (item 10) (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Aubert et al., 1996a; Klein, 
1989; McIvor, 2009; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). Second, evaluation 
of the quality of outsourced risk management activities by company‟s management is 
constructed from a 5 point Likert attitudinal scales (item 16, reverse coded) for use in 
the analysis of the subsample of companies that outsource risk management activities. 
Third, the behavioural uncertainty implications for new management are measured by a 
dichotomous variable and given a value of one indicating a change in the CEO in the 
past two years, zero otherwise (Kent, 2011). 
4.5.5 Frequency 
It is highly likely that company size directly impacts on transaction frequency 
for risk management activities. A number of studies have used archival proxies 
(Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Kent, 2011; Klein, 1989; 
Klein et al., 1990; Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) and 
composite measures incorporating questionnaire items (Speklé et al., 2007; Widener 
and Selto, 1999). This study measures frequency by a composite variable derived from 
three archival proxies (number of employees, revenue, total assets). Due to the different 
measuring scales of the individual components, each of the three measures are 
standardised 40  and the proxy score for frequency is measured by the mean of the 
standardised item scores (Speklé et al., 2007). Two additional questionnaire items 
intended to measure frequency were included in the survey. Item 21 requested survey 
                                                          
40 Each input is standardised by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the 
individual measure. 
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recipients to estimate the number of individual projects and item 22 the total 
expenditure on risk management activities. However a large number of respondents 
reported this data as unavailable precluding their use in the regression analysis. 
4.5.6 Control variables 
As it is likely other company characteristics influence the sourcing decision for 
risk management activities this study includes seven control variables in the statistical 
modelling. First, in order to control for potential confounding effects of industry this 
study has adopting a modified version of a U.S. industry schema developed by (Christie 
et al., 2003) as an industry level control for knowledge transfer costs, a factor 
influencing the governance choice decision. The sixty-seven Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) industry sub-sectors used to classify ASX listed 
companies are classified to the equivalent U.S. standard industry classifications system41 
(SIC) categories and assigned values as either non-specialised (0.0), mixed (0.5) or 
specialised (1.0) according to the Christie et al., (2003) schema. The industry 
descriptions and categorisation criteria data are presented in Appendices B-1 to B-5. 
Second, this study measures exposure to proprietary information as a categorical 
variable because companies whose operations involve significant proprietary knowledge 
are expected to minimise the use of external consultants and conduct activities in house 
even though outsourcing incurs lower transaction costs. Item 20 provides four discrete 
choices for the amount of time risk management staff spend working with 
proprietary/commercial in confidence information. Reponses are assigned values, zero 
equals 0 per cent, one equals less than 50 per cent, two equals more than fifty per cent. 
The fourth choice, „uncertain‟, elicits 24 responses. There are several methods of coding 
„uncertain‟ responses (Evans, Flores, and  Boyle, 2002). This study systematically 
substitutes each of the three discrete alternatives thereby constructing three alternative 
variables for inclusion in the statistical analysis
42
.  
                                                          
41
 Standard Industrial Classification is a U.S. government system for classifying industries by a four-digit 
code. 
42
 This variable is not significant in any of the regression models under any of the three alternative 
classifications.  
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Third, this study codes reputation as a dichotomous variable assigning a value of 
one if the service provider for external audit and/or risk management activities is a Big4 
accounting practice, otherwise zero on the basis companies are more likely to outsource 
due to quality considerations.  
Recall that according to TCE, a company‟s decision to internalise or outsource 
their risk management is a determined by the relative transaction costs for each option.  
However, the ability to make this choice is based on the assumption that the company 
has the resources available to make this decision. Drawing on the existing literature, this 
study controls for financial factors which have the capacity to restrain internalisation of 
the risk management function. Capital intensity measured as the ratio of fixed assets to 
operating revenue (Erramilli and Rao, 1993) and growth measured as percentage change 
in total assets over three years (Abbott et al., 2007; Kent, 2011) signal rising resource 
commitments whose costs make it harder for companies to establish functions internally 
regardless of other factors. Financial distress is measured as a dichotomous variable 
equalling one if the company has reported a net loss in two of the previous three years, 
zero otherwise (Abbott et al., 2007). Leverage has the potential to reduce financial 
resources available and preclude a company from contracting for risk management 
activities is measured as total liabilities as a proportion of total assets (Kent, 2011). 
Table 4.3 below presents a summary of the constructed variables for operationalisation 
in the regression analysis. 
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Table 4.3 – Summary of variables constructed for statistical analysis 
Construct 
Data Source: 
Questionnaire / Archival 
Variable Label 
Dependent Variables: 
Proportion of risk management 
activities outsourced 
2 and 3 D1 
Outsource risk management 
activities (yes/no) 
2 D2 
Outsource risk management 
activities 
(high/low) 
2 and 3 D3 
Independent Variables: 
Asset specificity - Company 
specific knowledge and training 
7,8,9 and 11  
6 
Skills and Training 
Training Externals 
Asset specificity - Contractual 
characteristics 
12 
5 
Contract Incentives 
Contract Duration 
Asset specificity – Staff turnover 15 Staff Turnover 
Asset specificity – expenditure on 
research and development 
Research and Development/total 
operating revenue 
Research and 
Development 
Environmental uncertainty – 
dynamism 
18 Dynamism 
Std. dev. of sales in the past 3years Volume/Demand 
Environmental uncertainty – 
technology 
19 Technology 
Environmental uncertainty – 
diversity 
17 Modifications 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index Competition 
No. of subsidiaries Subsidiaries 
Proportion of overseas revenue Overseas Revenues 
If re-structure, acquisition or merger 
or in the past 3 years 
Restructure 
Behavioural uncertainty – 
performance evaluation 
10 and 6 
Performance Evaluation 
Performance Quality 
Behavioural uncertainty – new 
management 
If change in the CEO in the past 2 
years 
New Management 
Frequency 
number of employees, revenue, total 
assets 
Frequency 
Control Variables: 
Industry level control for 
knowledge transfer costs 
Modification of Christie et al., (2003) 
schema. 
Industry 
Exposure to proprietary 
information 
20 Proprietary 
Reputation of external supplier  If Big4 supplier  Big4 
Resource constraint on 
establishing internal risk 
management function 
Ratio of fixed assets to operating 
revenue 
Capital Intensity 
Percentage change in total assets over 
previous three years 
Growth (previous 3 years) 
Dichotomous variable 1=if loss made 
in two of three previous years 
Financial Distress 
Resource constraint on risk 
management activities 
Total liabilities as a proportion of 
total assets 
Leverage 
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4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter 3 described the development of the survey questionnaire items and 
archival proxies for measurement of the governance choice and the three transactional 
dimensions predicted by TCE to influence the governance choice for risk management 
activities of ASX listed companies. This chapter presents an overview of the research 
protocol employed in the development, design and administration of the survey 
questionnaire instrument. Chapter 5 presents the empirical models used to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 2 and discusses the results. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study seeks to identify factors impacting a company‟s decision to internally 
generate or outsource their risk management function. Chapter 2 presented four 
hypotheses based on the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics (TCE). A 
transaction‟s attributes can be characterised by the three broad principal dimensions of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency according to TCE. It is these dimensions 
which determine why some transactions are internalised and directed by managers in a 
hierarchy and others are outsourced in the market to external suppliers. It is proposed 
that the specificity of a company‟s human assets engaged in risk management activities 
is associated with less outsourcing. Increases in environmental uncertainty due to 
demand/volume and technological change, behavioural uncertainty and transaction 
frequency are related to less outsourcing. In contrast, higher levels of environmental 
diversity due to the heterogeneous nature of a company‟s operations and the behavioural 
uncertainty implications for new management are associated with increased outsourcing. 
Data is obtained from a survey questionnaire instrument and archival data from 
company annual reports in order to test the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the research 
methodology used to measure each of the hypothesised variables for operationalisation 
in the statistical analyses. Chapter 4 outlines the research protocol employed in the 
development, design and administration of the survey questionnaire sent to ASX listed 
companies requesting information about their risk management function for the 
financial year ending 2009. Linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis is used 
to test the hypotheses and explain the governance choice for risk management activities 
for ASX listed companies. 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the analyses. Section 5.2 
presents the descriptive statistics for the hypothesised variables and alternative 
explanations for outsourcing risk management activities. Section 5.3 presents the results 
from the linear and logistic multivariate regression analyses for the sample of 271 
companies responding to the survey. Section 5.4 presents the results from the linear and 
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logistic multivariate regression analyses for the sub sample of 125 of these companies 
outsourcing risk management activities. Section 5.5 provides further discussion of the 
results of the analysis. Section 5.6 presents tests conducted for response bias. Section 
5.7 discusses the results of the linear regression analysis incorporating multiplicative 
interaction terms. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The analysis of the results begins with descriptive statistics of the surveyed 
sample of companies for the nature, extent and sourcing characteristics of their risk 
management activities. The questionnaire data from 271 useable respondent companies 
is combined with archival financial data for hypotheses testing in linear and logistic 
multiple regression analysis. 125 companies reported outsourcing some risk 
management activities and this subsample is analysed independently. 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics – risk categories  
All respondent companies identified risk categories covered under a risk 
management system. Table 5.1 provides data for the fourteen identified categories of 
risks covered under a company‟s risk management system. Financial reporting, 
compliance and operational risks are identified as the top three categories of risk in 
coverage and as the top three priority risks. Environmental, sustainability and climate 
change are the least identified categories of risk and low priorities. Risk associated with 
human capital and the environment are the most frequently outsourced categories. The 
mean number of risk categories identified is 8.98, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum 
of 17 where additional categories are specified as covered under the company‟s risk 
management system43.  
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 The other categories of risk identified as covered under the company‟s risk management system by five 
respondents are political/sovereign, legal/legislative, industry, capital management and financial (hedging, 
liquidity and tax management). 
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Table 5.1 – Descriptive statistics for risk categories covered under a company’s 
risk management system 
Risk Category n=271 Yes % OS'd % Top 3 % 
Financial Reporting 260 95.94 48 17.71 134 49.45 
Compliance 253 93.36 37 13.65 124 45.76 
Operational 231 85.24 12 4.43 99 36.53 
Safety 219 80.81 21 7.75 85 31.37 
Ethical Conduct 195 71.96 12 4.43 24 8.86 
Strategic 191 70.48 18 6.64 47 17.34 
Market Related 180 66.42 11 4.06 42 15.50 
Technological 152 56.09 28 10.33 36 13.28 
Product/Service Quality 137 50.55 6 2.21 38 14.02 
Reputation/Brand 136 50.18 8 2.95 31 11.44 
Human Capital 134 49.45 199 73.43 21 7.75 
Environmental 124 45.76 165 60.89 24 8.86 
Sustainability 101 37.27 11 4.06 17 6.27 
Climate Change 61 22.51 10 3.69 10 3.69 
 
5.2.2 Descriptive statistics – (whole sample)  
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, the type 
of external supplier and the dichotomous variables. Results suggest approximately half 
(54 per cent) of Australian listed companies do not outsource any risk management 
activities. Of the companies in the sample outsourcing risk management activities, 
89.80 per cent outsource less than 50 per cent. Professional service providers, other than 
accounting companies, are used by 59 per cent of the outsourcing companies. Risk 
management services are provided by the external auditor to 35 per cent of outsourcing 
companies, 30 per cent of companies use a Big4 accountant and only 22 per cent of 
companies use a non Big4 accounting company.  
Thirty companies in the sample were involved in a restructure, acquisition or 
merger in the last three years (11 per cent). Sixteen companies (6 per cent) had a change 
of CEO in the last two years. One hundred and sixty four (61 per cent) companies used 
the services of a Big4 accounting company for external audit and/or risk management 
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activities. One hundred and eighty (66 per cent of the sample) reported a loss in two of 
the previous three years. 
Table 5.2 – Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, dichotomous 
variables and external providers of risk management activities 
Governance choice for risk management activities (n=271) Yes % 
All risk management activities sourced in-house 146 53.87 
Outsource some risk management activities 125 46.13 
1-10% of risk management activities outsourced 29 10.70 
11-25% of risk management activities outsourced 58 21.40 
26-49% of risk management activities outsourced 26 9.59 
50-74% of risk management activities outsourced 10 3.69 
75-90% of risk management activities outsourced 2 0.74 
100% of risk management activities outsourced 0 0 
Dichotomous independent variables (n=271) 
  
Environmental diversity – restructure, acquisition or merger in last 3 yrs 30 11.07 
Behavioural uncertainty – change in CEO in last 2 yrs 16 5.90 
Reputation – supplier of risk management activities or external auditor is Big4 164 60.52 
Financial distress – if company has made a loss in 2 out of 3 previous years 180 66.42 
External Providers of risk management activities (n=125) 
  
Other Professional Services 74 59.20 
External Auditor 44 35.20 
Big4 Accountant 37 29.60 
Non-Big4 Firm 27 21.60 
 
Table 5.3 (page 98) provides the descriptive statistics for the Likert attitudinal 
scaled independent variables, categorical and continuous independent variables44. Recall, 
four separate dimensions of asset specificity are measured in this study. The combined 
measure for company specific skills and training with a mean of 12.38 from a maximum 
score of 24 indicates the perceived level of specificity of human assets working in risk 
management is generally low. This is supported by neutral average responses (neither 
agree or disagree) for the inclusion of contract incentives to retain risk management 
staff (mean of 3.14 out of 6) and comparison of staff turnover for risk management staff 
                                                          
44
 Extreme values are winsorised at three standard deviations, in order to mitigate the undue influence of 
outliers. 
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with other service functions (mean of 3.69 out of 5). One hundred and twenty one (45 
per cent) companies reported expenditure on research and development in their annual 
reports for the year 2009 with an average expenditure as a proportion of operating 
revenues of 0.24. 
Environmental uncertainty in volume/demand is measured by two variables. 
First, a survey item asking respondents to rate the dynamic nature of the external 
economic environment with a mean response of 3.43 from a maximum score of 5 
indicates companies are operating in an environment changing moderately to rapidly. 
This is supported by an average standard deviation in sales over the past 3 years of 0.45, 
the second measure for environmental uncertainty is volume/demand. Environmental 
uncertainty due to technology is perceived on average to be changing moderately with a 
mean value of 3.13 from a maximum score of 5. 
There are five aspects of environmental uncertainty due to diversity measured in 
this study. On average, respondents indicate minimal modification or adaption is 
required for risk management processes to suit different divisions‟ internal requirements 
(mean is 2.49 from a maximum of 5). The mean score for the rescaled Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition is 0.62. Recall, as the adjusted index 
approaches one the market becomes more competitive. The mean number of 
subsidiaries is 18.84 with the mean proportion of overseas revenues being 0.18. There is 
a neutral attitude to behavioural uncertainty measured by the degree of perceived 
difficulty in evaluating and measuring performance of external suppliers of risk 
management service with a mean value of 3.62 out of a maximum of 6. Recall that 
frequency is measured as a function of company size by a composite variable. The 
average number of employees is 1,414 with a range of 1 to 59,000. The average natural 
log of total revenues45 is 20.25, with a range 0 to 23.64 and natural logarithm of total 
assets 21.12, with a range 13.30 to 24.58. 
Companies have higher than average knowledge transfer costs according to the 
schema developed by Christie et al., (2003) when measured by the three categories of 
knowledge intensity according to industry classification (0, 0.5 or 1) indicated by a 
                                                          
45
 Two companies in the sample reported zero operating revenues. A value of $1 is substituted to enable 
logarithmic transformation. 
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mean of 0.73. On average, exposure to proprietary/commercial in confidence 
information is less than 50 per cent with a mean value of 1.09 for the 247 companies 
providing definitive responses to the survey item. With an average capital intensity of 
fixed assets to revenues at 6.58, median of 0.67 and range of 0 to 120 a substantial 
number of companies in the sample are highly capital intensive. Companies in the 
sample have average growth over the three year period of 0.41 and an average debt to 
assets ratio of 0.37. 
Table 5.3 - Descriptive statistics for the Likert attitudinal scaled independent 
variables, categorical and continuous independent variables 
Variable: n=271 
TCE 
Dimension 
Min Max Mean Median 
Std 
Dev. 
Skills & Training  Asset Specificity 4 20 12.38 12 3.44 
Contract Incentives  Asset Specificity 1 6 3.14 3 1.37 
Staff Turnover in risk 
management 
Asset Specificity 2 5 3.69 2 0.83 
Research and Development 
expenditure 
Asset Specificity 0 10.87 0.24 0 1.25 
Environmental Dynamism 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
1 5 3.43 4 0.76 
Std. dev. of 3 years sales 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
.01 1.73 0.45 0.30 0.42 
Technological Uncertainty 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
1 5 3.13 3 0.85 
Modifications 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
1 5 2.49 2 0.89 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0.00 1 0.62 0.67 0.24 
No. of subsidiaries 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0 563 18.84 5 45.50 
Proportion of Overseas 
revenues 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0 1 0.18 0 0.33 
Performance Evaluation 
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
1 6 3.62 4 1.13 
Number of employees Frequency 1.00 59,000 1,414 42 5713 
Log. of Total Revenues Frequency 0.00 23.64 20.25 16.51 21.47 
Log. of Total Assets Frequency 13.30 24.58 21.12 17.70 22.41 
Industry Control 0 1 0.73 1 0.36 
Exposure to Proprietary 
Information (n=247). 
Control 0 2 1.09 1 0.52 
Capital Intensity Control 0 120 6.58 0.67 21.34 
Growth (in previous 3 yrs) Control -0.97 4.08 0.41 0.12 1.06 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets Control 0.01 3.37 0.37 0.33 0.35 
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5.2.3 Descriptive statistics for the subsample of outsourcing companies 
Table 5.4 on page 100 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables, the proportion of risk management activities outsourced, the external supplier 
and the dichotomous variables for the subsample of 125 companies that outsource risk 
management activities. Seventy per cent (87 companies) of the sample outsource 25 per 
cent or less of their risk management activities. Sixteen per cent (20 companies) 
provided training to their external suppliers of risk management activities. Twelve per 
cent of companies (15 companies) in the sample are involved in a restructure, 
acquisition or merger in the last three years and 8.80 per cent (11 companies) had a 
change of CEO in the last two years. Sixty four per cent (80 companies) from the 
sample reported a loss in two of the previous three years.  
Approximately 66 per cent (82 companies) of the sub sample of outsourcing 
companies used the services of a Big4 accounting company for external audit and/or 
risk management activities. Approximately 30 per cent (37 companies) report in the 
questionnaire using a Big4 accounting company, 60 per cent (74 companies) using other 
professional service providers, 35.20 per cent (44 companies) the external auditor and 
21.60 per cent (27 companies) a non Big4 accountant for risk management activities. 
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Table 5.4 - Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, dichotomous 
variables and external providers of risk management activities for subsample of 
companies outsourcing risk management activities 
Governance choice for risk management activities (n=125) Yes % 
1-10% of risk management activities outsourced 29 23.20 
11-25% of risk management activities outsourced 58 46.40 
26-49% of risk management activities outsourced 26 20.80 
50-74% of risk management activities outsourced 10 8.00 
75-90% of risk management activities outsourced 2 1.60 
100% of risk management activities outsourced 0 0 
Low risk management outsourced (<25%) 87 69.60 
High risk management outsourced (>25%) 38 30.40 
Dichotomous independent variables (n=125) 
  
Asset Specificity – training to external suppliers 20 16.00 
Environmental Diversity – restructure, acquisition or merger in last 3 yrs 15 12.00 
Behavioural uncertainty – change in CEO in last 2 yrs 11 8.80 
Financial distress – if company has made a loss in 2 out of 3 previous years 80 64.00 
Reputation – Supplier of risk management. activities or external auditor is Big4 82 65.60 
External Providers of risk management activities (n=125) 
 
  
Other Professional Services 74 59.20 
External Auditor 44 35.20 
Big4 Accountant 37 29.60 
Non-Big4 Firm 27 21.60 
 
Table 5.5 on page 103 provides the descriptive statistics for the Likert attitudinal 
scaled categorical and continuous variables for the subsample of 125 companies that 
outsource risk management activities. For comparison purposes the results for the whole 
sample are presented in parenthesis after the reported results from the subsample. The 
results for the three asset specificity variables are very similar to the whole sample. 
Company specific skills and training with a mean of 12.58 (12.38) from a maximum 
score of 24 indicate the level of specificity of human assets working in risk management 
is generally low. Contract incentives and staff turnover for risk management staff have 
means of 3.25 (3.14) and 3.76 (3.69) respectively from a maximum score of 6 and 5. 
The archival proxy used to measure asset specificity, expenditure on research and 
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development as a proportion of operating revenues has a mean value of 0.06 indicating 
the subsample is characterised by lower expenditure on research and development 
compared to the whole sample (0.24). Contract duration for external suppliers of risk 
management activities has a mean score of 1.61 from the three interval categories 
(values assigned are one for less than 1 year; two for 1 to 3 years and three for greater 
than 3 years) indicating the average contract length is less than two years. 
This study measured three separate dimensions of environmental uncertainty, 
volume/demand, technological and diversity. The survey item rating the dynamic nature 
of the external economic environment has a mean response of 3.47, similar to the whole 
sample (3.43) indicating outsourcing companies are operating in an environment 
changing moderately to rapidly. The standard deviation in sales over the past 3 years 
with a mean value of 0.54 indicates the subsample experienced more volatile sales than 
the whole sample (0.45). In contrast the subsample is characterised by lower 
environmental uncertainty due to technology with a mean value of 3.07 (3.13) from a 
maximum score of 5. 
The descriptive statistics for environmental uncertainty due to diversity are 
broadly similar to the whole sample. On average, respondents indicate minimal 
modification or adaption is required for risk management processes to suit different 
divisions internal requirements 2.54 (2.49). The mean score for the rescaled Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition is 0.60 (0.62) from a maximum of one. 
The mean number of subsidiaries at 22.87 is higher than for the whole sample (18.84) 
and the proportion of overseas revenues, with a mean of 0.15, is lower than the whole 
sample (0.18).  
Behavioural uncertainty is measured by two survey items. The item measuring 
the degree of perceived difficulty in evaluating and measuring performance of external 
suppliers of risk management service has a mean value of 3.75 (3.62). The item 
measuring the perceived difficulty in evaluating the quality of outsourced risk 
management activities has a mean of 2.79 out of a maximum of 5. 
Recall that frequency is measured as a function of the company size by a 
composite variable. The multiple measures for frequency indicate outsourcing 
 102 
 
companies are smaller than the whole sample, proposing lower frequency of 
transactions for risk management activities. The average number of employees is 795 
(1,414) with a range of one to 15,140. The average natural logarithm of total revenues is 
20.16 (20.25), range 0 to 23.13 and total assets 21.04 (21.12), range 13.43 to 24.58.  
The industry controls for knowledge intensity and exposure to 
proprietary/commercial in confidence information in the sub sample of outsourcing 
companies are very similar to the whole sample with respective means of 0.79 (0.73) 
and 1.17 (1.09). The average capital intensity of fixed assets to revenues at 8.35 (6.58), 
median of 1.49 (0.67), indicates outsourcing companies are more highly capital 
intensive when compared to the whole sample. Companies in the subsample have higher 
average growth in the previous three years rates (0.52 compared to 0.41) and lower 
average debt to assets ratios (0.31 compared to 0.37) when compared to the whole 
sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103 
 
Table 5.5 - descriptive statistics for the Likert attitudinal scaled independent 
variables, categorical and continuous independent variables for subsample of 
companies outsourcing risk management activities 
Variable: n=125 
TCE 
Dimension 
Min Max Mean Median 
Std 
Dev. 
Skills and Training  
Asset 
Specificity 4 20 12.58 13 3.41 
Contract Incentives 
Asset 
Specificity 1 6 3.25 3 1.43 
Staff Turnover in risk 
management 
Asset 
Specificity 2 5 3.76 4 0.83 
Research and Development 
expenditure 
Asset 
Specificity 
0 5.79 0.06 0 0.53 
Contract Duration 
Asset 
Specificity 
1 3 1.61 1 0.68 
Environmental Dynamism 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
2 5 3.47 4 0.69 
Std. dev. of 3 years sales 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0.02 1.73 0.54 0.38 0.48 
Technological uncertainty 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
1 5 3.07 3 0.75 
Modifications 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
1 5 2.54 2.5 0.78 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0.00 0.93 0.60 0.68 0.25 
No. of subsidiaries 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0 563 22.87 5 59.33 
Proportion of Overseas 
revenues 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
0 1 0.15 0 0.31 
Performance Evaluation 
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
1 6 3.75 4 1.19 
Performance Quality 
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
2 5 2.79 3 0.70 
No. of employees Frequency 1.00 15,140 795 47 2191 
Log. of Total Revenues Frequency 0.00 23.13 20.16 16.74 21.18 
Log. of Total Assets Frequency 13.43 24.58 21.04 17.82 22.34 
Industry Industry 0 1 0.79 1 0.34 
Exposure to Proprietary 
Information 
Proprietary 0 2 1.17 1 0.52 
Capital Intensity 
Capital 
Intensity 
0 120 8.35 1.49 24.67 
Growth (in previous 3 yrs) Growth 0 4.08 0.52 0.15 1.13 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets Leverage 0.01 0.95 0.31 0.24 0.27 
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5.2.4 Correlations and tests of regression residuals 
The bivariate correlation matrices 46  reported in tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the 
number of subsidiaries and frequency are significantly correlated at 0.59 for the whole 
sample (n = 271) and at 0.81 for the subsample of outsourcing companies (n = 125). 
The next highest significant correlations are between the volume/demand and financial 
distress (0.40 where n = 271 and 0.49 where n = 125). However, the values for the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) collinearity statistics reported in tables 5.9 to 5.12 with 
the regression results well within accepted guidelines indicating multicollinearity is 
unlikely to threaten the efficiency of the regression models (Hair Jnr., Tatham, 
Anderson, Black, and  Babin, 2006; O'Brien, 2007). 
A Jarque-Bera test for normality of the regression residuals is conducted. The 
Jarque-Bera test, an asymptotic chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom, 
uses the skewness and kurtosis values to test the null hypothesis that the data is from a 
normal distribution. The Jarque-Bera test returns 16.24 for the linear regression for the 
whole sample of 271 companies which rejects the null hypothesis of normality at the p > 
0 .05 level (p<.00). The Jarque-Bera test result from the regression for the subsample of 
125 companies at 3.71 (p = 0.15) indicates the data is from an approximately normal 
distribution. 
A White test for heteroskedasticity is conducted to confirm that the variances of 
the regression residuals do not bias the variance of the estimated parameters. 
Heteroskedasticity results in inefficient estimators and biased standard errors, rendering 
the t tests and confidence intervals unreliable. The White test results (n = 271: F = 1.53, p 
= 0.06 and n = 125: F = 1. 36, p = 0.15) confirm not to reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no heteroskedasity.  
                                                          
46
 Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the results of the bivariate correlations for the restricted models for which the 
regression results are reported in tables 5.10 and 5.12. Results for the bivariate correlations for the 
unrestricted models are reported in Appendices C-1 and C-2. 
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Table 5.6 - Bivariate correlation matrix for restricted model independent variables (n=271) 
 
Research & 
Developme
nt 
Volume/ 
demand 
Technology 
Modificatio
ns 
Competitio
n 
Subsidiaries 
Overseas 
Revenues 
Restructure 
New 
Managemen
t 
Frequency Industry Big4 
Capital 
Intensity 
Financial 
Distress 
Volume/demand 
.11 
             
Technology 
.10 .03 
            
Modifications 
.03 .01 .12* 
           
Competition 
-.12* .09 .00 -.01 
          
Subsidiaries 
-.07 -.22** .05 .06 -.10 
         
Overseas Revenues 
.07 -.05 -.05 -.08 -.18* .18* 
        
Restructure 
.02 -.17** .11 -.04 -.04 .07 .11 
       
New Management 
-.05 -.05 .06 -.02 .08 .01 -.01 .11 
      
Frequency 
-.07 -.22** .02 .04 -.27** .59** .20** .24** -.05 
     
Industry 
.11 .32** -.16* -.09 -.03 -.12* .12* -.06 -.03 -.11 
    
Big4 
.05 -.13* -.03 .08 -.11 .23** .08 .12 .01 .25** -.14* 
   
Capital Intensity 
.33** .25** -.02 -.04 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.08 .04 -.09 .17** .00 
  
Financial Distress 
.13 .40** -.02 -.10 .09 -.19** -.06 -.12* .05 -.25** .36** -.16* .13* 
 
Leverage 
-.12 -.30** .06 .06 .01 .18** -.01 .13* .08 .19** -.36** .05 -.16** -.20** 
Note * and ** , correlation statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.7 - Bivariate correlation matrix for restricted model independent variables (n=125) 
 
Training  
Externals 
Contract 
Duration 
Staff 
Turnover 
Research 
and 
Developm
ent 
Dynamism 
Volume/ 
Demand 
Technolog
y 
Modificati
ons 
Competiti
on 
Subsidiari
es 
Overseas 
Revenues 
Restructur
e 
Performan
ce Quality 
Frequency 
Proprietar
y 
Big4 
Capital 
Intensity 
Growth 
(previous 
3 years) 
Financial 
Distress 
Contract 
Duration 
.04 
               
   
Staff Turnover 
.18* .10 
              
   
Research and 
Development 
-.09 -.05 -.10 
             
   
Dynamism 
.04 -.01 -.16 .09 
            
   
Volume/Demand 
-.17 -.01 -.25** .21* .17 
           
   
Technology 
-.02 .11 -.07 .03 .24** -.02 
          
   
Modifications 
-.24 .09 -.07 .04 -.06 -.09 .04 
         
   
Competition 
.05 -.05 -.03 -.02 .07 .11 -.02 .06 
        
   
Subsidiaries 
.19 -.04 .07 -.03 .05 -.28** .10 .03 -.09 
       
   
Overseas 
Revenues 
-.06 .18 -.13 .29** -.08 .00 -.01 .00 -.21 .23 
      
   
Restructure 
.11 -.02 .01 .24** .17 -.17 .13 .05 .05 .08 .13 
     
   
Performance 
Quality 
.13 -.07 -.10 -.07 .07 -.08 -.10 -.21* .05 .04 -.08 .00 
    
   
Frequency 
.15 .04 .05 -.04 -.02 -.29 .04 .01 -.25** .81** .26** .18 -.03 
   
   
Proprietary 
.03 -.08 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.09 .21* -.09 -.01 .00 -.07 .03 .14 -.01 
  
   
Big4 
.07 -.10 .02 .03 -.08 -.20 -.03 .09 -.06 .22* .18* .15 .02 .26** -.05 
 
   
Capital Intensity 
-.11 -.12 -.17 .07 -.04 .29 -.03 -.14 -.01 -.07 -.01 -.09 .07 -.10 .05 -.04    
Growth 
(previous 3 
years) 
-.14 .10 .04 .28** -.02 .17 -.04 .06 -.04 -.08 .11 .09 .05 -.08 .11 .01 .13   
Financial 
Distress 
-.05 -.08 -.23** .08 .00 .49** -.10 -.08 .12 -.16 -.19* -.21* .18 -.26** .04 -.20* .20* .05  
Leverage 
.12 .03 .10 -.07 -.04 -.42** -.01 .15 .01 .24 .01 .09 .04 .27** -.01 .13 -.21 -.16 -.35** 
Note * and ** , correlation statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed) 
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5.2.5 Descriptive statistics for alternative explanations 
Recall that the survey instrument provided respondents with the opportunity to 
identify reasons for the governance choice for risk management activities relevant to 
their company. A list of possible reasons for keeping risk management activities in 
house and outsourcing them was compiled from a review of alternative theoretical 
frameworks applied to the governance choice. Survey recipients were asked to identify 
if any questionnaire items were applicable to their company. Table 5.8 provides the 
response profile. 
Table 5.8 - Response profile for alternative explanations  
Reasons to internalise: (n = 281) 
No. of 
Responses 
% 
Strategic importance 154 54.80 
Economies of scale 108 38.43 
To maintain flexibility 100 35.59 
Non standard nature of tasks 75 26.69 
Mitigate risk of sub-optimal services 60 21.35 
Other 46 16.37 
Difficulty of managing relationships with external providers 43 15.30 
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Reasons to outsource: (n = 281) 
  
Access to expertise 152 54.09 
To achieve best practice 81 28.83 
To concentrate on core activities and competencies 52 18.51 
Variable demand requirements 36 12.81 
Routine nature of activity 16 5.69 
Other 12 4.27 
Share risks 8 2.84 
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Top of the list of reasons to internalise risk management activities is strategic 
importance, cited by 54.80 per cent of respondents. This supports findings from existing 
research based on the theoretical predictions of resource based theory (Arnold, 2000; 
Barney, 1991; Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Lonsdale, 1999; 
Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Raiborn et al., 2009; Selim and 
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Yiannakas, 2000). The next most prominent reasons to keep risk management activities 
in-house are economies of scale (38.43 per cent) and maintaining flexibility (35.59 per 
cent). 
Access to expertise is the most frequently cited reason to outsource (54.09 per 
cent) by a large margin, with the second most cited reason of achieving best practice 
cited by 28.83 per cent of respondents, which is in support of the existing literature 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Quélin and Duhamel, 
2003; Selim and Yiannakas, 2000; Serafini et al., 2003). 
5.3 STATISTICAL TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES (WHOLE SAMPLE) 
Prior to regression analysis all ratio and interval data is standardised and mean 
centred. This procedure is performed to accommodate the different measuring scales 
used for the individual variables (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Erramilli and Rao, 
1993; Speklé et al., 2007). This transformation has limited effect on the estimated 
coefficients and minimises multicollinearity which is a well documented problem in 
multiple regression models containing main effects and interaction terms (Kromrey and 
Foster-Johnson, 1998)47.  
5.3.1 Regression analyses 
A multivariate regression model operationalises the independent variables to 
predict the governance choice for risk management activities for the sample of 271 ASX 
listed companies that provided useable responses to the survey. The initial model 
presented for linear and logistic regression is specified as follows: 
DV11,2 = β0 + β1Skills and Training + β2Contract Incentives+ β3Staff Turnover + 
β4Research and Development + β5Dynamism + β6Volume/Demand + β7Technology + 
β8Modifications + β9Competition + β10Subsidiaries + β11Overseas Revenues + 
β12Restructure + β13Performance Evaluation + β14New Management + β15Frequency + 
β16Industry + β17Proprietary + β18Big4 + β19Capital Intensity + β20Growth + 
β21Financial Distress + β22Leverage + e  
                                                          
47
 Note the regression results with and without this procedure are qualitatively the same. Tables 5.2 to 5.5 
present the descriptive statistics for each variable using the unadjusted data. 
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Where48: 
DV1 = the proportion of risk management services outsourced by category where 0=0%; 
1=1-10%; 2=11-25%; 3=26-49%; 4=50-74%; 5=74-90%; 6=90-99%; 7=100% 
DV2 = a dichotomous variable for outsourcing of risk management services; 1 if any 
risk management services are outsourced, 0 otherwise. 
Skills and Training = the depth of company specific skills, knowledge and training 
required computed from the standardised mean centred score for survey items 7,8,9 and 
11. A higher score indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Contract Incentives = the use of contract incentives to promote staff retention in the risk 
management function from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 12. A 
higher score indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Staff Turnover = staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 15. A higher score indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Research and Development = expenditure on research and development as a proportion 
of operating revenues, standardised and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Dynamism = the perceived dynamism of the external environment facing the company 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 18. A higher score indicates 
greater environmental uncertainty. 
Volume/Demand = the variance (standard deviation) in sales over the past three years, 
standardised and mean centred. A higher variance indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
                                                          
48
 A full list in alphabetical order of variable labels and descriptions used in this study is provided in 
Appendices D-1 to D-3. 
 110 
 
Technology = the rate of technological change in a company‟s industry from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 19. A higher score indicates a higher 
rate of technological change. 
Modifications = the extent of modifications/adoptions required for risk management 
activities to suit different divisions/departments from the standardised mean centred 
score for survey item 17. A higher score indicates greater environmental uncertainty due 
to diversity. 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub sector calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, rescaled, standardised and mean centred. A higher score 
indicates greater environmental uncertainty due to a more competitive environment. 
Subsidiaries = the number of subsidiaries, standardised and mean centred. A higher 
number indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Overseas Revenues = the proportion of total revenue from overseas sales, standardised 
and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Restructure = equals 1 if the company has had any restructures, acquisitions or mergers 
in the past 3 years and 0 otherwise. A value of one indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Performance Evaluation = the degree of perceived difficulty in measuring performance 
of any or potential external consultants engaged for risk management activities from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 10. A higher score indicates greater 
behavioural uncertainty. 
New Management = equals 1 if the CEO changed in the period 2008-2009, 0 otherwise. 
A value of one indicates greater behavioural uncertainty for new management with 
regard to existing staff. 
Frequency = the mean centred average of the standardised scores for the number of 
employees, total revenues and total assets. A higher score indicates more frequent risk 
transactions. 
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Industry = control variable for industry knowledge transfer costs measured by a 
categorical variable where 0 equals low, 0.5 equals medium and 1equals high. A higher 
value indicates greater industry knowledge transfer costs. 
Proprietary = a categorical variable where 0 equals none, 1 equals less than 50 per cent 
and 2 equals more than 50 per cent from survey item 20. 
Big4 = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals external supplier of risk management 
services and/or external auditor is a Big4 accounting company, 0 otherwise. 
Capital Intensity = the ratio of fixed assets to operating revenue, standardised and mean 
centred. 
Growth = the percentage change in total assets over previous three years, standardised 
and mean centred. 
Financial Distress = a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the company makes a loss 
in two of three previous years, 0 otherwise. 
Leverage = total liabilities divided by total assets, standardised and mean centred. 
Table 5.9 below reports results for the linear and logistic multivariate regression 
analysis. The dependent variable (D1) for model 1, the linear model, is the proportion of 
risk management services outsourced to external providers according to one of eight 
interval categories. The dependent variable (D2) for model 2, the logistic model, takes a 
value of 1 if the company outsources risk management services and zero otherwise. 
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Table 5.9 - results for the linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis, 
unrestricted models one and two 
(Unrestricted) 
 
Model 1 - D1 Linear Regression Model 2 - D2 Logistic Regression 
N=271 
 
B t Sig. VIF B Wald Sig. 
Constant 
 
1.50 5.44 0.00 
 
-1.18 4.13 0.04 
Skills and Training - .02 .22 .82 1.45 .14 .66 .42 
Contract Incentives - .01 .24 .81 1.19 .04 .12 .73 
Staff Turnover - .07 .80 .42 1.17 .19 1.11 .29 
Research and Development - -.16 -2.70 .01 1.22 -.56 5.51 .01 
Dynamism - -.01 -.09 .93 1.33 .21 1.00 .32 
Volume/Demand - .83 4.23 .00 1.48 1.28 9.69 .00 
Technology - -.22 -2.34 .01 1.34 -.38 3.72 .03 
Modifications + .09 1.14 .25 1.15 .13 .52 .47 
Competition + -.63 -2.10 .04 1.15 -.98 2.42 .12 
Subsidiaries + .01 3.27 .00 1.67 .02 5.30 .01 
O/S Revenues + -.48 -2.06 .04 1.17 -.54 1.17 .28 
Restructure + .42 1.78 .04 1.21 .77 2.31 .07 
Performance Evaluation - .00 -.07 .94 1.21 .13 .90 .34 
New Management + .65 2.20 .03 1.09 1.10 2.81 .05 
Frequency - -.24 -2.39 .01 1.77 -.77 5.31 .01 
Industry - .23 1.06 .29 1.43 .43 .87 .35 
Proprietary - .17 1.15 .25 1.10 .35 1.38 .24 
Big4 + .10 .67 .51 1.16 .65 4.27 .02 
Capital Intensity + .01 1.20 .23 1.30 .02 3.06 .04 
Growth (previous 3 years) + .02 .35 .72 1.10 .01 .00 .96 
Financial Distress + -.06 -.32 .75 1.44 -.56 2.41 .12 
Leverage 
 
-.40 -1.85 .07 1.30 -1.32 4.79 .03 
Model 1: R square = 0.23; adjusted R square = 0.16; F = 3.40; p = 0.00. Model 2: Chi square 70.02 (22, N 
= 271); Cox and Snell R square = 0.23; Nagelkerke R square = 0.31; p = 0.00; correctly classifying 74.10 
per cent of cases. 
5.3.2 Regression analysis – (restricted model) 
Given that a number of the predictor and control variables are not significant the 
models are restricted to strive for scientific parsimony. Five variables derived from the 
survey (Skills and Training, Contract Incentives, Staff Turnover, Dynamism and 
Performance Evaluation) and two control variables (Growth and Proprietary) are 
omitted. The restricted linear model (15 independent variables) is compared with the 
original (unrestricted model - 22 independent variables) by conducting an F test of their 
sum of squared residuals. The objective is to test if the unrestricted model is 
 113 
 
significantly different thereby enhancing the explanatory power of the regression 
analysis. Results (F(7, 249) = 0.38, p = 0.89) indicate there is no significant difference 
between the unrestricted and the restricted model. In the interests of parsimony the 
restricted version is selected for linear (model 3) and logistic (model 4) regression 
analysis and results are reported in table 5.10 on page 115. The models are specified as 
follows: 
DV1,2 = β0 + β1Research and Development +β2Volume/Demand + β3Technology + 
β4Modifications + β5Competition + β6Subsidiaries + β7Overseas Revenues + 
β8Restructure + β9New Management + β10Frequency + β11Industry + β12Big4 + 
β13CapitalIntensity + β14Financial Distress + β15Leverage + e  
Where 
DV1 = the proportion of risk management services outsourced by category where 0=0%; 
1=1-10%; 2=11-25%; 3=26-49%; 4=50-74%; 5=74-90%; 6=90-99%; 7=100% 
DV2 = a dichotomous variable for outsourcing of risk management services; 1 if any 
risk management services are outsourced, 0 otherwise. 
Research and Development = expenditure on research and development as a proportion 
of operating revenues, standardised and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Volume/Demand = the variance (standard deviation) in sales over the past three years, 
standardised and mean centred. A higher variance indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Technology = the rate of technological change in a company‟s industry from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 19. A higher score indicates a higher 
rate of technological change. 
Modifications = the extent of modifications/adoptions required for risk management 
activities to suit different divisions/departments from the standardised mean centred 
score for survey item 17. A higher score indicates greater environmental uncertainty due 
to diversity. 
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Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub sector calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, rescaled, standardised and mean centred. A higher score 
indicates greater environmental uncertainty due to a more competitive environment. 
Subsidiaries = the number of subsidiaries, standardised and mean centred. A higher 
number indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Overseas Revenues = the proportion of total revenue from overseas sales, standardised 
and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Restructure = equals 1 if the company has had any restructures, acquisitions or mergers 
in the past 3 years and 0 otherwise. A value of one indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
New Management = equals 1 if the CEO changed in the period 2008-2009, 0 otherwise. 
A value of one indicates greater behavioural uncertainty for new management with 
regard to existing staff. 
Frequency = the mean centred average of the standardised scores for the number of 
employees, total revenue and total assets. A higher score indicates more frequent risk 
transactions. 
Industry = control variable for industry knowledge transfer costs measured by a 
categorical variable where 0 equals low; 0.5 equals medium and 1equals high. A higher 
value indicates greater industry knowledge transfer costs. 
Big4 = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals external supplier of risk management 
services and/or external auditor is a Big4 accounting company, 0 otherwise. 
Capital Intensity = the ratio of fixed assets to operating revenue, standardised and mean 
centred. 
Financial Distress = a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the company makes a loss 
in two of three previous years, 0 otherwise. 
Leverage = total liabilities divided by total assets, standardised and mean centred. 
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Table 5.10 - results for the linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis, 
restricted models three and four 
(Restricted)   Model 3 - D1 Linear Regression Model 4 - D2 Logistic Regression 
N=271 
 
B t Sig. VIF B Wald Sig. 
Constant   1.71 8.10 0.00   -0.62 2.04 0.15 
Research and Development - -.17 -2.76 .01 1.21 -.53 5.54 .01 
Volume/Demand - .83 4.36 .00 1.41 1.32 10.84 .00 
Technology - -.21 -2.52 .01 1.11 -.26 2.11 .08 
Modifications + .10 1.24 .22 1.06 .18 1.17 .28 
Competition + -.63 -2.15 .03 1.13 -.96 2.53 .11 
Subsidiaries + .01 3.41 .00 1.64 .02 5.72 .01 
O/S Revenues + -.49 -2.17 .03 1.13 -.65 1.84 .17 
Restructure + .41 1.77 .02 1.15 .70 2.11 .08 
New Management + .71 2.44 .01 1.05 1.30 4.25 .02 
Frequency - -.23 -2.35 .01 1.74 -.70 4.67 .02 
Industry - .21 .99 .32 1.41 .43 .92 .34 
Big4 + .11 .75 .45 1.14 .59 3.80 .05 
Capital Intensity + .01 1.19 .24 1.22 .02 2.75 .05 
Financial Distress + -.10 -.62 .53 1.35 -.75 4.61 .03 
Leverage   -.45 -2.12 .03 1.25 -1.44 5.90 .02 
Model 3: R square = 0.22; adjusted R square = 0.18; F = 4.90; p = 0.00. Model 4: Chi square = 63.63 (15, 
N = 271); Cox and Snell R square = 0.21; Nagelkerke R square = 0.28; p = 0.00; 69.00 per cent correctly 
classified. 
5.3.2.1 Results of linear regression – model 3 (restricted) 
Recall, TCE predicts as the specificity of human assets involved in the risk 
management function rises companies are more likely to conduct activities in house 
rather than outsource. Thus a negative hypothesised relation is predicted between asset 
specificity and the dependent variable, the proportion of risk management activities 
outsourced (D1). 
Model three provides support for hypothesis 1; that companies with more 
transaction-specific human assets outsource less risk management activities than those 
with less transaction-specific human assets when research and development is used as a 
proxy for asset specificity. Results indicate a significant negative relation between 
research and development and the proportion of risk management activities outsourced 
(t = -2.76, p = 0.01). Recall, a number of studies proposes expenditure on research and 
development is a proxy for asset specificity (Coff, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
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Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Helfat, 1994; Levy, 1985). Research and development 
relies on transaction specific inputs from human capital (Levy, 1985) and involves 
learning which is cumulative, has company specific characteristics and elements which 
impede imitation (Helfat, 1994). 
The variables constructed from the survey questionnaire measuring the three 
dimensions of asset specificity, company specific skills and training, contractual 
characteristics and staff turnover, are omitted from the restricted model because they are 
not significant. These results are in contrast to many studies that find asset specificity 
measured by these characteristics to be a significant predicator of governance choice for 
sourcing internal audit (Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999) and in the fields 
of marketing and information technology research (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Aubert et al., 1996b; John and Weitz, 1988; Klein et 
al., 1990). However, a number of other studies find no support for human asset 
specificity as an indicator of governance choice when exploring the determinants of the 
outsourcing decision for information technology (Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Nam et al., 
1996).  
Hypothesis 2a predicts companies with more uncertainty associated with 
volume/demand outsource less risk management activities. However, results from 
model three suggest the opposite because a significant positive relation exists between 
variance in sales and the proportion of risk management activities outsourced (t = 4.36, 
p = 0.00). This is in contrast to other studies that find outsourcing is related to lower 
variations in sales (Artz and Brush, 2000; Levy, 1985). These conflicting results could 
be due to this study‟s Australian setting. Prior studies conducted overseas have 
examined generally much larger companies and/or single industry groups. It is 
suggested smaller companies that experience uncertainty due to a high variability in 
sales lack the certainty of consistent revenue streams. As a result they are less likely to 
commit the financial resources to establishing an internal risk management function and 
are more likely to outsource when required. 
Support is found for hypothesis 2a in model three with evidence of increased 
environmental uncertainty due to technological change is related to less outsourcing of 
risk management activities (t = -2.52, p = 0.01). These results provide support for the 
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existing literature. Recall Afuah (2001) finds evidence vertical integration provides a 
more durable base from which adaption to competence destroying technological change 
can be made when measured by technical performance. Despite evidence to the contrary, 
Walker and Weber (1984) propose the costs of managing and coordinating activities 
between internal demands and external suppliers increase more than coordinating 
activities internally as the frequency of technological change increases making vertical 
integration the least costly option. 
This study measures five different aspects of diversity with mixed and 
conflicting results. Recall that hypothesis 2b predicts that companies outsource more 
risk management activities as environmental uncertainty due to diversity increases. This 
is because of a requirement for flexible information flow which can be obtained more 
cost effectively from external suppliers. In support of hypothesis 2b, results from model 
three provide evidence that companies with more subsidiaries (t = 3.41, p = 0.00) and 
companies that have had a restructure, acquisition or merger in the last 3 years (t = 1.77, 
p = 0.02) outsource more risk management activities.  
These results are in contrast to the environmental diversity measures of level of 
industry competition, measured by the rescaled Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, and 
revenues from overseas operations which are significant in the opposite direction 
predicted therefore providing no support for hypothesis 2b. Model three provides 
evidence that as industry competition rises companies outsource less risk management 
activities (t = -2.15, p = 0.03). These results are in contrast to existing studies (Levy, 
1985). It is suggested that as competition within an industry sector rises concern for 
behavioural uncertainty and opportunism of external suppliers likely to arise from 
exposure to risk management policies and procedures is more relevant for companies. 
Therefore industry competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index could be 
viewed as a measure of behavioural uncertainty for risk management activities. 
Results from model three suggest that as the proportion of overseas revenue 
from operations rises companies outsource less risk management activities (t = -2.17, p 
= 0.03), which is also in contradiction to hypothesised theoretical predictions for 
environmental diversity. A possible explanation is that companies may not want to 
relinquish control over aspects of risk management related to their foreign operations to 
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external suppliers given the regulatory compliance and strategic nature of risk 
management and thus prefer to assemble the resources internally. There is no support 
for the proposition companies with more uncertainty measured by the degree of 
modifications or adaptions required to suit different departments or divisions in risk 
management processes outsource more risk management activities. 
There is no support for hypothesis 3a that higher behavioural uncertainty 
relating to external suppliers leads to less outsourcing of risk management activities. 
Results for the variable measuring performance evaluation from model three are not 
significant. This is in contrast to Aubert et al., (1996b) but support results from prior 
governance studies (Nicholson, Jones, and  Espenlaub, 2006; Speklé et al., 2007; 
Widener and Selto, 1999). Speklé et al., (2007) argue against behavioural uncertainly as 
a factor in governance choice for internal audit. They propose that when specialist 
expert knowledge is involved senior management do not possess sufficient expertise to 
assess the quality of performance and initiate corrective actions and therefore there are 
no benefits from internal monitoring.  
In contrast, model three provides support for hypothesis 3b that behavioural 
uncertainty impacts the governance choice for risk management activities. Results 
indicate companies that have had a change of CEO in the past two years outsource more 
risk management activities (t = 2.44, p = 0.01). This supports Kent (2011), who 
proposes that established management has a relative advantage in the performance 
evaluation of internal employees compared to new management who are unfamiliar 
with their new employees‟ knowledge, expertise and potential for opportunistic 
behaviour. This increases relative behavioural uncertainty in evaluating internal 
employees and hence a new CEO entering the organisation seeks the advice of 
independent advisers outside the organisation rather than internal advisers. This is likely 
to be particularly relevant for providers of risk management activities within the 
company. Ouchi (1979) notes where human assets assume a prominent role such as risk 
management, internal (behavioural) uncertainty is likely to assume considerable 
importance supporting the decision for new management to seek independent advice. 
TCE predicts a greater volume of transactions leads to internal specialisation of 
the risk management function (Klein, 1989). The provision of risk management services 
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in house requires companies to maintain staff with expertise which is an investment 
carrying significant economies of scale (Speklé et al., 2007). Support is found in model 
three for hypothesis 4 with evidence that increased transaction frequency, proxied by 
company size, is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities (t = -
2.35, p = 0.01). This result is consistent with prior research and TCE predictions 
(Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988; Klein et al., 1990; Speklé et al., 
2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
Recall that this study proposes a number of other factors are likely to effect the 
sourcing decision for risk management activities and therefore includes a number of 
control variables in the statistical analysis. Model three provides evidence that as 
leverage increases companies outsource less risk management activities (t = -2.12, p = 
0.03). The literature identifies a number of financial factors outside of the TCE 
framework that have the capacity to restrain internalisation of the risk management 
function. However no support is found for capital intensity and financial distress as 
financial restraining factors that significantly impact the proportion of risk management 
activities outsourced. In addition, the control variables for industry knowledge, transfer 
costs and quality of external supply (measured by whether the external auditor or 
supplier of risk management activities is a Big4 accounting company) are not 
significant predictors of the proportion of risk management activities outsourced in 
model 3. 
5.3.2.2 Results of logistic regression – model 4 (restricted) 
 Model four is a logistic regression modelling the outsourcing of risk 
management activities as a discrete binary choice, yes or no. Results are qualitatively 
similar to model three which is the linear regression modelling the proportion of risk 
management activities outsourced.  
Support is provided for hypothesis 1 with evidence that the specificity of human 
assets involved in the risk management function, proxied by expenditure on research 
and development, is associated with the decision to source the risk management 
function internally (wald = 5.54, p = 0.01).  
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Results from model four support model three in that environmental uncertainty 
in volume/demand measured as variance in sales is significantly associated with the 
decision to outsource risk management activities (wald = 10.84, p = 0.00). These results 
support Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) who find evidence variance in sales is 
associated with the decision to outsource to manufacturers‟ representatives as opposed 
to the use of an internal direct sales force. Partial support is found for environmental 
uncertainty due technological change as a factor in the decision to internalise risk 
management activities (wald = 2.11, p = 0.08)49.  
Recall hypothesis 2b predicts that companies outsource more risk management 
activities as environmental uncertainty due to diversity of the environment increases. 
Support is provided from model four with more subsidiaries associated and whether the 
company has had a restructure, acquisition or merger in the past three years with the 
decision to outsource (wald = 5.72, p = 0.01 and wald = 2.11, p = 0.08). Modifications 
required for risk management processes, competition and proportion of overseas 
revenue are not significant indictors of the decision to outsource risk management 
activities or not in model four.  
No support is found for hypothesis 3a that the behavioural uncertainty associated 
with the performance evaluation of external suppliers of risk management activities is a 
factor in governance choice. However support is found for hypothesis 3b that 
behavioural uncertainty impacts the governance choice for risk management activities 
for new management. Results from model four indicate a significant positive 
association between the decision to outsource and companies that have had a change of 
CEO in the past two years (wald = 4.25, p = 0.02). Hypothesis 4 is supported with 
model four providing evidence the decision not to outsource is associated with 
transaction frequency (wald = 4.67, p = 0.02). 
Results from model four indicate companies using a Big4 accounting company 
for their external audit and/or risk management activities are significantly associated 
with the decision to outsource risk management activities (wald = 3.80, p = 0.05). This 
is consistent with the argument companies are more likely to outsource to external 
                                                          
49
 Prior to the restrictions results from the logistic regression are significant at p<.05 reported in table 5.10. 
 121 
 
suppliers if they have a reputation for quality regardless of other factors. It is argued 
capital intensity indicates rising resource commitments leading to less funds for 
companies to establish functions internally regardless of other factors such as asset 
specificity. Results from model four support this proposition indicating capital intensive 
companies are associated with the decision to outsource (wald = 2.75, p = 0.05). 
Contrary to theoretical propositions, results from model four indicate companies 
experiencing financial distress do not outsource risk management activities (wald = 4.61; 
p = 0.03). Leverage is also associated with the decision not to outsource (wald = 5.90, p 
= 0.02) in model four. It is proposed financial distress and leverage are factors 
restricting the financial resources available and are likely to limit the magnitude of risk 
management activities conducted internally and by external consultants. Results from 
model four indicate knowledge intensity associated with an industry sector is not a 
significant factor in the discrete decision to outsource risk management activities. 
5.4 STATISTICAL TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES (SUBSAMPLE OF 
OUTSOURCING COMPANIES) 
 A subsample of the 125 ASX listed companies reporting outsourcing of risk 
management activities is analysed independently. The three items in the survey 
specifically relating to those companies outsourcing risk management activities are 
included as additional independent variables in the regression analyses. Two items 
measure aspects of asset specificity. Item 5 measures the average contract length with 
external providers of risk management activities, assuming transactions requiring 
specific investments require a mechanism to protect the supplier. One of the 
mechanisms is a longer contract duration. Item 6 is a dichotomous variable to measure 
if training is provided to external suppliers of risk management activities. The third, 
item 16, relates to the TCE dimension behavioural uncertainty, measuring the degree of 
perceived difficulty in evaluating the quality of outsourced risk management activities.  
5.4.1 Regression analysis  
Two additional models are tested using only the companies that outsourced 
some of their risk management function. For model five, in the linear regression, the 
dependent variable for the sub sample analysis is operationalised as the proportion of 
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risk management activities outsourced to external providers according to one of seven 
categories (D1). The dependent variable in model six, the logistic regression, is a binary 
variable (D3) measuring high or low outsourcing. High is more than 25 per cent of risk 
management activities outsourced and given a value of one and low is 25 per cent or 
less outsourced and is given a value of zero. The initial model is specified as follows 
and results are reported in table 5.11 on page 125. 
DV11,3 = β0 + β1Training Externals + β2Contract Duration + β3Skills and Training + 
β4Contract Incentives + β5Staff Turnover + β6Research and Development + 
β7Dynamism + β8Volume/Demand + β9Technology + β10Modifications + 
β11Competition + β12Subsidiaries + β13Overseas Revenues + β14Restructure + 
β15Performance Evaluation + β16Performance Quality + β17New Management + 
β18Frequency + β19Industry + β20Proprietary + β21Big4 + β22Capital Intensity + 
β23Growth + β24Financial Distress β25Leverage + e  
Where: 
DV1 = the proportion of risk management services outsourced by category where 1=1-
10%; 2=11-25%; 3=26-49%; 4=50-74%; 5=74-90%; 6=90-99%; 7=100% 
DV3 = an outsourcing variable for risk management services where 1 equals high with 
more than 25 per cent of risk management activities outsourced and 0 equals low with 
25 per cent or less outsourced. 
Training Externals = a dichotomous variable measured as 1 = training provided to 
external suppliers of risk management activities, 0 otherwise. 
Contract Duration = a categorical variable for the average length of contract with an 
external provider of risk management services, 1 equals less than 1 year, 2 equals 1 to 3 
years and 3 equals more than 3 years. 
Skills and Training = the depth of company specific skills, knowledge and training 
required computed from the standardised mean centred score for four survey items 7,8,9 
and 11.  A higher score indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
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Contract Incentives = the use of contract incentives to promote staff retention in risk 
management activities from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 12. A 
higher score indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Staff Turnover = staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 15. A higher score indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Research and Development = expenditure on research and development as a proportion 
of operating revenues, standardised and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Dynamism = the perceived dynamism of the external environment facing the company 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 18. A higher score indicates 
greater environmental uncertainty. 
Volume/Demand = the variance (standard deviation) in sales over the past three years, 
standardised and mean centred. A higher variance indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Technology = the rate of technological change in a company‟s industry from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 19. A higher score indicates a higher 
rate of technological change. 
Modifications = the extent of modifications/adoptions required for risk management 
activities to suit different divisions/departments from the standardised mean centred 
score for survey item 17. A higher score indicates greater environmental uncertainty due 
to diversity. 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub sector calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, rescaled, standardised and mean centred. A higher score 
indicates greater environmental uncertainty due to a more competitive environment. 
Subsidiaries = the number of subsidiaries, standardised and mean centred. A higher 
number indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Overseas Revenues = the proportion of total revenue from overseas sales, standardised 
and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
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Restructure = equals 1 if the company has had any restructures, acquisitions or mergers 
in the past 3 years, 0 otherwise. A value of one indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Performance Evaluation = the degree of perceived difficulty in measuring performance 
of any existing or potential external consultants engaged for risk management activities 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 10. A higher score indicates 
greater behavioural uncertainty. 
Performance Quality = the degree of perceived difficulty in evaluating the quality of 
outsourced risk management activities from the standardised mean centred score for 
survey item 16. A higher score indicates greater behavioural uncertainty. 
New Management = equals 1 if the CEO changed in the period 2008-2009, 0 otherwise. 
A value of one indicates greater behavioural uncertainty for new management with 
regard to existing staff. 
Frequency = the mean centred average of the standardised scores for the number of 
employees, total revenue and total assets. A higher score indicates more frequent risk 
transactions. 
Industry = control variable for industry knowledge transfer costs measured by a 
categorical variable where 0 equals low, 0.5 equals medium and 1equals high. A higher 
value indicates greater industry knowledge transfer costs. 
Proprietary = a categorical variable where 0 equals none, 1 equals less than 50 per cent 
and 2 equals more than 50 per cent from survey item 20. 
Big4 = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals external supplier of risk management 
services and/or external auditor is a Big4 accounting company, 0 otherwise. 
Capital Intensity = the ratio of fixed assets to operating revenue, standardised and mean 
centred. 
Growth = the percentage change in total assets over previous three years, standardised 
and mean centred. 
Financial Distress = a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the company makes a loss 
in two of three previous years, 0 otherwise. 
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Leverage = total liabilities divided by total assets, standardised and mean centred. 
Table 5.11- results for the linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis for 
subsample of companies outsourcing risk management activities, unrestricted 
models 
  
Model 5 - D1 Linear Regression Model 6 - D3 Logistic Regression 
N=125 (unrestricted) 
 
B t Sig. VIF B Wald Sig. 
(Constant) 
 
2.87 6.02 .00 
 
-40.27 2.56 .11 
Training Externals - .25 1.84 .07 1.32 2.29 8.55 .00 
Contract Duration - .54 2.14 .04 1.37 7.12 7.91 .00 
Skills and Training - -.08 -.74 .46 1.79 .08 .02 .89 
Contract Incentives - .02 .34 .73 1.30 -.27 1.01 .32 
Staff Turnover - -.09 -.74 .46 1.41 -1.02 3.18 .04 
Research and Development - -.14 -.79 .43 1.38 -141.68 1.90 .08 
Dynamism - -.19 -1.40 .08 1.33 -1.79 4.99 .02 
Volume/Demand - .53 2.20 .03 2.06 4.54 9.72 .00 
Technology - -.22 -1.90 .03 1.29 -1.72 6.18 .01 
Modifications + .15 1.25 .22 1.34 .13 .06 .81 
Competition + -1.01 -2.81 .01 1.24 -5.49 7.75 .01 
Subsidiaries + .01 2.35 .01 3.87 .10 6.42 .01 
Overseas Revenues + -.60 -1.73 .09 1.69 -3.05 3.73 .05 
Restructure + .56 1.78 .04 1.59 4.27 4.55 .02 
Performance Evaluation - -.03 -.40 .69 1.42 -.11 .08 .77 
Performance Quality - -.15 -1.15 .25 1.30 -.03 .00 .95 
New Management - .02 .06 .95 1.30 .16 .02 .90 
Frequency - -.51 -1.85 .04 4.00 -8.40 6.34 .01 
Industry - .17 .55 .58 1.78 1.06 .45 .50 
Proprietary - .05 .31 .76 1.20 1.43 3.01 .08 
Big4 + -.18 -.95 .35 1.24 -1.28 1.89 .17 
Capital Intensity + .00 -.83 .41 1.22 -.02 2.61 .06 
Growth (previous 3 years) + .05 .67 .51 1.32 .40 1.49 .22 
Financial Distress + .26 1.09 .28 2.00 1.92 2.28 .07 
Leverage 
 
-.26 -.69 .49 1.58 -3.17 1.69 .19 
Model 5: R square = 0.32, adjusted R square = 0.15; F = 1.88, p = .02. Model 6: Chi square 84.85 (25, N 
= 125), p = 0.00, Cox and Snell R square of 0.50, a Nagelkerke R square of 0.71 correctly classifying 
83.00 per cent of cases. 
5.4.2 Regression analysis – restricted model 
 Given that a number of the predictor and control variables in models five and six 
are not significant, the models are restricted to strive for scientific parsimony. Five 
variables are omitted (Skills and Training, Contract Incentives, Performance Evaluation, 
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New Management and Industry). The restricted linear model (20 independent variables) 
is compared with the original (unrestricted model - 25 independent variables) by 
conducting an F test of their sum of squared residuals. The objective is to test if the 
unrestricted model is significantly different thereby enhancing the explanatory power of 
the regression analysis. Results (F(5, 100) = 0.26, p = 0.96) indicate there is no 
significant difference between the unrestricted and the restricted model. In the interests 
of parsimony the restricted version is selected for linear (model 7) and logistic (model 8) 
regression analysis and results are reported in table 5.12 on page 129. The models are 
specified as follows: 
DV11,3 = β0 + β1Training Externals + β2Contract Duration + β3Staff Turnover + 
β4Research and Development + β5Dynamism + β6Volume/Demand + β7Technology + 
β8Modifications + β9Competition + β10Subsidiaries + β11Overseas Revenues + 
β12Restructure + β13Performance Quality + β14Frequency + β15Proprietary + β16Big4 + 
β17Capital Intensity + β18Growth + β19Financial Distress + β20Leverage + e  
Where: 
DV1 = the proportion of risk management services outsourced by category where 1=1-
10%; 2=11-25%; 3=26-49%; 4=50-74%; 5=74-90%; 6=90-99%; 7=100% 
DV3 = an outsourcing variable for risk management services where 1 equals high with 
more than 25 per cent of risk management activities outsourced and 0 equals low with 
25 per cent or less outsourced. 
Training Externals = a dichotomous variable measured as 1 = training provided to 
external suppliers of risk management activities, 0 otherwise. 
Contract Duration = a categorical variable for the average length of contract with an 
external provider of risk management services, 1 equals less than 1 year, 2 equals 1 to 3 
years and 3 equals more than 3 years. 
Staff Turnover = staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 15. A higher score indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
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Research and Development = expenditure on research and development as a proportion 
of operating revenues, standardised and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates 
greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Dynamism = the perceived dynamism of the external environment facing the company 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 18. A higher score indicates 
greater environmental uncertainty. 
Volume/Demand = the variance (standard deviation) in sales over the past three years, 
standardised and mean centred. A higher variance indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Technology = the rate of technological change in a company‟s industry from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 19. A higher score indicates a higher 
rate of technological change. 
Modifications = the extent of modifications/adoptions required for risk management 
activities to suit different divisions/departments from the standardised mean centred 
score for survey item 17. A higher score indicates greater environmental uncertainty due 
to diversity. 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub sector calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, rescaled, standardised and mean centred. A higher score 
indicates greater environmental uncertainty due to a more competitive environment. 
Subsidiaries = the number of subsidiaries, standardised and mean centred. A higher 
number indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Overseas Revenues = the proportion of total revenue from overseas sales, standardised 
and mean centred. A higher proportion indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Restructure = equals 1 if the company has had any restructures, acquisitions or mergers 
in the past 3 years, 0 otherwise. A value of one indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Performance Quality = the degree of perceived difficulty in evaluating the quality of 
outsourced risk management activities from the standardised mean centred score for 
survey item 16. A higher score indicates greater behavioural uncertainty. 
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Frequency = the mean centred average of the standardised scores for the number of 
employees, total revenue and total assets. A higher score indicates more frequent risk 
transactions. 
Proprietary = a categorical variable where 0 equals none, 1 equals less than 50 per cent 
and 2 equals more than 50 per cent from survey item 20. 
Big4 = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals external supplier of risk management 
services and/or external auditor is a Big4 accounting company, 0 otherwise. 
Capital Intensity = the ratio of fixed assets to operating revenue, standardised and mean 
centred. 
Growth = the percentage change in total assets over previous three years, standardised 
and mean centred. 
Financial Distress = a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the company makes a loss 
in two of three previous years, 0 otherwise. 
Leverage = total liabilities divided by total assets, standardised and mean centred. 
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Table 5.12- results for the linear and logistic multivariate regression analysis for 
subsample of companies outsourcing risk management activities, restricted models 
(Restricted) 
 
Model 7 - D1 Linear Regression Model 8 - D3 Logistic Regression 
N=125  
 
B t Sig. VIF B Wald Sig. 
Constant 
 
2.98 6.79 .00 
 
-27.68 1.64 .20 
Training Externals - .26 2.06 .04 1.24 2.08 9.44 .00 
Contract Duration - .46 1.97 .05 1.21 6.08 9.35 .00 
Staff Turnover - -.10 -.97 .33 1.28 -.86 2.71 .05 
Research and Development - -.16 -.93 .35 1.33 -92.57 1.06 .30 
Dynamism - -.21 -1.58 .06 1.26 -1.86 6.76 .01 
Volume/Demand - .60 2.63 .01 1.91 4.52 11.94 .00 
Technology - -.23 -2.08 .02 1.24 -1.58 7.01 .01 
Modifications + .14 1.22 .23 1.26 .19 .16 .69 
Competition + -.98 -2.81 .01 1.21 -5.11 8.41 .00 
Subsidiaries + .01 2.46 .01 3.72 .09 8.45 .00 
Overseas Revenues + -.57 -1.78 .08 1.47 -2.73 3.24 .07 
Restructure + .64 2.25 .03 1.32 4.25 6.58 .01 
Performance Quality - -.13 -1.07 .29 1.23 .03 .00 .95 
Frequency - -.52 -1.93 .03 3.87 -7.73 7.48 .01 
Proprietary - .06 .41 .69 1.15 1.26 3.34 .07 
Big4 + -.16 -.92 .36 1.18 -1.37 2.48 .12 
Capital Intensity + .00 -.92 .36 1.19 -.02 2.64 .10 
Growth (previous 3 years) + .05 .70 .48 1.25 .35 1.38 .24 
Financial Distress + .26 1.23 .22 1.70 2.44 4.95 .03 
Leverage 
 
-.33 -.96 .34 1.37 -2.92 2.66 .10 
Model 7: R squared = 0.32; adjusted R square = 0.18; F = 2.37; p = 0.00. Model 8: Chi square = 
82.76 (20, N = 125); Cox and Snell R square = 0.49; Nagelkerke R square = 0.69, p = 0.00, correctly 
classifying 84.60 per cent of cases. 
5.4.2.1 Results of linear regression for the subsample of outsourcing companies –
model 7 (restricted) 
Model seven is a linear regression with the dependent variable operationalised as 
the proportion of risk management activities outsourced to external providers according 
to one of seven categories. Recall that hypothesis 1 predicts that with increasing human 
asset specificity of the risk management function companies outsource less. Results 
from model seven provide no support for this hypothesis, with expenditure on research 
and development and staff turnover in risk management relative to other service 
functions not significant for the proportion of risk management activities outsourced in 
the subsample group of 125 companies. However, model seven does provide evidence 
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that companies are more likely to provide training (t = 2.06, p = 0.04) and have longer 
contract durations with their external suppliers (t = 1.97, p = 0.05) as the proportion of 
risk management services provided rises. This positive relation is in contradiction to the 
theoretical predictions of TCE that these characteristics are indicators of asset 
specificity.  
There is marginal support from model seven for hypothesis 2a that 
environmental uncertainly due to volume/demand is associated with less outsourcing of 
risk management activities. The variable perceived dynamism of the external economic 
environment is marginally significant for the sub sample of outsourcing companies (t = 
-1.58, p = 0.06). Variation in sales as a measure of volume/demand uncertainty is 
significant in model seven as leading to more outsourcing (t = -2.63, p = 0.01), 
replicating results from model three. Support is found for hypothesis 2b that 
technological uncertainty is associated with less outsourcing of risk management 
activities for the subsample of 125 companies from model seven (t = -2.08, p = 0.02). 
Further evidence is provided from model seven to support results from model 
three for environmental uncertainty due to the diversity of the environment as a factor 
influencing the proportion of risk management activities outsourced. Support is found 
for hypothesis 2b that environmental diversity leads to more outsourcing when 
measured by the number of subsidiaries in model seven (t = 2.46; p = 0.01) and if the 
company has had a restructure, acquisition or merger in the past three years (t = 2.25; p 
= 0.03). However, again contrary to the hypothesised relation for environmental 
diversity, model seven finds significant evidence that as the level of industry 
competition rises and the proportion of revenues from overseas increases companies 
outsource less risk management activities (t  = -2.81, p = 0.01 and t = -1.78, p = 0.08). 
The degree of modifications required to suit different departments or divisions is not a 
significant indicator of the proportion outsourced in model seven.  
There is no support from model seven for hypotheses 3a and 3b that behavioural 
uncertainty impacts the proportion of risk management activities outsourced in the 
subsample of outsourcing companies.  
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Model seven provides support for hypothesis 4 with evidence that as transaction 
frequency increases companies outsource less (t = -1.93; p = 0.03) supporting results 
from model three for the whole sample.  
Recall that the restricted models analysing the subsample of companies 
outsourcing risk management activities operationalises six control variables as 
alternative explanations for the proportion outsourced. None of these variables are 
significant indicators of the proportion of risk management activities outsourced for the 
subsample. 
5.4.2.2 Results of logistic regression for the subsample of outsourcing companies 
model 8 (restricted) 
Model eight is a logistic regression where the dependent variable is binary, 
measuring high or low outsourcing where high is more than 25 per cent of risk 
management activities outsourced and low is 25 per cent or less outsourced. Model 
eight provides support for hypothesis 1 with lower staff turnover in risk management 
relative to other service functions being associated with low outsourcing of risk 
management activities (wald = 2.71; p = 0.05). Model eight also indicates companies 
associated with higher outsourcing of their risk management activities provide training 
to their external suppliers (wald = 9.44, p = 0.00) and have longer contracts (wald = 
9.35, p = 0.00) replicating the results from model seven. Results from model eight 
provide no support for expenditure on research and development as associated with low 
outsourcing of risk management activities in the subsample group of 125 companies.  
Support is found for hypothesis 2a with outsourcing companies indicating 
uncertainty due to volume/demand, measured by the survey variable perceived 
dynamism of the external environment facing the company and technological change, is 
associated with lower outsourcing (wald = 6.76, p = 0.01; wald = 7.01; p = 0.01). Model 
eight reports significant results in the opposite predicted direction for environmental 
uncertainty due to volume/demand supporting previous analysis conducted in this study. 
Companies characterised by higher variation in sales are associated with higher 
outsourcing of risk management activities (wald = 11.94; p = 0.00).  
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Mixed and conflicting results occur for model eight for hypothesis 2b which 
predicts higher environmental diversity is associated with higher outsourcing of risk 
management activities. In support of hypothesis 2b the number of subsidiaries and 
whether the company has had a recent restructuring, acquisitions or mergers are 
associated with high outsourcing (wald = 8.45, p = 0.00 and wald = 6.58, p = 0.01). 
Results from model eight for environmental diversity, measured by competition and 
proportion of overseas revenues, provide further evidence that the level of industry 
competition is significantly associated with low outsourcing (wald = 8.41, p = 0.00 and 
wald = 3.24, p = 0.07). The degree of modifications required to suit different 
departments or divisions is not a significant indicator of the proportion outsourced in 
model eight. 
No support is provided for hypothesis 3a which proposes that behavioural 
uncertainty associated with the provision of risk management services from external 
suppliers leads to less outsourcing. The variable measuring the quality of outsourced 
risk management activities is not significant in model eight. The measure of behavioural 
uncertainty associated with new management was omitted from the restricted model for 
the subsample due to lack of significance which could be due to only 11 companies in 
the subsample having had a change in CEO in the past two years.  
Hypothesis 4 is supported with transaction frequency associated with low 
outsourcing of risk management activities in the sub sample of outsourcing companies 
(wald = 7.48, p = 0.01).  
Significant results from model eight indicate that companies who have 
experienced a loss in two of the three previous years are associated with higher 
outsourcing of risk management activities (wald = 4.95, p = 0.03). Capital intensity is 
marginally associated with lower outsourcing of risk management activities (wald = 
2.64, p = 0.10). These results are in contrast to the results for the whole sample from 
model four which finds financial distress is associated with the decision not to outsource 
and capital intensity is associated with the decision to outsource. Leverage is marginally 
associated with lower outsourcing of risk management activities in the sub sample of 
outsourcing companies (wald = 2.66, p = 0.10). Contrary to theoretical predictions 
exposure to proprietary information is marginally associated with higher outsourcing of 
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risk management activities in the sub sample of outsourcing companies (wald = 3.34, p 
= 0.07). Growth and reputation are not significant indicators in model eight of the 
decision to outsource more or less risk management activities for the subsample.  
5.5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.5.1 Asset Specificity 
In a study of 133 journal articles from 35 journals from 1971 to 1992 Lohtia et 
al., (1994) argue there is no consistent definition or operationalisation of the construct 
asset specificity. The authors note prior research has treated asset specificity as a uni-
dimensional construct and future operationalisations should consider different 
dimensions (Lohtia et al., 1994). This study uses a survey questionnaire to 
operationalise four individual dimensions of asset specificity in order to extend the 
scope of measurement of the construct. Linear and logistic regression and inclusion of 
multiplicative interaction terms (discussed in section 5.7) for asset specificity in the 
analysis is conducted. Significant results are obtained for the archival proxy expenditure 
on research and development in linear and logistic regression analysis of the whole 
sample (models three and four) and staff turnover in the logistic regression analysis of 
the sub sample (model eight). No significant results are found for the two aspects, 
company specific skills and training and contractual characteristics from analysis of the 
whole sample of companies, and evidence contrary to theoretical expectations from the 
subsample of 125 outsourcing companies was found. There are a number of possible 
explanations.  
Recall that the generic technical and professional skills of engineers, doctors, 
lawyers and accountants are examples of skills which are valuable in a variety of 
companies or industries (Coff, 1997; Williamson, 1981a). It is likely the deepening of 
professional skills applied in risk management with company specific knowledge is not 
sufficient to constitute a degree of asset specificity that influences the governance 
choice decision. With respondents reporting an average of 92 per cent of staff working 
in risk management having professional qualifications such as a university degree or 
equivalent, asset specificity may not be a determining factor for the governance choice 
for risk management activities.  
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Results from the analysis of the subsample of companies outsourcing risk 
management find evidence of a significant positive relation between outsourcing and 
contract duration and training provision for external suppliers of risk management 
activities contrary to theoretical expectations. Agency theory also depicts the company 
as a nexus of contracting relationships which incur transaction costs due to opportunism 
on the part of the supplier with information asymmetry the core driver (Oviatt, 1988). 
Drawing on agency theory, it is proposed companies are incurring the bonding and 
monitoring costs of investing in training and longer contract duration for external 
providers of risk management activities. 
5.5.2 Uncertainty 
Recall that this study finds mixed and conflicting significant results for the TCE 
dimension environmental uncertainty decomposed into the three dimensions of 
volume/demand, technological and diversity. David and Han (2004) conduct a 
systematic assessment of empirical support for TCE examining 308 statistical tests from 
63 articles. Only 24 per cent of tests for uncertainty were significant in the predicted 
direction, 60 per cent not significant and 16 per cent significant in the opposite direction 
predicted.  
Widener and Selto (1999) refer to environmental uncertainty as the stability and 
predictability of internal audit activities as a consequence of business conditions. 
Finding no support for this dimension, the authors conclude their measure is noisy and 
lacking reliability and advocate future research strive for better more reliable measures. 
In their replication of the Widener and Selto (1999) study, Speklé et al., (2007) also find 
uncertainty is not a predictor of governance choice, proposing environmental 
uncertainty does not affect the sourcing decision for internal audit. The authors argue 
that the decision it is not a discrete choice between the two options and companies 
generally have a combination of in house and external providers. This co-sourcing 
option provides additional ways to deal with uncertainty which are not captured by the 
general TCE predictions.  
It is suggested the Widener and Selto (1999) study combines conflicting 
constructs in a single summary measure and therefore results for the underlying 
 135 
 
opposing components have cancelled each other out and thus no significant relationship 
is validated. Examination of the survey questions used in their studies bear out this 
proposition. It is proposed the four questionnaire items from the Widener and Selto 
(1999) study used to operationalise the dimension environmental uncertainty are in fact 
measuring more than a single dimension with conflicting governance outcomes. Table 
5.13 below presents the survey items, suggested TCE transactional dimensions and 
predicted governance choice from the Widener and Selto (1999) study.  
Table 5.13 - Survey items from the study by Widener and Selto (1999) 
Widener and Selto 1999 Survey
50
 
Questions measuring ‘Environmental Uncertainty’ 
Proposed 
Dimension 
Hypothesised 
Governance Mode 
In fiscal 1996 (2003) how much variation in business activities 
was there among auditees? 
Diversity Outsource 
In fiscal 1996, were there changes in the business organization 
(such as acquisitions, divestitures, reorganisations) of your 
company? 
Diversity Outsource 
In fiscal 1996, (2003)  how predictable was the need for internal 
audit services?  
Volume/demand In-house
51
 
In fiscal 1996, were there changes (turnover) in auditee 
personnel within your company? 
Asset specificity In-house 
 
5.5.3 Frequency 
Researchers in TCE observe that frequency has not received the equivalent 
academic scrutiny of asset specificity and uncertainty (David and Han, 2004; Geyskens 
et al., 2006; Macher and Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). David and Han 
(2004), in their systematic assessment of empirical support for TCE, review only 13 
tests of frequency compared to 107 for asset specificity and 87 for uncertainty. 
Geyskens et al., (2006) do not include frequency in their meta analytical study of 
transaction cost theory due to lack of research. Some empirical studies show no 
association between transaction frequency and governance mode (Anderson and 
Schmittlein 1984; Anderson 1985), while other studies find a significant relationship as 
predicted by TCE (John and Weitz, 1988; Klein et al., 1990; Speklé et al., 2007; 
                                                          
50
 Two of the questions from the Widener and Selto (1999) study where used in the replication 
questionnaire by Speklé, et al., (2007), marked in parenthesis (2003). 
51
 This study hypothesised a negative association between environmental uncertainty due to 
volume/demand and outsourcing but results provided evidence of the opposite relation. 
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Widener and Selto, 1999). Described as the most simple to contextualise, representing 
the volume and value of transactions over time (Williamson, 1979), this study combines 
measures of company size (totals assets, operating revenues, number of employees) to 
create a composite proxy variable to measure frequency. In support of TCE theoretical 
predictions results provide evidence of a negative relation between transaction 
frequency and outsourcing of risk management activities. 
5.6 RESPONSE BIAS 
Response bias is the threat that respondents to the survey are not representative 
of the population (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The TCE literature identifies a 
number of potential response biases. This study tests for three types of respondent bias. 
First, survey respondents are compared to non respondents. Non response bias occurs if 
those not responding to the survey are systematically different from those responding, 
thus compromising the generalisablity of the results (Flynn et al., 1990). A useful 
approach is demographic matching to determine whether differences exist between 
respondents and non-respondents (Flynn et al., 1990). Second, early versus late 
respondents are compared on the basis late respondents are very similar to non 
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) given they would not have responded if a 
second set of surveys had not been sent. 
Third, a comparison is made between mail and email respondents because a 
mixed mode of questionnaire administration is used. Whilst email is essentially an 
electronic version of regular mail with many similarities (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998), 
researchers have reported a variation in response rates and speed (Sheehan and 
McMillan, 1999). Schaefer and Dillman (1998) found email administered surveys 
obtained a slightly higher completion rate compared to the mail counterpart (69 per cent 
versus 57 per cent) and response time was significantly higher (9 days versus 14 days). 
Dillman, Phelps, Tortora, Swift, Kohrell, Berck, and Messer (2009) found mail and 
internet respondents qualitatively the same when comparing mixed modes. Yun and 
Trumbo (2000) observe no significant influence due to survey mode in their study of 
multi mode survey techniques, finding the use of multiple modes actually improved 
representativeness of the sample without biasing results. 
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This study tests for response bias by comparing the means of respondents with 
non respondents, early with late respondents and mail with email respondents on the 
basis of size (total assets, operating revenues and number of employees) and age 
(number of years listed on the ASX). An independent samples t test is used to test for 
response bias by comparing the means of size and age variables for the 281 survey 
respondents52. To ensure the assumption of normally distributed data is not violated, 
additional analysis includes a non parametric Mann Whitney U Test performed to 
compare medians. 
Total assets (natural logarithm), operating revenues (natural logarithm), the 
number of employees and number of years company has been established are used as 
demographic variables for comparison following existing research in the field 
(Anderson, 1985, 1988; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Aubert et al., 1996b, 2003; 
Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener, 2004; Widener and Selto, 
1999). Discussion and results are presented below indicating overall response bias does 
not threaten the reliability of the results. 
5.6.1 Non-response bias 
Respondents are compared with the non respondents to the survey request using 
available data for the comparison variables from the population of 1811 companies 
surveyed. The comparison variables for non respondent companies are total assets and 
operating revenues (961 observations), number of employees (645 observations) and 
number of years operating (505 observations) measured as number of years listed on the 
ASX. Results are reported in the table 5.14 below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 Ten companies were excluded from the regression analysis due to missing data and/or identification as 
outliers. Results from tests for response bias for the reduced sample are qualitatively the same. 
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Table 5.14 – Results of statistical tests for non respondent bias 
Variable Category N 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
t P 
Mann-
Whitney P 
Log of Total Assets 
Respondent 281 18.01 2.68 
3.52 0.01 0.01 
Non-respondent 961 17.45 2.21 
Log of Operating 
Revenue 
Respondent 281 16.10 3.95 
1.88 0.06 0.09 
Non-respondent 961 15.61 3.31 
Number of 
employees 
Respondent 281 1801 6416 
1.73 0.08 0.39 
Non-respondent 645 1011 3582 
Number of years 
operating 
Respondent 281 32.50 40 
2.17 0.03 0.03 
Non-respondent 505 25.37 35 
 
Results suggest no significant differences at the p > 0.05 between respondents 
and non respondents measured by mean natural logarithm of operating revenues and 
mean number of employees (mean = 16.10, standard deviation = 3.95 versus mean = 
15.61, standard deviation = 3.31, t = 1.88, p = 0.06 and mean = 1801, standard deviation 
= 6416 versus 1011, standard deviation = 3582, t = 1.73, p = 0.08). However, results for 
the size variable, natural logarithm of total assets indicate respondent companies are 
significantly larger than non respondents (mean = 18.01, standard deviation = 2.68 
versus mean = 17.45, standard deviation = 2.21, t = 3.52, p = 0.01) and have been listed 
on the ASX for a longer period of time (mean = 32.50, standard deviation = 40 versus 
mean = 25.37, standard deviation = 35, t = 2.17, p = 0.03). Hence, results may not be 
generalisable to the entire population of ASX listed companies.  
In their study examining sourcing the internal audit function from a TCE 
perspective Widener and Selto (1999) report the same bias and maintain the difference 
does not provide sufficient evidence to adversely affect the study. They argue larger 
companies are prepared to devote the resources to responding to a survey. More 
decision making about governance choice is made by larger companies because they are 
bigger consumers of the service, that is internal audit or risk management, and therefore 
the survey is of greater interest to respondents. It is proposed the same argument applies 
for companies with longer operating histories who are likely to have more established 
risk management functions and therefore systems in place to grant more convenient 
access to data for response purposes. 
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5.6.2 Early versus late respondent bias 
Testing for response bias based on the time taken to return the survey 
questionnaire is conducted at two levels. First, the sample is divided into the two 
categories of early respondents categorised as median days or less to reply and late 
respondents as replying in greater than the median number of response days. Second the 
sample is divided into three categories, early (19 days and less) versus middle (20 to 42 
days) versus late (43 to 111 days) respondents on the basis of the length of the survey 
administration period being 111 days (Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
Results are reported in tables 5.15 and 5.16 below. 
Table 5.15 - Results of statistical tests for early versus late respondent bias 
Variable Category N Mean Std Dev t P 
Mann-
Whitney 
P 
Log of Total Assets 
Early Respondent 151 18.34 2.47 
1.94 0.73 0.02 
Late respondent 130 17.77 2.41 
Log of Operating 
Revenue 
Early Respondent 151 16.64 3.94 
2.48 0.90 0.01 
Late respondent 130 15.48 3.89 
Number of 
employees 
Early Respondent 151 2023 5496 
0.59 0.50 0.93 
Late respondent 130 1506 7488 
Number of years 
operating 
Early Respondent 151 11.38 12.50 
0.88 0.08 0.16 
Late respondent 130 10.20 9.20 
 
Table 5.16 - Results of statistical tests for early versus middle versus late 
respondent bias 
Variable Category N Mean Std Dev Levene Stat. 
Mann-
Whitney 
P 
Log of Total Assets 
Early Respondent 100 18.45 2.33 
0.53 0.59 Middle Respondent 92 17.82 2.61 
Late respondent 89 17.92 2.41 
Log of Operating 
Revenue 
Early Respondent 100 17.01 3.39 
2.83 0.06 Middle Respondent 92 15.68 4.33 
Late respondent 89 15.51 4.00 
Number of 
employees 
Early Respondent 100 1837 5102 
0.24 0.79 Middle Respondent 92 1635 4953 
Late respondent 89 1928 8893 
Number of years 
operating 
Early Respondent 100 12.00 13.85 
3.67 0.03 Middle Respondent 92 9.87 9.18 
Late respondent 89 10.51 9.32 
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Results indicate no significant differences at the p > 0.05 level between the two 
groups of early and late survey respondents using independent samples t test and the 
non parametric Mann Whitney U Test on the basis of size measured by employees (p = 
0.50 and 0.93) and number of years operating (p = 0.08 and 0.16). Results for the 
independent t tests indicate no significant differences on the basis of size measured by 
natural logarithm of total assets (p = 0.73) and by natural logarithm of operating 
revenues (p = 0.90). However, results from the non parametric Mann Whitney U Test 
for these two comparison variables indicate a significant difference on the basis of size 
measured by these two variables (natural logarithm of total assets, p = 0.02 and natural 
logarithm of operating revenues p= 0.01). 
One way between groups ANOVA is used to test for differences in the sample 
divided into the three groups representing early, middle and late respondents. Results 
indicate no significant differences between the groups for any of the size variables 
(natural logarithm of total assets: Levene = 0.53, p = 0.59; natural logarithm of total 
operating revenues: Levene = 2.83, p = 0.06; number of employees: Levene = 0.24, p = 
0.79). However a significant difference is reported between groups in the number of 
years they have been operating in results from the non parametric Mann Whitney U Test 
(p = 0.03). On balance it is suggested there is limited difference between respondents on 
the basis of time of response.  
5.6.3 Mail versus email respondent bias test 
 The results reported in table 5.17 suggest no significant difference at the p > 
0.05 level between mail and email respondents on the basis of company size and age. 
The significance reported in the number of employees in the t test is not supported in 
the results for non parametric Mann Whitney U Test. 
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Table 5.17 - Results of statistical tests for mail versus email respondent bias 
Variable Category N Mean 
Std Dev 
t P 
Mann-
Whitney P 
Log of Total Assets 
Mail 238 18.12 2.52 
0.66 0.08 0.66 
Email 43 17.85 2.07 
Log of Operating 
Revenue 
Mail 238 16.27 4.00 
1.69 0.74 0.06 
Email 43 15.16 3.57 
Number of 
employees 
Mail 238 2018 6870 
1.26 0.03 0.20 
Email 43 433 1110 
Number of years 
operating 
Mail 238 10.81 11.40 
-0.11 0.36 0.42 
Email 43 11.01 9.51 
 
In summary, there are some significant differences in terms of size and the 
number of years of operations between respondents which is acknowledged as a 
limitation of this study. However, it is suggested there is minimal evidence that 
response bias has adversely affected the research project.  
5.7 INTERACTIONS 
 Williamson (1979) maintains asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency should 
not be examined in isolation but as interactions between the dimensions. Williamson 
(1985, p. 74 & 79) justifies this by proposing that for transactions characterised by low 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency are of little consequence because new 
trading relations can be easily arranged and continuity has little value. Therefore, 
outsourcing is favoured. In contrast increasing uncertainty creates the imperative to 
devise mechanisms to deal with the gaps and contractual adaptations that inevitably 
arise for transactions characterised by high asset specificity. Under these circumstances 
TCE predicts internal production is demanded as repeated renegotiation of contracts is 
achieved more efficiently in house as opposed to more formal agreements with external 
parties (Williamson, 1985, p. 56). 
Although the majority of empirical research studies have operationalised the 
three TCE dimensions individually to explain the governance structure (Widener and 
Selto, 1999), many studies have employed interactions between asset specificity as the 
key driver and the other dimensions (Anderson, 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; 
Murray and Kotabe, 1999; Nicholson et al., 2006; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and 
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Selto, 1999). However despite Williamson‟s assertion, there is mixed and conflicting 
evidence for the interaction terms as significant predictors of governance choice. 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) find no significant relation between the 
interaction terms asset specificity and behavioural and environmental uncertainty and 
the use of an integrated versus non integrated sales force. However Anderson (1985) 
reports a positive relation between the interaction term asset specificity and 
environmental uncertainty and the decision to outsource the sales function, which is the 
opposite direction predicted by the theory. Results from Wang (2002) support the 
proposition that asset specificity alone is not a decisive factor and only influences the 
choice to internalise software development activities when combined with behavioural 
uncertainty. Widener and Selto (1999) and Speklé et al., (2007) find no significant 
support for interactions between asset specificity and behavioural and environmental 
uncertainty and the sourcing decision for internal audit services. Although a significant 
relation between the interaction of asset specificity and frequency and outsourcing is 
found, it is in the opposite direction predicted by the theory. Widener and Selto (1999) 
attribute this to possible outliers in the sample and Speklé et al., (2007) to the high 
proportion of companies that do not outsource any internal audit activities. 
This study extends the restricted linear and logistic regression models to include 
multiplicative interaction terms using a dummy variable for asset specificity interacting 
with the uncertainty and frequency variables. Asset specificity is operationalised as a 
dichotomous binary variable measured as high versus low asset specificity based on the 
level of expenditure on research and development 53 . Results suggest none of the 
interactive terms are significant predictors of governance choice. An F test of the sum of 
squared residuals is conducted to compare the expanded model (including the 
interaction variables) with model three (the restricted model). Results (F(9,246) = 0.36, 
p = 0.95) indicate that there is no significant difference. The model specifications and 
results are reported in Appendix E-1. 
                                                          
53
 High is given a value of 1 = greater than the mean scaled expenditure on research and development, 
otherwise low = 0. For robustness purposes an alternative measure of asset specificity was also tested in 
the interactive model, the standardised summary scores of the survey items for the four dimensions, 
company skills and training, contractual characteristics and staff turnover and the archival variable 
expenditure on research and development. Results indicated the model is not significant at the p<0.05 
level. 
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5.8 CONCLUSION 
This study uses transaction cost economics (TCE) to identify factors influencing 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) companies‟ decision to internally generate or 
outsource activities required to manage risk. A unique data set obtained from a survey 
sample of 271 listed ASX companies in 2009 is combined with archival data and 
hypotheses is operationalised and analysed using linear and logistic regression. This 
chapter presented the findings. 
Broadly in line with the TCE propositions expenditure on research and 
development, staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions and 
environmental uncertainty measured in terms of technological change and transaction 
frequency is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. Uncertainty 
due to environmental diversity measured by the number of subsidiaries and recent 
restructures, acquisitions or mergers is associated with more outsourcing of risk 
management activities. Behavioural uncertainty related to new staff is also associated 
with more outsourcing.  
Contrary to the theoretical predictions of TCE, volatile sales are associated with 
more outsourcing and competition and overseas sales are associated with less 
outsourcing of risk management activities. Training and contract duration, hypothesised 
as indicators of asset specificity are associated with more outsourcing. 
Big4 suppliers are associated with more outsourcing of risk management 
activities and leverage is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. 
Financial distress is associated with the decision not to outsource in the whole sample of 
companies and associated with more outsourcing for the subsample of companies that 
do outsource risk management activities. Capital intensity is associated with more 
outsourcing in the whole sample of companies and there is a marginal association with 
less outsourcing for the subsample of companies that do outsource risk management 
activities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the thesis, acknowledges the limitations of 
the study, and discusses the implications of the research in the following sections. 
Section 6.2 summarises the motivation, research question and contribution. Section 6.3 
summarises the results of the hypotheses testing and section 6.4 discusses the study‟s 
limitations and implications for the theory of the research findings. Section 6.5 suggests 
opportunities for future research and section 6.6 concludes the chapter.  
6.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH MOTIVATION, RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
CONTRIBUTION 
Risk management is a recognised business discipline with a broad supporting 
infrastructure in academe and professional practice. Development of a sound framework 
of risk oversight, risk management and internal control is fundamental to good 
corporate governance (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2008; ASX Markets 
Supervision, 2009). Management are responsible for development of a system 
(structures, policies, and procedures and culture) to identify, assess, treat and monitor 
risk to support achievement of the organisation‟s objectives. The services required to 
support a company‟s risk management activities can be conducted in house by 
employees of the company, outsourced to professionals such as accounting practices or 
other professional consultants or by a combination of internal and external sources. 
Using the theoretical framework of TCE, this study examines what internal and external 
factors influence this decision. The research question is „what are the internal and 
external factors influencing the decision to internalise or outsource risk management 
activities?‟ 
The ASX listing rules impose disclosure and certification requirements for risk 
management through the Corporate Governance Principles (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003, 2007a). The legal authority for these principles is sections 793C and 
1101BN of the Corporations Act (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). The ASX 
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Corporate Governance Council released the first edition, Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, in March 2003. The 2003 version of 
the Principles was updated in 2007. The revised version, Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (2007), more clearly defines the board and 
management‟s responsibilities for risk oversight, management and disclosure. A key 
change is the expansion of the scope of Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk to 
reflect the heightened concern and increasing expectations of stakeholders for risk 
management (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2008). Whereas previously the 
focus was on the risks surrounding financial reporting, the changes place greater 
emphasis on reporting and disclosing the effectiveness of risk management across a 
broader range of risks (KPMG, 2007). The scope of risks has been broadened by 
adopting the concept material business risks which the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (2008, p. 2) defines as “the most significant areas of uncertainty or exposure, at 
a whole-of-company level, that could have an adverse impact on the achievement of 
company objectives”. 
This study is motivated by a number of factors. First, limited research exists on 
the characteristics of companies‟ risk management systems in individual organisational 
settings (Bhimani, 2009). Prior research, overseas and in Australia, has tended to focus 
on specific functional areas of risk management such as internal audit (Carey et al., 
2006; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999). 
Second, from a theoretical perspective, there is an extensive growing body of empirical 
TCE research across business disciplines. However, its application in accounting is 
relatively scarce (Macher and Richman, 2008) and mainly confined to management 
accounting, for example, Carey et al., (2006), Speklé et al., (2007) and Widener and 
Selto (1999). Bhimani (2009) proposes the relationships between management 
accounting, corporate governance and risk management have been addressed only to a 
minimal extent in the academic literature but they are increasingly intertwined and 
inextricably interdependent. Applying the TCE framework in the context of risk 
management extends the application of the theory. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, few 
studies explore how risk management works in practice and how it is organised using 
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internal employees and external consultants (Arena et al., 2010; Power, 2009). Previous 
studies have applied TCE to explain the sourcing decision for internal audit activities 
(Speklé et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999) and managerial advisory services (Kent, 
2011) but have not applied it to the risk management function.  
Second, this research is timely because of the increased regulatory focus on risk 
management activities given the recent global financial crisis and the additional 
compliance burden placed on listed entities by the revised Corporate Governance 
Principles in Australia. Hence, this study is undertaken in an important period because 
data has been collected from companies for 2009 which is the first full reporting year 
following the implementation of the revised Principle 7: Recognise and Manage Risk. 
Third, this data obtained from a survey sample of 271 companies listed on the ASX in 
2009, combined with archival data from the company‟s annual reports is unique.  
This research has implications for companies when making decisions about 
governance choice for risk management activities. Results suggest the factors 
management should consider are those associated with the internal and external 
environment. It is suggested management make decisions on governance choice based 
on production and transaction costs of each alternative. Transaction costs by their very 
nature are the least transparent. This study undertakes to investigate directly the factors 
influencing the risk management sourcing decision. This knowledge, by increasing and 
promoting understanding of the issues, can be used by managers and professional 
bodies to enhance their decision making on the choice of governance for risk 
management. 
6.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
TCE views the company as a governance structure based on a series of 
contractual agreements (Alchian and Woodward, 1988). Transaction costs are those 
associated with contracting for the procurement of goods and/or services. Whether 
transactions are organised within the company or between companies across a market is 
a decision which depends on the transaction costs for each alternative. The more 
complex the transaction between two different parties in the market, the more costly it is 
to negotiate, write and enforce a contract and this creates transaction costs. Companies 
 147 
 
and markets are alternative governance structures differing in their transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937). Therefore, assuming cost minimisation is the goal, there is a need to 
align governance structures with the drivers of transaction costs in order to reduce costs 
(Widener, 2004; Williamson, 1991b). Economising on transaction costs is realised by 
assigning a transaction to a governance structure according to its attributes, which can 
be characterised by the three broad principal dimensions of asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency that have identifiable relative qualitative and measurable quantitative 
characteristics (Williamson, 1973, 1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1988a, 
1988b, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2005; Williamson et al., 1975). Four 
principle hypotheses are developed from the theoretical framework provided by TCE 
predicting the governance choice for a company‟s risk management activities. Data 
from the 271 survey questionnaire respondents combined with archival data from their 
companies‟ annual reports is used to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 2.  
Linear and logistic multivariate regression is used to analyse the data on two 
levels. First for the sample of 271 companies that responded to a survey questionnaire, 
and second for a sub sample of 125 companies reporting outsourcing risk management 
activities. Models three (271 companies) and seven (125 companies) apply linear 
regression with the dependent variable as the proportion of risk management outsourced. 
Models four and eight apply logistic regression examining the sourcing decision as 
discrete alternatives for the whole sample. Model four examines sourcing decision for 
risk management activities as the discrete alternative of yes or no. Model eight includes 
only outsourcing companies and the dependent variable is measured as a high and low 
dichotomous variable. 
Support is found for hypothesis 1 in that the transaction specificity of the human 
assets involved in the provision of risk management activities is negatively related to 
the proportion outsourced. Results confirm that as expenditure on research development 
rises companies outsource less risk management activities. Further support is found 
with expenditure on research and development associated with the decision not to 
outsource risk management activities. Lower staff turnover in risk management relative 
to other service functions is associated with low outsourcing of risk management 
activities in companies that outsource some. Contrary to theoretical propositions 
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evidence exists that training and contract duration for external suppliers of risk 
management activities are associated with increased outsourcing.  
Support is found for hypothesis 2a that environmental uncertainty due to 
technological change is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. 
No support is found for hypothesis 2a that environmental uncertainty due to 
volume/demand is negatively related to the proportion or decision to outsource. Results 
from all four models (three, four, seven and eight) indicate companies with more 
variable sales outsource more risk management activities. 
Support is found for hypothesis 2b that environmental uncertainty due to 
diversity is associated with more outsourcing of risk management activities. Results 
from all four models (three, four, seven and eight) indicate the proportion outsourced 
and the decision to outsource is positively related to the number of subsidiaries. 
Evidence is provided that companies that have had a restructure, acquisition or merger 
in the past three years outsource proportionally more risk management activities. 
Contrary to the theoretical expectations of hypothesis 2b, as the level of competition 
within the industry and overseas revenue as a proportion of total revenues rises 
companies outsource less risk management activities. 
No support exists for hypothesis 3a that behavioural uncertainty associated with 
external suppliers of risk management activities leads to less outsourcing. Support is 
found for hypothesis 3b that companies with newer management outsource more risk 
management activities because of the behavioural uncertainty associated with existing 
staff for the proportion outsourced and for the decision to outsource.  
Support is found for hypothesis 4 that higher frequency of risk management 
transactions is associated with less outsourcing from all four models (three, four, seven 
and eight). 
Companies using a Big4 accounting company and capital intensive companies 
are associated with the decision to outsource risk management activities. Financial 
distress is associated with the decision not to outsource in the whole sample of 271 
respondent companies. This is in contrast to results from the analysis of the subsample 
 149 
 
of 125 companies that do outsource risk management activities where financial distress 
is an indicator of more outsourcing. Higher leverage is associated with less outsourcing 
and the decision not to outsource. There is no evidence that companies with higher 
industry knowledge transfer costs outsource more risk management activities. A 
tabulated summary of these results is presented in Appendices F-1 to F-3. 
6.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
There are a number of limitations to this study. The following is a discussion of 
the limitations imposed by the threat of measurement error and those associated with the 
theoretical framework along with implications for theory. 
The results for the multiple predictor variables from the survey questionnaire 
operationalised in the regression are subject to the general limitations of survey data. 
Values are based on respondents evaluations and measurement error occurs when an 
observed value differs from the actual value (Hair Jnr., Black, Babin, and  Anderson, 
2010; OECD). This can result in two types of error. Type one errors are rejection of the 
null hypothesis when it is actually true. Generally referred to as a false positive, it is 
stating there is a correlation between variables when in fact none exists. Type two errors, 
the opposite of type one errors, are the threat of failing to reject the null hypothesis 
which is not finding a correlation when it does exist. Type one errors are considered 
more serious as they are inferring a relation exists when in fact it does not. However 
given results for many of the survey variables are not significant both type one and type 
two should be considered.  
The use of multiple variables and reliance on their combination focuses attention 
on the issue of measurement error (Hair Jnr. et al., 2010). Hence intercompany and inter 
industry comparisons must be made with caution (Macher and Richman, 2008). All 
variables used in multivariate regression have some degree of measurement error (Hair 
Jnr. et al., 2010). Reliability and validity of the measures have to be considered in 
assessing the research (Flynn et al., 1990). Validity refers to the extent to which the 
empirical measure adequately reflects the construct it has been developed to represent. 
(Hair Jnr. et al., 2010; Sekaran, 2003). Reliability relates to the precision and 
consistency of the instrument to measure its intended construct (DeCoster, 2005; 
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Sekaran, 2003). The following presents a discussion of the processes undertaken to 
minimise threats to validity and reliability of the measurements used in this research 
study. 
Construct validity testifies to the extent the instrument measuring the construct 
fits with the theory (Sekaran, 2003) and is the ultimate objective of scale development 
(Sekaran 2003). A construct is a representation of something that does not exist as an 
observable dimension and the more abstract, the harder to measure (Nunnally 1978). To 
strive for construct validity the items and scales used in this study to measure the TCE 
dimensions in the context of risk management activities rely heavily on adapting 
measures from existing cross-disciplinary studies as discussed in chapter 3. Given the 
research context and Australian setting, the measures used for risk management are 
subject to compounding measurement error and this is a limitation of the study.  
Face validity is the degree to which items appear to reflect the intended  
construct they have been designed to measure (Sekaran, 2003). Content validity ensures 
there is adequate capture of the domain of interest with sufficient items and without 
extraneous content (Hinkin, 1995, 1998). To minimise threats to content and face 
validity a panel of academic experts consisting of six professors from accounting, 
management, economics and marketing provided guidance advice throughout the survey 
questionnaire development process (Aubert et al., 1996a, 2003; Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 
1990; Nam et al., 1996; Widener and Selto, 1999). Pretesting content and face validity 
ensures conceptually inconsistent items can be dropped and the questions in the survey 
in appearance and measurement adequately assess domains of interest (Sekaran, 2003).  
This study relies on a number of individual questionnaire items combined in a 
summary measure to operationalise the TCE construct asset specificity. The reliability 
of this measure is tested using Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient which indicates how well 
the items measuring the construct are positively correlated to one another; the closer to 
one, the higher the internal consistency and reliability (Sekaran, 2003). Cronbach‟s 
alpha is frequently used in academic studies of governance employing survey 
methodology, for example (Ang and Cummings, 1997; Artz and Brush, 2000; Aubert et 
al., 1996b, 2003; Carey et al., 2006; De Vita et al., 2009; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000b; 
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Nam et al., 1996; Speklé et al., 2007; Wang, 2002; Widener, 2004; Widener and Selto, 
1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
Conclusions have been drawn from a sample size of 271 which represents 16.82 
per cent of the surveyed population. The small sample size, although comparable with 
prior studies as discussed in chapter 5, is a limiting factor and although there is limited 
evidence of sampling bias results may not be generalisable to the population of 
Australian listed companies or their international counterparts. In addition Australia is a 
unique setting, in contrast to the U.S and other regimes, because compliance with 
corporate governance regulations is quasi-voluntary reducing comparability of results 
outside Australia.  
This study primarily emphasises TCE to explain the decision to internalise or 
outsource risk management activities and this is a potential limiting factor. The 
literature emphasises that companies may have numerous non TCE related motives for 
selecting a governance choice in addition to reducing transaction costs (Erramilli and 
Rao, 1993). Other theoretical frameworks predict the boundaries of the company and 
agency theory and resource based approaches are complementary theories.  
Significant results are found to support the theoretical predictions of TCE for the 
archival proxy, investment in research and development. Widener and Selto (1999) in 
examining the sourcing decision for internal audit services draw on resource based 
theory. They propose firms respond to competitive pressures by focusing scarce 
resources on competitive advantage and internalising internal audit if the function is 
intended to reinforce the firm‟s strategy. Acknowledging resource based theories, it is 
proposed that research and development is another a strategic imperative viewed as a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). There is evidence to 
support this proposition from the current study with 70.48 per cent of companies 
identifying risks associated with strategy as covered under their risk management 
system and 54.80 per cent of respondents noting strategic importance as a reason to 
internalise risk management activities. Beaumont and Sohal (2004) find evidence 
companies maintain activities in house rather than outsource if they are strategic in 
nature through fear of dependence and loss of flexibility regardless of the degree of 
specificity of the asset involved.  
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Results from this study provide strong support for uncertainty as a factor 
influencing governance choice for risk management activities. This study decomposes 
the TCE dimension uncertainty into four broad dimensions of volume/demand, 
technological, diversity and behavioural uncertainty. Significant results for a number of 
constructs operationalised individually provide support for the underlying TCE 
propositions. Environmental uncertainty due to technological change, diversity 
measured by the number of subsidiaries, and recent structural and managerial change 
are associated with outsourcing proposed by TCE. However, results for environmental 
uncertainty associated with demand/volume, industry competition and proportion of 
overseas revenues are in contradiction to the theoretical predictions of TCE and a 
number of prior studies. It is proposed this study provides evidence to support the 
proposition environmental uncertainty is a multi-faceted construct requiring 
examination of the dimensions individually. Recall that many prior studies examine 
environmental uncertainty as a single dimension reporting mixed and conflicting results 
and therefore providing limited support for the theoretical predictions of TCE. It is 
suggested this is due to measurement issues associated with composite measures 
consisting of a broad range of constructs, predicting conflicting governance modes. 
David and Han (2004) propose the TCE construct uncertainty has been loosely 
interpreted with a considerable assortment of measurements and conclude future 
research should be firmly grounded on core TCE propositions.  
In support of TCE theoretical predictions, results provide evidence transaction 
frequency is associated with less outsourcing of risk management activities. Recall that 
researchers in TCE observe frequency has not received the academic scrutiny that asset 
specificity and uncertainty have and results are conflicting (David and Han, 2004; 
Geyskens et al., 2006; Macher and Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
Macher and Richman (2008, p. 7) propose that given TCE researchers have been largely 
unable to confirm the effects of transactional frequency on governance modes and 
greater theoretical and empirical treatment of frequency is required. Check this This 
study uses a composite proxy variable for company size to measure frequency as data 
from questionnaire items intended to measure frequency of transactions (the number of 
individual projects and total expenditure on risk management activities) was reported as 
unavailable by a large number of survey respondents and this is acknowledged as a 
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limitation. Researchers acknowledge the limitations of proxy measures, arguing the 
measure is likely capturing the effects of economies of scale and greater theoretical and 
empirical treatment of frequency is required (Macher and Richman, 2008; Widener and 
Selto, 1999). 
This study has explored the decision to internally generate or outsource risk 
management activities as a discrete choice between two alternatives, outsource or not, 
with only the magnitude of activities outsourced considered. However Williamson 
(1985, 1991a) discusses a third form of governance contract, an intermediate hybrid 
option such as a joint venture or strategic alliance. Frequently referred to as relational 
governance, hybrids are considered a viable alternative to internal production when the 
market fails (Geyskens et al., 2006). Incorporating a large informal component, 
relational governance lacks transparency and is therefore not easily measured or legally 
enforceable. Sociologists argue they operate their own safeguard mechanisms to guard 
the future value of the relationship (Geyskens et al., 2006). Relational governance as an 
option for risk management activities is not considered in this study and this is 
acknowledged as a limitation common to many similar studies. In a study of 133 journal 
articles from 35 journals from 1971 to 1992 Lohtia, Brooks, and Krapfel (1994) note 
concentration on the two alternatives, outsourcing in the market or internal production is 
key limitation in the TCE literature. 
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has examined a key aspect of corporate governance, risk 
management, through the lens of TCE. Mixed and conflicting results provide many 
opportunities for further research in this field. In addition further evidence is provided 
for future research to integrate TCE with other theoretical frameworks such as agency 
theory and resource based theories as suggested by a number of researchers (Arnold, 
2000; David and Han, 2004; Jin and Doloi, 2008; Leiblein, 2003; Macher and Richman, 
2008).  
Corporate governance is intrinsically linked to risk management and the quality 
of a company‟s governance impacts this decision. Future research opportunities lie in 
examining the governance characteristics of the respondent companies as potential 
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drivers of risk management implementation. Beasley et al., (2005) examine a number of 
governance characteristics as potential drivers of enterprise risk management 
implementation. Pagach and Warr (2010) examine drivers of enterprise risk 
management implementation and find that company size, leverage, volatility of 
operating cash flows and level of institutional ownership are factors that are positively 
associated with the likelihood of initiating an enterprise risk management program. 
Abbott et al., (2007) in their examination of the monitoring and oversight role that the 
audit committee plays in the financial reporting process control for quality of corporate 
governance via a governance rank variable which includes board independence, board 
size, CEO duality, proportion of inside ownership and blockholder ownership as 
governance characteristics. 
The theoretical framework of TCE relies on a number of underlying contextual 
behavioural assumptions in which company specific variables prevail. Opportunities 
exist for future research to explore measurement and operationalisation of opportunism 
and risk preference. Recall, Williamson (1985) states that absent opportunism there is 
no reason to supplant the market with a hierarchy. Macher and Richman (2008) suggest 
future research should explore and seek to measure and operationalise opportunism as a 
construct. Given risk management activities are predominantly performed by 
professional knowledge workers (as evidenced by 92 per cent with a university degree 
or equivalent in this study) there is more difficulty associated with monitoring and 
measuring outputs compared with workers involved in the production of a good. 
Opportunism is therefore a major consideration for operationalising more effectively in 
future TCE research associated with professional knowledge workers.  
Risk preference refers to the propensity for humans to exhibit variable risk 
preference behaviours when making decisions (Williamson, 1985). Williamson 
proposes risk preference affects the choice of governance structure and risk averse 
decision makers are likely to choose internal organisation whereas risk seeking decision 
makers prefer a market exchange. Although Williamson (1985) adopts an assumption of 
risk neutrality in TCE on the basis the focus should be on the transaction‟s attributes 
rather than the risk attitude of the transactors he acknowledges the importance of risk 
preferences for decision makers. Chiles and McMackin (1996) seeking to build on 
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Williamson‟s approach propose that risk preference manifests itself at a company level 
in a number of ways, one of which is the choice to be highly leveraged for risk seeking 
decision makers. There is the opportunity for future research to examine the relation 
between a company‟s financial structure as a measure of company level risk preference 
and their risk management characteristics. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter presented a summary and of the thesis, and discussed the results 
and their theoretical implications. The limitations of the research are identified along 
with implications for the theory. A number of suggestions for future research are 
presented. This chapter concludes the thesis. 
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Appendix A-3 Questionnaire Covering Letter 
 
Date 
 
«First_Name» «Second_Name» 
«Job_Position» 
«Company_Name» 
«First_Line_of_Address» 
«TOWN»  «STATE»  «Postcode» 
 
Dear «First_Name», 
Sourcing Risk Management Services 
We are conducting important university research that will identify the factors that determine an organisation’s 
decision to use external consultants or internal employees when certifying the financial statements as per 
S295A of the Corporations Act and ‘Recommendation 7 – Recognise and Manage Risk’.  (On the back of this 
page is a more comprehensive explanatory statement).  Our research is Australian based and involves all 
companies currently listed on the ASX. 
We would greatly appreciate about five minutes of your time to complete the enclosed, 2-page survey. No 
long answers or opinions are necessary and a reply paid self-addressed return envelope is enclosed.  We have 
included your company’s ASX code on the completed survey so that we can combine your response with 
publically available company information.   In doing this we give you our complete assurance that your 
responses will be known only to the two researchers named below and will be considered highly confidential 
and secured accordingly.  Only aggregate data will be used in the analysis and no individual company will be 
identified or identifiable in any report, article or paper that is written.  This research project has gone through 
an ethical review process and been given approval by the Bond University Ethics Committee. 
The survey is being sponsored by Bond University and the Accounting and Finance Association of Australia & 
New Zealand (AFAANZ). Your contribution will assist in providing valuable insights into crucial aspects of the 
risk management activities of ASX listed companies and the findings will provide useful guidance for public 
companies, regulators and professional bodies.  It will be our pleasure to share our findings with you. Please 
indicate if you wish to receive a summary by ticking the box at the end of the survey. 
If you are unable to answer any of the questions, please complete as much of the questionnaire as possible. All 
information is valuable and can be used to further this research.   
Thank you so much for your assistance, your support is gratefully appreciated. If you have any queries please 
contact either of the following: 
Kind Regards,        
       
Professor Pamela Kent      Jacqueline Christensen 
Phone (07) 5595 2279       Phone (07) 5595 2294  
Email: pkent@bond.edu.au      Email: jchriste@bond.edu.au 
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Appendix A-4 Questionnaire Explanatory Statement 
 
Factors influencing a company’s decision to internally generate or outsource risk 
management activities. 
 
Pamela Kent, Bond University and Jacqueline Christensen, Bond University54  
The aim of this research is to identify factors that influence a listed company’s decision to internally 
generate or outsource risk management.  This study focuses on those activities required to support 
the certifications provided by the CEO and CFO (or persons acting in these roles) in accordance with 
S295A of the Corporations Act 2002 and the revised 2007 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations as designated by ASX listing rule 4.10.3. The main context of this study is 
contained in ‘Principle 7 – Recognise and Manage Risk’ which was extended after a review of the 
original ASX Principles 2003.  This recommendation states that companies should establish a sound 
system of risk oversight and management and internal control.  Subsection 7.2 states:  
“The board should require management to design and implement the risk management and 
internal control system to manage the company’s material business risks and report to it on 
whether those risks are being managed effectively. The board should disclose that management 
has reported to it as to the effectiveness of the company’s management of its material business 
risks”. 
This statement effectively broadens the scope of the risk oversight reporting role from primarily a 
focus on controls relating to the integrity of financial reporting to assurance against other material 
business risks.   
The services and activities required for the development of a robust certification process can be 
handled in-house, outsourced to external consultants or a combination of both. This survey will 
capture firm specific data on the sourcing decision.  When combined with archival data, the analysis 
will provide valuable insights into crucial aspects of the risk management activities of ASX listed 
companies and the findings will provide useful guidance for public companies, regulators and 
professional bodies. Organisations have much to learn about risk management and academic 
research in this domain will provide valuable insight and increase our understanding of the economic 
landscape. 
                  Should you have any complaint concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please 
do not hesitate to contact Bond University Ethics Committee quoting Project Number: RO-912 to: 
The Complaints Officer 
Bond University Human Research Ethics Committee 
Bond University Research Institute 
Level 2, Room 232, Conference Centre 
Bond University, Gold Coast, QLD 4229 
                                                 Telephone (07) 5595 4194; Fax (07) 5595 5009                                «ASX Code» 
 
                                                          
54 Jacqueline Christensen, PhD Candidate - is doing research towards a PhD under the supervision of Dr. Pamela Kent, a Professor in the 
Faculty of Business, Technology and Sustainable Development at Bond University. 
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Appendix A-5 Questionnaire First Follow-up Letter 
 
 
Date 
 
 
«First_Name» «Second_Name» 
«Job_Position» 
«Company_Name» 
«First_Line_of_Address» 
«TOWN»  «STATE»  «Postcode» 
 
 
 
 
Dear «First_Name», 
Sourcing Risk Management Services 
In the last three weeks we mailed you a survey seeking your assistance in our university 
research into risk management practices in ASX listed companies. If you have already 
completed the survey and returned it, please accept our sincere thanks.  If not, we would 
greatly appreciate it if you could do so in the next few days.  It is extremely important that 
data about your company is included in the study if the results are to accurately represent 
Australian companies.   
In the event that by some chance you did not receive the survey or it has been misplaced, a 
replacement is enclosed.   The survey is very brief, only 2 pages and should take less than 
ten minutes of your time to complete. 
Your contribution to the success of this study will be greatly appreciated. 
 
 Kind Regards,        
       
Professor Pamela Kent     Jacqueline Christensen 
Phone (07) 5595 2279      Phone (07) 5595 2294  
Email: pkent@bond.edu.au      Email: jchriste@bond.edu.au 
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Appendix A-6 Questionnaire Second Follow-up Letter 
Date 
 
 
«FIRST_NAME» «SECOND_NAME» 
«POSITION» 
«COMPANY_NAME» 
«FIRST_LINE_OF_ADDRESS» 
«TOWN»  «STATE»  «POSTCODE» 
 
 
 
 
Dear «FIRST_NAME», 
Sourcing Risk Management Services 
We recently wrote to you seeking your assistance in our university research into risk 
management practices in ASX listed companies and as of today we have not yet received 
your completed survey.  We understand you will have many demands on your time but 
would ask you to take a few minutes of it to assist us in further understanding this crucial 
area of business. If you have already completed the survey and returned it, please accept 
our sincere thanks. 
The survey is very brief, should take about five minutes to complete and a reply paid 
envelope is enclosed for your convenience.  We give you our complete assurance that your 
responses will be known only to the two researchers named below and will be considered 
highly confidential and secured accordingly.  Only aggregate data will be used in the analysis 
and no individual company will be identified or identifiable in any report, article or paper 
that is written.  
Your contribution to the success of this study will be greatly appreciated.  Thanking you in 
anticipation. 
 Kind Regards,        
       
Professor Pamela Kent     Jacqueline Christensen 
Phone (07) 5595 2279      Phone (07) 5595 2294  
Email: pkent@bond.edu.au      Email: jchriste@bond.edu.au 
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Appendix A-7 Questionnaire Third Follow-up Email/Letter 
 
Bond University Research Study – REMINDER 
For the Urgent Attention of First Name Last Name Position 
Sourcing Risk Management Services 
We recently contacted you regarding a research study on risk management practices.  
If you have already completed the survey and returned it, please accept our sincere 
thanks. 
To date the response rate has been encouraging and the data collected very useful, 
but we still need your. The electronic survey should only take about five minutes to 
complete.  Here is a link to the survey (if you are unable to complete in one short 
session you can return via the link at anytime within the next two weeks). 
Thank you. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Professor Pamela Kent, pkent@bond.edu.au 
Jacqueline Christensen jchriste@bond.edu.au 
Phone (07) 5595 2294 
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Appendix B-1 Industry Knowledge Transfer Costs Categorisation 
Group SIC Codes Industry Description GIC Sectors 
GICS 
Sub-
Industry 
Code 
GICS Sub-Industry 
Knowledge 
Specialisation 
KS 
Code No. of 
Companies 
1 (0100-0999) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
This division includes establishments primarily 
engaged in agricultural production, forestry, 
commercial fishing, hunting and trapping, and related 
services. 
Consumer 
Staples (30) 
30202010 Agricultural Products Specialized 1.0 1 
2 (1000-1499) Mining 
This division includes all establishments primarily 
engaged in mining. The term mining is used in the 
broad sense to include the extraction of minerals 
occurring naturally: solids, such as coal and ores; 
liquids, such as crude petroleum; and gases such as 
natural gas. The term mining is also used in the broad 
sense to include quarrying, well operations, milling 
(e.g., crushing, screening, washing, flotation), and 
other preparation customarily done at the mine site, or 
as a part of mining activity. 
Energy (10) 10102010 Integrated Oil and Gas Specialized 1.0 1 
Energy (10) 10102020 Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Specialized 1.0 17 
Energy (10) 10102050 Coal and Consumable Fuels Specialized 1.0 12 
Materials (15) 15104010 Aluminium Specialized 1.0 3 
Materials (15) 15104020 Diversified Metals and Mining Specialized 1.0 35 
Materials (15) 15104030 Gold Specialized 1.0 23 
Materials (15) 15104040 Precious Metals and Minerals Specialized 1.0 8 
3 (1500-1599) Construction: General Building 
This division includes establishments primarily 
engaged in construction. The term construction 
includes new work, additions, alterations, 
reconstruction, installations, and repairs. 
UNUSED Mixed 0.5 0 
4 (1600-1699) Construction: Heavy 
This major group includes general contractors 
primarily engaged in heavy construction other than 
building, such as highways and streets, bridges, 
sewers, railroads, irrigation projects, flood control 
projects and marine construction, and special trade 
contractors primarily engaged in activities of a type 
that are clearly specialized to such heavy construction 
and are not normally performed on buildings or 
building-related projects. 
Industrials (20) 20103010 Construction and Engineering Specialized 1.0 12 
5 (1700-1799) Construction: Special Trade 
This major group includes special trade contractors 
who undertake activities of a type that are specialized 
either to building construction, including work on 
mobile homes, or to both building and non-building 
projects. 
UNUSED Mixed 0.5 0 
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Appendix B-2 Industry Knowledge Transfer Costs Categorisation cont… 
Group SIC Codes Industry Description GIC Sectors 
GICS Sub-
Industry 
Code 
GICS Sub-Industry 
Knowledge 
Specialisation 
KS 
Code 
No. of 
Companies 
7 (2000-3999) Manufacturing 
The manufacturing division includes 
establishments engaged in the mechanical or 
chemical transformation of materials or substances 
into new products. These establishments are 
usually described as plants, factories, or mills and 
characteristically use power driven machines and 
materials handling equipment. Establishments 
engaged in assembling component parts of 
manufactured products are also considered 
manufacturing if the new product is neither a 
structure nor other fixed improvement. Also 
included is the blending of materials, such as 
lubricating oils, plastics resins, or liquors. 
Energy (10) 10101020 
Oil and Gas Equipment and 
Services 
Specialized 1.0 3 
Materials (15) 15101010 Commodity Chemicals Specialized 1.0 1 
Materials (15) 15101030 
Fertilizers and Agricultural 
Chemicals 
Specialized 1.0 2 
Materials (15) 15102010 Construction Materials Specialized 1.0 2 
Materials (15) 15103020 Paper Packaging Specialized 1.0 2 
Materials (15) 15104050 Steel Specialized 1.0 9 
Materials (15) 15105010 Forest Products Specialized 1.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20102010 Building Products Specialized 1.0 3 
Industrials (20) 20104010 
Electrical Components and 
Equipment 
Specialized 1.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20104020 Heavy Electrical Equipment Specialized 1.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20106010 
Construction & Farm Machinery & 
Heavy Trucks 
Specialized 1.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20106020 Industrial Machinery Specialized 1.0 4 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25101010 Auto Parts and Equipment Specialized 1.0 2 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25201050 Housewares and Specialties Specialized 1.0 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25203010 
Apparel, Accessories and Luxury 
Goods 
Specialized 1.0 2 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25203030 Textiles Specialized 1.0 1 
Consumer Staples 
(30) 
30201030 Soft Drinks Specialized 1.0 1 
Consumer Staples 
(30) 
30202030 Packaged Foods and Meats Specialized 1.0 2 
Health Care (35) 35101010 Healthcare Equipment Specialized 1.0 5 
Health Care (35) 35101020 Healthcare Supplies Specialized 1.0 2 
Health Care (35) 35201010 Biotechnology Specialized 1.0 8 
Health Care (35) 35202010 Pharmaceuticals Specialized 1.0 4 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45201020 Communications Equipment Specialized 1.0 1 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45203010 
Electronic Equipment and 
Instruments 
Specialized 1.0 1 
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Appendix B-3 Industry Knowledge Transfer Costs Categorisation cont…. 
 
Group SIC Codes Industry Description GIC Sectors 
GICS Sub-
Industry 
Code 
GICS Sub-Industry 
Knowledge 
Specialisation 
KS 
Code 
No. of 
Companies 
8 
(4000-
4999) 
Transportation & Public Utilities 
This division includes establishments providing, to 
the general public or to other business enterprises, 
passenger and freight transportation, 
communications services, or electricity, gas, steam, 
water or sanitary services, and all establishments of 
the United States Postal Service. 
Energy (10) 10102040 
Oil and Gas Storage and 
Transportation 
Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20304010 Railroads Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20305010 Airport Services Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Industrials (20) 20305020 Highways and Railtracks Nonspecialised 0.0 3 
Industrials (20) 20305030 Marine Ports and Services Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Utilities (55) 55102010 Gas Utilities Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Utilities (55) 55103010 Multi-Utilities Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
9 
(5000-
5199) 
Wholesale Trade 
This division includes establishments or places of 
business primarily engaged in selling merchandise 
to retailers; to industrial, commercial, institutional, 
farm, construction contractors, or professional 
business users; or to other wholesalers; or acting as 
agents or brokers in buying merchandise for or 
selling merchandise to such persons or companies. 
Industrials (20) 20107010 
Trading Companies and 
Distributors 
Nonspecialised 0.0 5 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25501010 Distributors Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Consumer Staples 
(30) 
30101020 Food Distributors Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Health Care (35) 35102010 Healthcare Distributors Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
10 
(5200-
5999) 
Retail Trade 
This division includes establishments engaged in 
selling merchandise for personal or household 
consumption and rendering services incidental to 
the sale of the goods. In general, retail 
establishments are classified by kind of business 
according to the principal lines of commodities sold 
(groceries, hardware, etc.), or the usual trade 
designation (drug store, cigar store, etc.). 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25502020 Internet Retail Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25503010 Department Stores Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25504010 Apparel Retail Nonspecialised 0.0 2 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25504040 Specialty Stores Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25504050 Automotive Retail Nonspecialised 0.0 2 
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Appendix B-4 Industry Knowledge Transfer Costs Categorisation cont…. 
 
Group SIC Codes Industry Description GIC Sectors 
GICS Sub-
Industry 
Code 
GICS Sub-Industry 
Knowledge 
Specialisation 
KS 
Code 
No. of 
Companies 
11 
(6000-
6199) 
Finance 
This division includes establishments operating 
primarily in the fields of finance and includes 
depository institutions, non-depository credit 
institutions, holding (but not predominantly 
operating) companies, other investment companies, 
brokers and dealers in securities and commodity 
contracts, and security and commodity exchanges. 
Financials (40) 40101015 Regional Banks Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Financials (40) 40102010 Thrifts and Mortgage Finance Nonspecialised 0.0 3 
Financials (40) 40201020 
Other Diversified Financial 
Services 
Nonspecialised 0.0 2 
Financials (40) 40201030 Multi-sector Holdings Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Financials (40) 40203010 Consumer Finance Nonspecialised 0.0 3 
12 
(6200-
6299) 
Security & Commodity Brokers 
This major group includes establishments engaged 
in the underwriting, purchase, sale, or brokerage of 
securities and other financial contracts on their own 
account or for the account of others; and 
exchanges, exchange clearinghouses, and other 
services allied with the exchange of securities and 
commodities. 
Financials (40) 40201040 Specialized Finance Mixed 0.5 2 
Financials (40) 40203010 
Asset Management and Custody 
Banks 
Mixed 0.5 13 
Financials (40) 40203030 Diversified Capital Markets Mixed 0.5 1 
Financials (40) 40402010 Diversified REITs Mixed 0.5 5 
Financials (40) 40402020 Industrial REITs Mixed 0.5 1 
Financials (40) 40402040 Office REITs Mixed 0.5 1 
Financials (40) 40402050 Residential REITs Mixed 0.5 1 
Financials (40) 40402060 Retail REITs Mixed 0.5 1 
Utilities (55) 55105010 
Independent Power Producers and 
Energy Traders 
Mixed 0.5 1 
13 
(6300-
6999) 
Insurance & Real Estate 
This division includes establishments operating 
primarily in the fields of Insurance and real estate. 
Insurance covers carriers of all types of insurance, 
and insurance agents and brokers. Real estate 
includes owners, lessors, lessees, buyers, sellers, 
agents, and developers of real estate. 
Financials (40) 40301020 Life and Health Insurance Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Financials (40) 40301040 Property and Casualty Insurance Nonspecialised 0.0 1 
Financials (40) 40403030 Real Estate Development Nonspecialised 0.0 2 
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Appendix B-5 Industry Knowledge Transfer Costs Categorisation cont…. 
Group 
SIC 
Codes 
Industry Description GIC Sectors 
GICS 
Sub-
Industry 
Code 
GICS Sub-Industry 
Knowledge 
Specialisation 
KS 
Code 
No. of 
Companies 
14 
(7000-
8999) 
Services 
This division includes establishments primarily 
engaged in providing a wide variety of services for 
individuals, business and government 
establishments, and other organizations. Hotels and 
other lodging places; establishments providing 
personal, business, repair, and amusement services; 
health, legal, engineering, and other professional 
services; educational institutions; membership 
organizations, and other miscellaneous services, are 
included. 
Industrials (20) 20201010 Commercial Printing Mixed 0.5 1 
Industrials (20) 20201050 
Environmental and Facilities 
Services 
Mixed 0.5 4 
Industrials (20) 20201070 Diversified Support Services Mixed 0.5 4 
Industrials (20) 20202010 
Human Resource and Employment 
Services 
Mixed 0.5 1 
Industrials (20) 20202020 Research and Consulting Services Mixed 0.5 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25301010 Casinos and Gaming Mixed 0.5 2 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25301020 Hotels, Resorts and Cruise Lines Mixed 0.5 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25302010 Education Services Mixed 0.5 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25401020 Broadcasting Mixed 0.5 3 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25401025 Cable and Satellite Mixed 0.5 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25401030 Movies and Entertainment Mixed 0.5 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary (25) 
25401040 Publishing Mixed 0.5 2 
Health Care (35) 35102020 Healthcare Facilities Mixed 0.5 2 
Health Care (35) 35203010 Life Sciences Tools and Services Mixed 0.5 1 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45101010 Internet Software and Services Mixed 0.5 4 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45102010 IT Consulting and Other Services Mixed 0.5 4 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45102020 
Data Processing and Outsourced 
Services 
Mixed 0.5 1 
Information 
Technology(45) 
45103010 Application Software Mixed 0.5 8 
Telecom Services 
(50) 
50101010 Alternative Carriers Mixed 0.5 2 
Telecom Services 
(50) 
50101020 
Integrated Telecommunication 
Services 
Mixed 0.5 1 
 
 184 
 
Appendix C-1 Bivariate correlation matrix for unrestricted model independent variables (n=271) 
 
Skills& 
Training 
Contract 
Incentives 
Staff 
Turnover 
Research 
and 
Developme
nt 
Dynamism 
Volume/ 
Demand 
Technolog
y 
Modificatio
ns 
Competitio
n 
Subsidiarie
s 
Overseas 
Revenues 
Restructure 
Performance 
Evaluation 
New 
Manageme
nt 
Frequency Industry Proprietary Big4 
Capital 
Intensity 
Growth 
Financial 
Distress 
Contract 
Incentives 
.23** 
                    
Staff Turnover 
.20** -.04 
                   
Research and Development 
-.04 -.04 -.09 
                  
Dynamism 
.02 .11 -.19** .01 
                 
Volume/demand 
-.06 -.04 -.07 .11 .12* 
                
Technology 
.19** .10 -.04 .10 .38** .03 
               
Modifications 
.29** .10 .00 .03 .09 .01 .12 
              
Competition 
.09 .06   .05 .12* -.08 -.08 .00 .01 
             
Subsidiaries 
.09 .18** .10 -.07 .02 -.22** .05 .06 .10 
            
Overseas Revenues 
.03 -.05 .00 .07 -.09 -.06 -.05 -.08 .17** .18** 
           
Restructure 
-.12 .03 .01 .02 .10 -.17 .11 -.04 .04 .07 .11 
          
Performance Evaluation 
.33** .12 .02 -.01 .12 .08 .11 .14 .02 .00 -.10 -.04 
         
New Management 
.05 -.05 .02 -.05 .02 -.05 .06 -.02 -.08 .01 -.01 .12 .04 
        
Frequency 
.07 .22** .06 -.07 .01 -.22 .02 .05 .27** .59** .19** .25** .03 -.05 
       
Industry 
-.06 -.10 -.08 .11 -.03 .33** -.17** -.09 .03 -.12 .13 -.08 .03 -.04 -.11 
      
Proprietary 
.03 .12 .01 .00 -.02 -.08 .10 .01 -.02 .05 -.01 .00 -.03 .11 .08 -.08 
     
Big4 
-.06 .11 .05 .05 -.05 -.14* -.03 .08 .11 .23** .08 .13* -.02 .01 .25** -.15* .05 
    
Capital Intensity 
-.08 -.08 -.14* .33** -.03 .25** -.03 -.05 .05 -.06 -.05 -.08 .11 .04 -.09 .17** .02 .00 
   
Growth 
.07 .05 .02 .00 .09 .13* .00 .00 .01 -.03 -.03 .04 .02 -.03 -.06 .07 .10 .03 .13* 
  
Financial Distress 
-.13* -.17** -.11 .13* -.01 .40** -.03 -.11 -.10 -.19** -.05 -.13* -.09 .05 -.25** .35* -.12 -.16 .13* -.05 
 
Leverage 
.00 -.01 -.02 -.12* -.04 -.30** .05 .06 -.01 .18** -.01 .14* -.04 .08 .19** -.37** .04 .05 -.16** -.15* -.20** 
Note * and ** , correlation statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed) 
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Appendix C-1 Bivariate correlation matrix for unrestricted model independent variables (n=125) 
 
Training 
Externals 
Contract 
Duration 
Skills & 
Training 
Contract 
Incentives 
Staff 
Turnover 
Research 
and 
Developmen
t 
Dynamism 
Volume/De
mand 
Technology 
Modification
s 
Competition Subsidiaries 
Overseas 
Revenues 
Restructure 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Performance 
Quality 
New 
Management 
Frequency Industry Proprietary Big4 
Capital 
Intensity 
Growth 
Financial 
Distress 
Contract Duration 
 
.03 
                    
   
Skills & Training .48** -.03 
                   
   
Contract Incentives .13 .22** .16 
                  
   
Staff Turnover .12 .19* .19 -.07 
                 
   
Research and 
Development 
-.04 -.09 -.11 -.10 -.10 
                
   
Dynamism -.06 .03 -.01 .13 -.15 .09 
               
   
Volume/Demand -.01 -.18* -.19* -.15 -.25** .21* .17 
              
   
Technology .11 .00 .17 .10 -.08 .03 .26** -.03 
             
   
Modifications .08 -.25** .22** -.02 -.06 .04 -.08 -.08 .04 
            
   
Competition .04 -.05 .07 .00 .03 .02 -.08 -.11 .02 -.06 
           
   
Subsidiaries -.04 .19* .06 .16 .07 -.03 .06 -.28 .11 .03 .09 
          
   
Overseas Revenues .17* -.04 .03 -.01 -.13 .27** -.05 -.02 -.01 -.02 .20* .22* 
         
   
Restructure -.07 .10 -.17 .05 .03 .25 .12 -.17 .13 .04 -.06 .09 .14 
        
   
Performance Evaluation .17* -.02 .36** .10 -.04 .10 .19* .09 .12 -.01 -.01 -.09 -.04 -.04 
       
   
Performance Quality .09 -.13 .08 -.07 .09 .06 -.05 .08 .10 .21* .05 -.04 .08 .02 .21* 
      
   
New Management .02 .15 .04 -.04 -.02 -.04 .04 -.09 .07 -.07 -.05 .01 -.11 .26 .07 -.07 
     
   
Frequency .03 .17 .01 .17 .03 -.04 .02 -.31** .04 .00 .24** .77** .20* .21* -.05 .03 -.03 
    
   
Industry -.07 -.07 -.02 -.14 -.16 .07 .05 .44** -.03 -.02 -.14 -.16 .15 -.10 .11 .02 -.01 -.24** 
   
   
Proprietary -.09 .04 -.02 .10 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.09 .16 -.09 .01 .00 -.07 .04 -.01 -.14 .16 -.02 .02 
  
   
Big4 -.08 .09 -.18* .03 .01 .03 -.06 -.21* -.08 .10 .06 .22** .19 .19* -.12 -.03 -.02 .25** -.24** -.08 
 
   
Capital Intensity -.12 -.12 -.13 -.12 -.17 .07 -.04 .29** -.04 -.14 .01 -.07 -.02 -.09 .09 -.07 .00 -.11 .16 .05 -.05    
Growth .09 -.15 .01 -.02 .05 .28** -.04 .18 -.05 .06 .04 -.07 .09 .07 .03 -.05 -.19* -.08 .11 .11 .02 .14   
Financial Distress -.10 -.04 -.08 -.22** -.23** .08 -.01 .48** -.15 -.09 -.13 -.16 -.16 -.24** .00 -.17 .06 -.32** .44** .02 -.20* .20* .03  
Leverage .05 .13 .11 .02 .09 -.07 -.02 -.42** .00 .16 -.01 .24** .01 .12 -.12 -.04 .12 .30** -.46** -.01 .13 -.22* -.15 -.35** 
Note * and ** , correlation statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed) 
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Appendix D-1 Complete List of Variables in Alphabetical Order 
Dependent Variables: 
DV1 
the proportion of risk management services outsourced by category where 
0=0%; 1=1-10%; 2=11-25%; 3=26-49%; 4=50-74%; 5=74-90%; 6=90-
99%; 7=100% 
DV2 
a dichotomous variable for outsourcing of risk management services; 1 if 
any risk management services are outsourced, 0 otherwise. 
DV3 
an outsourcing variable for risk management services where 1 equals high 
with more than 25 per cent of risk management activities outsourced and 
0 equals low with 25 per cent or less outsourced. 
Independent Variables: 
Big4 
Big4 = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals external supplier of risk 
management services and/or external auditor is a Big4 accounting 
company, 0 otherwise. 
Capital Intensity 
Capital Intensity = the ratio of fixed assets to operating revenue, 
standardised and mean centred. 
Competition 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub sector 
calculated as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, rescaled, standardised and 
mean centred. A higher score indicates greater environmental uncertainty 
due to a more competitive environment. 
Contract Duration 
a categorical variable for the average length of contract with an external 
provider of risk management services, 1 equals less than 1 year, 2 equals 
1 to 3 years and 3 equals more than 3 years. 
Contract Incentives 
the use of contract incentives to promote staff retention in risk 
management activities from the standardised mean centred score for 
survey item 12. A higher score indicates greater asset specificity for risk 
management activities. 
Dynamism 
the perceived dynamism of the external environment facing the company 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 18. A higher 
score indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Financial Distress 
a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the company makes a loss in 
two of three previous years, 0 otherwise. 
Frequency 
the mean centred average of the standardised scores for the number of 
employees, total revenue and total assets. A higher score indicates more 
frequent risk transactions. 
Growth 
the percentage change in total assets over previous three years, 
standardised and mean centred. 
Industry 
control variable for industry knowledge transfer costs measured by a 
categorical variable where 0 equals low, 0.5 equals medium and 1equals 
high. A higher value indicates greater industry knowledge transfer costs. 
Leverage total liabilities divided by total assets, standardised and mean centred. 
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Appendix D-2 Complete List of Variables in Alphabetical Order cont. 
Independent Variables cont: 
Modifications 
the extent of modifications/adoptions required for risk management 
activities to suit different divisions/departments from the standardised 
mean centred score for survey item 17. A higher score indicates 
greater environmental uncertainty due to diversity. 
New Management 
equals 1 if the CEO changed in the period 2008-2009, 0 otherwise. A 
value of one indicates greater behavioural uncertainty for new 
management with regard to existing staff. 
Overseas Revenues 
the proportion of total revenue from overseas sales, standardised and 
mean centred. A higher proportion indicates greater environmental 
uncertainty. 
Performance 
Evaluation 
the degree of perceived difficulty in measuring performance of any 
existing or potential external consultants engaged for risk 
management activities from the standardised mean centred score for 
survey item 10. A higher score indicates greater behavioural 
uncertainty. 
Performance Quality 
the degree of difficulty in evaluating the quality of outsourced risk 
management activities from the standardised mean centred score for 
survey item 16. A higher score indicates greater behavioural 
uncertainty. 
Proprietary 
a categorical variable where 0 equals none, 1 equals less than 50 per 
cent and 2 equals more than 50 per cent from survey item 20. 
Research and 
Development 
expenditure on research and development as a proportion of operating 
revenues, standardised and mean centred. A higher proportion 
indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Research and 
Development Dummy 
equals 1 if high expenditure on research and development versus 0 if 
low expenditure on research and development. A value of 1 indicates 
higher asset specificity. 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Dynamism 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
dynamism 
Research and 
Development Dummy 
*Volume/Demand 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Volume/Demand 
Research and 
Development Dummy 
*Technology 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Technology 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Modifications 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Modifications 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy* 
*Competition 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Competition 
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Appendix D-3 Complete List of Variables in Alphabetical Order cont. 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Subsidiaries 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Subsidiaries 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Overseas 
Revenues 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Overseas Revenues 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Restructure 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and  
Restructure 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy* 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
Performance Evaluation 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy* New 
Management 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
New Management 
Research and 
Development 
Dummy*Frequency 
Multiplicative interaction variable for research and development and 
frequency 
Restructure 
Restructure = equals 1 if the company has had any restructures, 
acquisitions or mergers in the past 3 years and 0 otherwise. A value of 
one indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Skills and Training 
the depth of company specific skills, knowledge and training required 
computed from the standardised mean centred score for four survey 
items 7,8,9 and 11. A higher score indicates greater asset specificity for 
risk management activities. 
Staff Turnover 
staff turnover in risk management relative to other service functions 
from the standardised mean centred score for survey item 15. A higher 
score indicates greater asset specificity for risk management activities. 
Subsidiaries 
the number of subsidiaries, standardised and mean centred. A higher 
number indicates greater environmental uncertainty. 
Technology 
the rate of technological change in a company‟s industry from the 
standardised mean centred score for survey item 19. A higher score 
indicates a higher rate of technological change. 
Training Externals 
equals 1 if training provided to external suppliers of risk management 
activities, 0 otherwise. 
Volume/Demand 
variance (standard deviation) in sales over the past three years, 
standardised and mean centred. A higher variance indicates greater 
environmental uncertainty. 
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Appendix E-1 Regression Results for Interaction Effects 
Dependent Variable – Proportion of risk management services outsourced (n=271)  
Model 3   Coefficient t P VIF 
(Constant)   1.49 4.67 0.00   
Research and Development Dummy - -0.05 -0.27 0.79 1.47 
Dynamism - 0.16 1.13 0.26 2.19 
Volume/Demand - 0.65 2.36 0.02 2.71 
Technology - -0.21 -1.69 0.05 2.23 
Modifications + 0.20 1.81 0.04 1.93 
Competition + -0.92 -2.34 0.02 1.86 
Subsidiaries + 0.01 3.13 0.00 2.56 
Overseas Revenues + -0.48 -1.37 0.17 2.48 
Restructure + 0.43 1.35 0.09 2.08 
Performance Evaluation - -0.05 -0.56 0.57 2.08 
New Management + 0.50 1.19 0.23 1.98 
Frequency - -0.39 -1.83 0.04 5.90 
Industry - 0.39 1.60 0.11 1.62 
Proprietary - 0.28 1.94 0.05 1.14 
Big4 + 0.13 0.86 0.39 1.18 
Capital Intensity + -0.00 -0.48 0.63 1.20 
Growth (previous 3 years) + 0.03 0.40 0.69 1.13 
Financial Distress + -0.14 -0.80 0.43 1.50 
Leverage  -0.49 -2.11 0.04 1.35 
Research and Development Dummy* Dynamism - -0.48 -2.22 0.03 2.06 
Research and Development Dummy* 
Volume/Demand 
- 0.29 0.76 0.45 2.55 
Research and Development Dummy* Technology - 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.97 
Research and Development Dummy* 
Modifications 
- -0.25 -1.48 0.07 1.97 
Research and Development Dummy* 
Competition 
- -0.45 -0.70 0.49 1.90 
Research and Development Dummy* Subsidiaries - 0.00 -0.39 0.70 2.58 
Research and Development Dummy* Overseas 
Revenues 
- -0.21 -0.42 0.67 2.67 
Research and Development Dummy* Restructure - 0.41 0.82 0.41 2.35 
Research and Development Dummy* 
Performance Evaluation 
- 0.22 1.69 0.10 2.08 
Research and Development Dummy* New 
Management 
- 0.16 0.26 0.80 2.02 
Research and Development Dummy* Frequency - 0.13 0.49 0.62 5.57 
R squared = .25, adjusted R squared = .16, F=2.66, P=0.00 
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Appendix F-1 Summary of the results of hypothesis testing 
 
Hypothesis Operationalised Dimension Results 
H1: Companies with more transaction-
specific human assets outsource less 
risk management activities than those 
with less transaction-specific human 
assets. 
Company specific knowledge and 
training  
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125). 
Contract characteristics 
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125). 
Staff turnover 
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 Supported in subsample of outsourcing companies for decision to 
outsource high versus low (125). 
Expenditure on Research and 
Development  
 Supported in whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125). 
Training for external suppliers 
 No support - significant in non-predicted direction for subsample of 
outsourcing companies (125). 
Contract duration for external 
suppliers  
 No support - significant in non-predicted direction for subsample of 
outsourcing companies (125). 
H2a: A negative association exists 
between the choice to outsource risk 
management activities and 
volume/demand uncertainty and 
uncertainty due to technological 
factors. 
Volume/demand (environmental 
dynamism). 
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 Supported in subsample of outsourcing companies (125). 
Volume/demand uncertainty. 
 
 No support -significant in non-predicted direction in the whole sample 
(271). 
 No support – significant in non-predicted direction for subsample of 
outsourcing companies (125). 
Technological uncertainty 
 
 Supported in whole sample (271) significant results for proportion 
outsourced and marginally significant for decision to outsource. 
 Supported in sub-sample of outsourcing companies (125). 
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Appendix F-2 Summary of the results of hypothesis testing 
 
H2b: A positive association exists 
between the choice to outsource risk 
management activities and uncertainty 
arising from environmental diversity. 
Modifications 
 
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125). 
Competition 
 
 No support - significant in non-predicted direction in the whole sample 
(271) for proportion outsourced, no support for the decision to outsource. 
 No support – significant in non-predicted direction for subsample of 
outsourcing companies (125). 
Subsidiaries 
 
 Supported in whole sample (271). 
 Supported in sub-sample of outsourcing companies (125). 
Proportion of overseas revenue. 
 
 No support – significant in non-predicted direction in the whole sample 
(271) for proportion outsourced, no support for decision to outsource. 
 No support in subsample of outsourcing companies (125) – marginally 
significant in non-predicted direction. 
Restructure, acquisition or merger 
in last three years 
 Supported in whole sample (271) significant results for proportion 
outsourced and marginally significant for decision to outsource. 
 Supported in sub-sample of outsourcing companies (125). 
H3: An association exists between the 
choice to outsource risk management 
activities and behavioural uncertainty. 
Performance evaluation of 
external suppliers of risk 
management services  
 No support for whole sample (271)  
 No support for subsample (125). 
Quality evaluation of performance 
of external suppliers of risk 
management services 
 No support in subsample (125). 
New Management  
 Supported in whole sample (271). 
 No support in subsample (125). 
H4: Companies that undertake risk 
management activities frequently will 
conduct them in-house and conversely 
infrequent transactions are associated 
with outsourcing. 
Composite variable for company 
size 
 Supported in whole sample (271). 
 Supported in sub-sample of outsourcing companies (125). 
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Appendix F-3 Summary of the results for control variables 
 
Controls: 
A negative association exists between the 
choice to outsource risk management activities 
and the industry knowledge transfer costs  
Industry knowledge 
transfer costs 
 No support in whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125). 
 
A negative association exists between the 
choice to outsource risk management activities 
and exposure to commercial in 
confidence/proprietary information. 
Exposure to commercial 
in confidence/proprietary 
information 
 No support for whole sample (271). 
 No support for subsample (125) – marginally significant in non-predicted 
direction for high versus low outsourced. 
A positive association exists between the choice 
to outsource risk management activities and the 
reputation of the external supplier. 
Reputation of external 
supplier of risk 
management activities 
 Supported in whole sample (271) significant results for decision to 
outsource, not significant for proportion outsourced. 
 No support for subsample (125). 
 
A positive association exists between the choice 
to outsource risk management activities and 
increasing capital intensity. 
Capital intensity 
 Supported in whole sample (271) significant results for decision to 
outsource, not significant for proportion outsourced. 
 No support for subsample (125) - marginally significant in non-predicted 
direction for high versus low outsourced. 
A positive association exists between the choice 
to outsource risk management activities and 
short term growth. 
Growth (previous 3 
years) 
 No support for whole sample (271) 
 No support for subsample (125) 
A positive association exists between the choice 
to outsource risk management activities and 
financial distress. 
Financial Distress 
 No support - significant in non-predicted direction in the whole sample 
(271) for the decision to outsource, no support for proportion outsourced. 
 Supported in sub-sample of outsourcing companies (125) significant results 
for high versus low outsourced, not significant for proportion outsourced. 
A negative association exists between the 
choice to outsource risk management activities 
and exposure to commercial in 
confidence/proprietary information. 
Leverage 
 No support - significant in non-predicted direction in the whole sample 
(271). 
 No support for subsample (125) - marginally significant in non-predicted 
direction for high versus low outsourced. 
 
